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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the interaction between tax treaties and electronic commerce, 
and considers the effectiveness of tax treaties in dividing tax revenue between states 
in the electronic commerce context.1  The focus of this paper is upon two core tax 
treaty concepts which strongly impact upon the division of tax revenue and are 
central to the operation of tax treaties in the electronic commerce context,2 namely 
the permanent establishment concept and income characterisation or the distinction 
between business profits and royalties.3  The operation of these concepts in the 
electronic commerce context poses questions that go to the core structure and policy 
of tax treaties.   
 
Tax treaties are fiscal arrangements forged in another era and shaped by traditional 
business models.  They do not contemplate the special attributes of electronic 
commerce, and hence, their application to electronic commerce gives rise to 
intricate issues.  These issues can be dealt with in two ways.  The first involves 
treaty interpretation and the application of existing rules to electronic commerce.  
The second involves examination of treaty objectives and policy to determine 
whether tax treaties should be reformed to handle electronic commerce in a manner 
                                            
1 In this paper, the term “tax treaties” refers to conventions between sovereign states for the purpose 
of avoiding double taxation and eliminating tax avoidance.  Most such conventions are modeled 
after, or are similar in operation to, models published by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (“OECD’) or the United Nations.  The term “electronic commerce” 
refers to transactions facilitated through or by the use of the Internet or similar computer and 
telecommunications networks.   
2 In this paper, the term “electronic commerce context” refers to electronic commerce transactions 
where the seller and the purchaser are not residents of the same tax jurisdiction and the seller has no 
physical presence or agents in the tax jurisdiction of the purchaser in connection with the transaction.  
Although electronic commerce includes dealings in tangibles, the focus of this paper is on 
transactions in intangibles.  
3 In this paper, the term ‘business profits’ includes profits from independent personal services 
(reflecting the position adopted under the OECD Model Treaty).  It should be noted that electronic 
commerce may also involve the disposal of property (e.g. falling under the scope of Article 13(4) of 
the OECD Model Treaty and Article 13(6) of the UN Model Treaty), which are less common and are 
not dealt with specifically in this paper.   
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consistent with such policy and objectives.  Much has been said in recent times 
about interpretation and clarification and many hasty conclusions have been made 
after the recent collapse of Internet companies.  However, electronic commerce has 
just started to realize its potential, and tax treaty policy and objectives are issues 
that require deeper and further analysis.  This paper examines the interrelations 
between electronic commerce and tax treaties at those levels in order to determine 
whether reform is required, and if so, to develop and suggest viable reform concepts 
and measures.   
 
Electronic commerce also triggers core questions in non-treaty contexts, especially 
because of readily accessible structures involving the setting up of electronic 
commerce operations in tax havens, aimed at escaping taxation altogether or at least 
radically reducing the overall fiscal cost of such operations.  Whilst the context of 
this paper is treaty-related, much of the discussion below would be relevant in non-
treaty contexts, although the particular issues pertaining to the curbing of tax haven 
practices in the electronic commerce context are not specifically addressed.  In 
addition, this paper does not discuss the interaction of electronic commerce with 
indirect taxation, such as value-added-tax or goods and services tax.  Indirect taxes 
involves different policy and fiscal principles and thus cannot be adequately 
examined within the scope of this paper.  However, part of the reform proposals 
examined are based on recent studies conducted on the interaction of electronic 
commerce with value-added-tax.4       
 
                                            
4 Obviously, not all indirect tax-based solution (in particular, the reverse charge mechanism) would 
be necessarily adequate in a treaty context, where one of the contracting states may not impose such 
indirect taxes or where the degree of fiscal co-operation between the contracting states may not be 
sufficiently high. 
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Following this introduction, the structure of this paper is as follows.  The first part 
briefly discusses the concept of electronic commerce.  The second part examines 
the various doctrines and theories which define a state’s fiscal limits in the 
particular context of the fiscal assertion and resulting imposition of tax by the state 
on a non-resident that has no physical presence in the state.  The third part outlines 
the application of existing permanent establishment and income characterisation 
rules to electronic commerce.  The fourth part discusses the concept of permanent 
establishment: its history, objectives, rationales, and interaction with electronic 
commerce.  The fifth part discusses income characterisation and the distinction 
between business profits and royalties: their history, objectives, rationales, and 
interaction with electronic commerce.  The sixth part explores and recommends 
reform options.  The recommendation proposed is confined to electronic commerce 
and concerns a threefold reform: (a) the electronic commerce tax revenue is equally 
shared by the two states, (b) removal of the distinction between business profits and 
royalties, and (c) the introduction of a low withholding tax imposed on non-
residents electronic commerce vendors, which tax is collected by businesses 
(business-to-business transactions) and financial institutions (business-to-consumer 
transactions).  
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 2 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE – A BRIEF OUTLINE 
The growth of electronic commerce during the past ten years is attributable to the 
expansion of the Internet in terms of number of users, sophistication and 
capabilities.  The purpose of this part of the paper is to briefly outline the Internet as 
a concept and as the medium through or over which electronic commerce takes 
place.  This medium directly affects and shapes both the attributes of electronic 
commerce and the development of new business models relying on electronic 
commerce.   
 
The Internet is part of a global system of telecommunication networks, through 
which information, such as text, voice or images, can be transferred from point to 
point by various means of communications.  The Internet consists of the ‘logical’ 
connections among computers creating a virtual environment, often referred to as 
cyberspace, within which the flow of data is not defined by reference to physical or 
geographical parameters.  A website constitutes the most common form of presence 
in cyberspace, which form of presence is essentially a collection of electronic 
documentation and software.5   
 
The concept of an Internet is not new, and dates back to the late 1960s.6  Its recent 
rapid growth in the 1990s is attributable to low-cost computing power, improved 
software, enhanced accessibility and connectivity, and the development of the 
                                            
5 There is ample discussion about the technical and operational aspects Internet, and it is not the 
purpose here to repeat or elaborate further on this issue - see e.g. Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein 
and Li (2001), pp. 10-11; Hardesty (2000), para 2.02; Thorpe (1997), pp. 638-641; US Treasury 
(1996), para 2.4; Leiner et al, (2000); Ricci (1999), Part I Ch A; Sher (1999), pp. 421-422; IFA 
(2001), pp. 215-220 (Argentina National Report by Gutman Marcus G). 
6 Leiner et al, (2000), pp. 2-4. 
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‘World Wide Web’, which is a ‘user-friendly’ graphic format.7  Since its recent 
expansion in the 1990s, the Internet has substantially affected in many ways the 
conduct of commercial enterprises, formed the ground on which new industries 
emerge, and brought about considerable social, political, and economic changes.8  
The potential and novelty associated with the Internet and electronic commerce 
fueled in the late 1990s unrealistic expectations which resulted in a gold rush of 
high hype and share prices.  The resulting dot.com shakeout – the collapse of 
Internet-based businesses and share values - clarified the relationships between 
expectations, abilities and demand.  Yet it would be injudicious to conclude that 
electronic commerce has run its course or that its commercial potential has been 
exhausted.  As stated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, matters should be 
viewed in perspective: 
 
“If we consider the history of other technological revolutions, none of this should 
be a surprise.  Of nearly 1,000 U.S. companies that tried to build and sell gas-
powered automobiles before 1927, only 200 survived long enough to bring a 
commercially suitable vehicle to the market.  Of these, fewer than a handful operate 
today, but they account for a substantial share of a much larger economy.  The 
lesson is that technological revolutions take time, and the digital technology 
revolution has barely begun.”9
 
Central to the growth and potential growth of electronic commerce are a number of 
attributes that distinguish electronic commerce from traditional commerce.  These 
                                            
7 Smith (2002), part II, chapter A.   
8 See discussion in e.g. Clinton and Gore (1997), Introduction Section; Smith (2002), Part II; Hudson 
(1997); Segaller (1998); Hauben and Hauben (1997); OECD Round Table Discussion, pp. 8-9’ 
McLure (1997), pp. 285-291; US Treasury (1996), para 3.2; Australian Taxation Office (1999), pars 
5.4.1-5.4.58.7-20; Johnston (2001); US Department of Commerce (2002); Hawkins and Verhoest 
(2002). 
9 U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 21 (footnote omitted). 
 5
attributes have been the subject of ample discussion,10 and may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
Intelligent and capable presence in cyberspace - Access to foreign markets 
without establishing a physical presence was traditionally based on remote 
sales through physical publications such as newspapers, magazines and 
catalogues, and through telecommunications facilities such as the telephone, 
radio and television.  The difference between such traditional methods 
(leaving aside the telephone) and the Internet is that the former are one-way 
and passive, whereas the later is two-way and interactive.  A website, for 
example, may be constantly updated, adapt itself to user’s needs and tastes, 
provide instant access to other websites, visually link in real time a 
salesperson and a prospective buyer, place ‘cookies’ on user’s computer 
enabling future customized access and record shopping habits and patterns, 
provide access to large databases that could not fit into a physical catalogue 
or a showroom, store or link to almost any number of electronic products, 
make and receive payments, and importantly, conclude transactions.11  Thus, 
an interactive and sophisticated website can perform a broad range 
activities, which may far exceed the capabilities of traditional methods.   
 
Intangibility - An enterprise that carries on a business through a website in a 
foreign state carries on a business nowhere and everywhere in that state: 
                                            
10 See e.g. sources referred to in footnotes 11-21 below. 
11 See e.g. Avi-Yonah (1997), p. 510; Sher (1999), p. 424; Tadmore (2001), p. 1828; McLure pp. 
288-291. 
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nowhere physically in the state, but from every point of Internet access in 
that state.12   
 
Irrelevance of geographic boundaries - Intangibility, and the resulting 
ability of enterprises to appear on the Internet in various places in the world, 
renders geographic boundaries irrelevant.  In Dow Jones & Co. Inc, v 
Gutinck, a decision of the Australian High Court, Gaurdon J stated: 
 
“It is ubiquitous, borderless, global and ambient in its nature.  Hence the 
term ‘cyberspace’.  This is a word that recognises that the interrelationships 
created by the Internet exist outside conventional geographic boundaries 
and comprise a single interconnected body of data, potentially amounting 
to a single body of knowledge”.13
 
Digitization - Digitization is the basis of cyberspace.  It refers to the ability 
to communicate and to deliver goods, services, software and other things by 
converting information into a sequence of number, which can be efficiently, 
rapidly and effectively transferred over the Internet, and then stored, copied 
or otherwise processed by computers.14   
Low costs - Presence in cyberspace is relatively inexpensive.   The cost of a 
sophisticated website could be substantial, but lower than establishing 
                                            
12 See e.g. discussion in US Treasury (1996), para 7.2.3.1; OECD Round Table Discussion, p. 6; 
Cockfield (2002), p. 338; Li (1999) pp. 1414-1415. 
13 Gaurdon J, Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] (10 December 2002), para 80. (Footnotes 
omitted).   
14 See e.g. Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 11-16; McLure (1997), pp. 286-
287. 
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physical presence or agency relationships in countless markets which would 
otherwise remain inaccessible.15   
Accessibility - Access to an enterprise’s website only requires connection to 
a telecommunications system and use of basic hardware.  The ability to 
access the Internet is not shared by many communities in developing states, 
but overall, the Internet is becoming increasingly accessible.16
Anonymity - Enterprises, and especially consumers, can maintain anonymity 
in cyberspace.17  Anonymity may facilitate transactions that may not take 
place otherwise.  It may also contribute to the growth of industries which 
may be considered as illegal or socially unacceptable.    
Improved communication - The Internet has made communication cheaper, 
easier, faster and more efficient, and in many instances, simply possible.  
This, by itself, has given rise to new business models as it enables 
cooperation among persons and interests that would not be otherwise 
feasible.18   
Disintermediation - Low costs, cyberspace presence and ‘clever’ websites 
enable enterprises to adopt business models that do not rely on physical 
intermediaries, but rather, focus on the direct provision of goods and 
services by the enterprise to the purchaser.19
                                            
15 See e.g. discussion in OECD Round Table Discussion, pp. 5-6; Owens (1997), Part II, Ch A. 
16 Cockfield (2002) pp. 337-338. 
17 See e.g. OECD Round Table Discussion, p. 6; US Treasury (1996), para 3.2.9. 
18 For example, the ability of consumers to group together and buy in large quantities thereby 
reducing prices. 
19 See e.g. Cockfield (2002), p. 338; Schmitz (2000); Avi-Yonah (1997), pp. 514-515; Owens 
(1997), Part II, Ch A; McLure (1997), p. 295. 
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Integration of business functions - It is now easier and cheaper, and in 
many instances possible, for an enterprise to organize inputs - such as 
services, information, rights or goods – from various suppliers and locations, 
and to package or bundle such inputs into new products and solutions that 
may be sold over the Internet in a way that could not have been managed by 
a traditional ‘physical’ business.20   
Integration with brick and mortar - Obviously, not every thing can be done 
or sold over the Internet.  The recent ‘dot.com shake-out’ reinforced the fact 
that physical presence and real face-to-face contact are still central to many, 
if not most, business activities.  Many traditional ‘physical’ businesses, 
therefore, have strengthened their operations by enhancing their electronic 
commerce capabilities, which supplement, rather than substitute, their 
physical operations.21
The unique attributes of electronic commerce and the Internet have formed the basis 
for the development of new business models selling a broad range of products, 
rights and services.22   The OECD Characterisation Report divided these business 
models into some 28 categories.23  The following models are common, and serve to 
illustrate the distinctive capabilities of electronic commerce: 
  
 
 
                                            
20 See e.g. Avi-Yonah (1997), pp. 507-508.  
21 See e.g. Advisory Commission (2000), p. 11. 
22 The most common example is perhaps the online book retailer www.amazon.com.  The range of 
products that can be purchased on the Internet is indeed broad – see e.g. www.dell.com (hardware), 
www.godiva.com (chocolates), www.walmart.com (department store), www.sony.com (electronics); 
www.wine.com (wines), www.levis.com (clothing), www.xtremepowersports.com (snowmobiles). 
www.ebay.com (auctions and almost everything). 
23 Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
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Electronic order processing of tangible goods - A customer selects an item 
from an online catalogue of tangible goods and orders the item 
electronically directly from a commercial provider.  The product is 
physically delivered to the customer by a common carrier.24   
Electronic ordering and downloading of digital goods - A customer selects 
an item from an online catalogue of intangible goods and orders the item 
electronically directly from a commercial provider.  The digital product is 
downloaded onto the customer’s hard disk or other non-temporary media.25   
 
Application service provider - A provider makes available to a customer 
access to a software application hosted on computer servers owned and 
operated by the provider.  The software automates a particular function for 
the customer.26   
Data warehousing - A customer stores its computer data on computer 
servers owned and operated by a provider.  The customer can access, 
upload, retrieve and manipulate data remotely.27   
Customer support over a computer network - A provider provides the 
customer with online technical support, including installation advice and 
trouble-shooting information. This support can take the form of online 
technical documentation, a trouble-shooting database, and communications 
with human technicians.28   
                                            
24 Category 1, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report.  As noted above, the focus of this paper is 
not on transaction involving tangibles. 
25 Category 2, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
26 Category 9, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
27 Category 13, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
28 Category 14, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
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Electronic access to professional advice - A consultant, engineer, doctor or 
other professional service provider advises customers through email, video 
conferencing, or other remote means of communication.29   
Access to interactive websites - A provider makes available to subscribers a 
website featuring digital content, including information, music, video, 
games, and activities (whether or not developed or owned by the provider).  
Subscribers pay a fixed periodic fee for access to the site.30
Sales referral program - An online provider pays a sales commission to an 
operator of a web site that refers sales leads to the provider.  When the link 
on the operator’s web page is used, the provider can identify the source of 
the sales lead and will pay the operator a percentage commission if the user 
buys the product.31
Streamed web-based broadcasting - A user accesses a content database of 
copyrighted audio and/or visual material.  The broadcaster receives 
subscription or advertising revenues.32   
The above examples of electronic commerce business models are not exhaustive, 
and are merely illustrations of basic and initial reactions of business thinking to the 
Internet and electronic commerce.  It is difficult to predict the medium-term future 
of electronic commerce.  Electronic commerce develops and evolves on a daily 
basis and is affected by market demand, innovation, improved technologies, 
availability of funds, and the increasing number of Internet users.  It is certainly 
possible that in just a few years’ time, the Internet and electronic commerce of the 
                                            
29 Category 18, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
30 Category 21, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
31 Category 24, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
32 Category 26, Annex 2, OECD Characterisation Report. 
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present time will be viewed as embryonic, if not ‘primitive’, versions of whatever 
will have been created and developed.  
 12
 3 JURISDICTION TO TAX NON-RESIDENTS AND 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE - THE CONCEPTUAL 
BASES 
3.1 Introduction  
Before exploring the interaction of electronic commerce with tax treaties in detail, it 
may be helpful to explore the core conceptual frameworks of tax jurisdiction and 
source taxation.  These concepts are independent of tax treaties, yet underpin treaty 
policy and elucidate the operation of tax treaties.  They are central to 
comprehending the relative strength of the fiscal assertions made by states and the 
relationships between tax jurisdictions and tax treaties.   
 
The principal conceptual bases and theories of international taxation dealing with 
the assertion of taxing rights by a state are the sovereignty doctrine, the 
benefit/entitlement doctrine, the faculty doctrine, the economic allegiance doctrine, 
and the realistic doctrine.  The discussion of these conceptual bases and theories 
focuses upon the jurisdiction to assert taxing rights over non-residents, and applies 
them in the electronic commerce context, where the non-resident is not present in 
the source state and has no physical presence there.33  It is concluded that all 
doctrines warrant the assertion of taxing rights in such circumstances.   
                                            
33 In this paper, “source state” is the state where the purchaser of goods, services, products or right, is 
located, and “residence state” is the state where the vendor of goods, services, products or rights 
resides for treaty purposes.  It is noted that these terms can at times be confusing in the lectronic 
commerce context, and thus their definition is important.  This is because residence rules will apply 
to more and more transactions as the relevance of source rules to electronic commerce continues to 
decrease.  As was noted in Forst (1997), p. 1472: “Even if source-based principles are applied, a 
preponderance of the income earned through electronic interaction still might be allocated to the 
country of residence.  To the extent that electronic commerce does away with human 
intervention…the country of source will more often coincide with the country of residence.” 
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 3.2 The Sovereignty Doctrine 
Sovereignty refers to the collection of rights and competences which go to make up 
the state.34  Jurisdiction is the right and competence of the state to affect the rights 
of persons through the exercise of judicial, legislative and administrative powers, 
which includes the power to make and enforce laws, including tax laws.35  
Jurisdiction is therefore “subsumed within, and has as its source, sovereignty”.36   
 
Since jurisdiction derives from sovereignty, jurisdiction can only extend as far as 
sovereignty exists.37  And since the power to make and enforce tax laws is a subset 
of jurisdiction, tax jurisdiction must also have limits:  
 
“if jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty, then it is necessary so that the limits 
of fiscal jurisdiction are similar to those national sovereignty.  Consequently, 
identifying the limits of sovereignty is tantamount to identifying the limits of every 
type of jurisdiction, including tax or fiscal jurisdiction.”38
 
The scope of the state’s fiscal jurisdiction would depend on the aspect of 
sovereignty concerned.  There are two aspects to sovereignty.  National sovereignty 
applies to citizens and residents of the state.  National sovereignty allows the state 
to apply its jurisdiction, including the imposition of taxes, on its citizens and 
residents wherever they might be.39  Territorial sovereignty, by contrast, is defined 
                                            
34 Jeffery (1999), p. 26.   
35 Martha 1989, pp. 13-14; Jeffery 1999, p. 26: Albrecht (1952), p.148. 
36 Jeffery (1999), p. 26. 
37 Jeffery 1999, p. 26; Martha (1989), pp. 13-14. 
38 Martha (1989), p. 32.  See also Albrecht (1952), p.152; Jeffery (1999), p. 43 
39 Albrecht (1952), pp. 158-159; Musgrave (2001), pp. 1336-1337. 
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by reference to the geographical boundaries of a state.40  This territorial sovereignty 
is the source of the state’s fiscal jurisdiction over non-residents.  As put by 
Albrecht: 
 
“The taxation of aliens must therefore depend upon the physical presence of the 
alien within the territory of the taxing state or upon the existence there of some 
property or interest belonging to him upon which the tax may be levied.”41   
 
The latter connecting factor of “some property or interest” in the state is of 
particular relevance to non-residents who have no presence in it.  This connecting 
factor can be interpreted in narrow or broad terms.  In narrow terms, it may be 
argued that this connecting factor is confined to an interest that is a legal interest, 
whether in something tangible or intangible, for example, proprietary or contractual 
interests.  In broad terms, by contrast, it may be contended that this connecting 
factor also applies to other types of interest, such as economic interest: the “state is 
sovereign over its territory and is therefore, as a matter of general international law, 
free to tax anyone and anything within its territory”.42   
 
It appears that the narrow construal of this connecting factor better accords with the 
theory underpinning the sovereignty doctrine.  Non-legal interests can be anything, 
meaning that in effect the state’s fiscal jurisdiction has no meaningful or otherwise 
definable limits.  This would fly in the face of the notion of jurisdiction, which must 
be confined by reference to sovereignty.  Therefore, as Mann argued, “a merely 
political, economic, commercial, or social interest does not in itself constitute a 
                                            
40 Jeffery (1999), p. 48.   
41 Albrecht (1952), pp. 152-152 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
42 Martha (1989), p. 103 (emphasis added). 
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sufficient connection”.43  Rather, things such as economic interest may merely be 
the products of presence or operation of legal interest.  The point was explained by 
Albrecht: 
 
“The two preceding sections have dealt with the jurisdiction to tax aliens based 
upon the physical presence of the alien or his property within the taxing state.  At 
least one of these two factors is essential to the jurisdiction to tax aliens.  Another 
category of jurisdictional questions arises, however, not conveniently classifiable as 
either of these two groups, which relate to taxation based upon the exercise of some 
form of economic activity within the jurisdiction of the taxing state.  This type of 
taxation finds its ultimate jurisdictional basis upon one or both of the grounds 
already mentioned, since the economic activity may be sufficient in the law of the 
taxing state to constitute a form of residence and it may in one way or another be 
conjoined with the possession or use of property…economic activity therefore does 
not constitute an independent basis for jurisdiction”.44
 
The narrow approach to territorial sovereignty does not exclude taxation of non-
present non-residents who have no physical interest in a state, as the assertion of tax 
can be based on a legal interest in the state.  In the electronic commerce context, 
there may a number of such interests that that can fiscally link the non-resident to 
the state.  For example, the contract under which the non-resident sells goods, 
services, information or rights could constitute such an interest.  In addition, the 
non-resident may have rights in a debt arising in consequence of the sale or in the 
enforcement of payment of the debt.   
 
                                            
43 Mann (1973), p. 39. 
44 Albrecht (1952), pp. 165-166. 
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However, such links can be severed.  Parties to a contract may decide where a 
contract is formed, which rules govern it, where disputes are to be determined, and 
where enforcement is to take place.  In addition, such links involve uncertainty.  
The location of intangible property and rights for tax purposes in international law 
is “a complicated and relatively unexplored problem”.45  Different factual settings 
and laws may produce conflicting results.  For instance, it has been argued that 
certain intangible property may exist in more than one place at the same time, that a 
debt interest may have no situs, that the situs of the debt follows the owner, and that 
the situs of the debt is where the debtor is or where it is recoverable.46   
 
However, the state can resolve some of these problems.  “[I]nternational law only 
fixes the outer limits of state action”,47 and therefore, the state, through its national 
laws, can determine questions of situs.  As was discussed by Christianson J of the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota in Conger v Packard:  
 
“These rules apply to all taxes imposed by a state upon property.  They apply to 
both tangible and intangible property.  There is no great difficulty in understanding 
the rules; the difficulty arises in applying them.  Obviously, it is more difficult to 
apply them in dealing with intangible than in dealing with tangible property. The 
actual physical situs of tangible property is readily ascertainable.  This is not so 
with intangible property…It has been the tendency of the modern decisions in 
dealing with intangible property to apply thereto the maxim, mobilia sequuntur 
personam (movables follow the person), and to hold that such property has its situs 
                                            
45 Albrecht (1952), p. 160.  See also the League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 20. 
46 Albrecht (1952), pp.162-164; Martha (1989), pp. 106-107.  See also discussion in Day (1922), pp. 
38-39. 
47 Jeffery (1991), p. 46. 
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and is taxable only at the domicile of the owner.  This maxim, however, is only a 
presumption… the state may refuse to recognize the maxim …”.48
 
In other words, a state can, under the sovereignty doctrine, significantly expand its 
fiscal jurisdiction through its national laws.  It can pass laws that deem legal 
interests to be located within its borders.  The state can, as a result, capture, within 
its tax jurisdiction, remote non-resident vendors by creating sufficient fiscal links 
with non-residents, including those that merely engage in transactions over the 
Internet with its residents. 
 
3.3 The Benefit/Entitlement doctrine 
The core principle of the benefit/entitlement doctrine is that the state has the right to 
tax those who derive income using the benefits it offers: 
 
“The right of a jurisdiction to tax all income arising within its geographical borders 
is recognised as a fundamental entitlement.  This permits a country to share in the 
gains of foreign-owned factors of production operating within its borders, gains 
which are generated in cooperation with its own factors, whether they be natural 
resources, an educated and/or low-cost work force, or the proximity of a market.  
The tax benefits so obtained may be thought of as a national return to the leasing of 
those complementary factors to non-resident investors or temporary workers.  
Second, such taxation may be thought of in benefit terms, as a quid pro quo 
payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services provided by the host 
country”.49
                                            
48 Christianson J, Langer v Packard 40 N.D. 182 (1918), pp. 197-198. 
49 Musgrave (1997), p. 449 (emphasis added).  This notion is centuries’ old - see early and detailed 
discussion in Seligman (1894), pp. 79-126.  It should be noted that a distinction may be made 
between ‘benefit’ and ‘entitlement’; the former concentrates on benefits arising from public goods 
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 The benefit/entitlement doctrine has significant drawbacks.  In principle, the state 
should distribute the overall tax burden in accordance with the distribution of 
governmental benefits.50  However, such a correlation does not necessarily exist, at 
least not in the context of income tax.51  It has been said that income taxes cannot be 
proportioned to benefits,52 and that there is “no satisfactory method of apportioning 
either the cost or the benefit”.53  For example, a tourist guide who shows overseas 
visitors through the state’s national parks, funded by the state, is relying on public 
goods to generate income far more than a person who operates from home, 
generating the same annual income from trading in foreign equities.  Yet both 
taxpayers may pay the same amount of tax.  Further, there may be no link between 
the level of benefits used and any payment of taxes.  For example, the recipients of 
social security benefits may pay little or no income tax.54  The doctrine is therefore 
flawed at its very core: 
“Under a strict regime of benefit taxation, each taxpayer would be taxed in line 
with his or her public services.  Since preferences differ, no general tax formula 
could be applied to all people”.55
                                                                                                                          
and services and the latter is more concerned with broader economic benefits (such as the economic 
environment for the production of income and the exploitation of a market in a state) – see e.g. 
Green (1993) p. 30; McLure (2000), p.4.  This principle has further variations - see e.g. Albrecht 
(1952), pp. 146-149, and Martha (1989), pp. 19-21 (contractual and ethical - or retribution - 
theories); Skaar (1991), p. 24 (equivalence, cost and benefit theories); Palmer (1989), pp. 31-33 
(national tax base theory).  In this paper, a unified approach of ‘benefit’ and ‘entitlement’ is adopted, 
focusing upon the core principle that a non-resident should pay something back to the state that 
enables the non-resident to generate income, whether by providing public goods and services or the 
market and demand for the things sold. 
50 Kaufman (1988), p. 157. 
51 There may well be a correlation between benefits and certain fees, levies and duties – see e.g. 
Seligman (1928), pp. 97-110. 
52 Seligman (1894), p. 9; Green (1993), pp. 29-30; Palmer (1989), pp. 25-26; Kaufman (1988), pp. 
183-184. 
53 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 18. 
54 See discussion in Seligman (1894), pp. 83-84; Palmer ((1989), p. 26; Fleming, Peroni and Shay 
(2001), pp. 333-334. 
55 Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), p. 220. 
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Notwithstanding these drawbacks and flaws, the benefit/entitlement doctrine offers 
strong justifications for the assertion of taxing rights over non-residents.56 Apart 
from the use of benefits, there are also issues of fairness, equity and revenue.  It 
would be unfair if a state had to bear the costs of providing benefits to an enterprise 
that is taxed exclusively by another state.  In addition, if non-residents were to 
exploit a state’s public goods and services without paying tax, the tax burden upon  
those who pay tax would have to be higher to cover the additional costs.57   
 
The doctrine may therefore be used to define the limits of a state’s tax jurisdiction 
over non-residents (as distinct from determining the actual tax amount that a 
taxpayer may be required to pay).  The question that arises here is what would 
constitute sufficient nexus to fiscally link the state with the non-resident.  
Traditionally, meaningful access to a market in a state required some degree of 
physical presence of a non-resident in the state, which in turn usually required use 
of at least some public goods and services.58  However, this does not entirely 
preclude claims based on the use of other benefits that are independent of physical 
presence.  The League of Nations 1923 Report stated that as far as consumption is 
concerned:  
 
“…there is room even for a consideration of the cost to the government in 
providing a proper environment which renders the consumption of wealth possible 
or agreeable”.59   
 
                                            
56 Graetz (2001), p. 298; Palmer (1989), pp. 27-29. 
57 Skaar (1991), p. 26; Palmer (1989), p. 32. 
58 See generally Skaar, (1991), pp. 111-152. 
59 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 18. 
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Similarly, Adams regarded a state’s market – the state’s capacity to consume – as a 
benefit that justifies source taxation: 
 
“A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the necessity of maintaining 
a suitable business environment…Business is responsible for much of the work 
which occupies the courts, the police, the fire department, the army, and the 
navy…The relationship between private business and the cost of government is a 
loose one, much like the relationship between the expenses of a railroad and the 
amount of traffic which it carries.  The connection, however, is real, and, in the 
long run, the more business the greater will be certain fundamental costs to 
government...business ought to be taxed because it costs money to maintain a 
market and those costs should in some way be distributed over all beneficiaries of 
that market.. a market is a valuable asset to the social group which maintains it and 
communities ought to charge for the use of community assets”.60   
 
And a market in a state may offer many benefits to an outsider without physical 
presence.  For example, White J, in his dissenting judgment in the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Quill Corp. v North Dakota said with respect to mail-orders:  
 
“These advantages include laws establishing sound local banking institutions to 
support credit transactions; courts to ensure collection of the purchase price from 
the seller's customers; means of waste disposal from garbage generated by mail-
order solicitations; and creation and enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
which protect buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they will have a 
ready means of protecting against fraud, and the latter by creating a climate of 
                                            
60 Adams (1917), p. 187. 
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consumer confidence that inures to the benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order 
transactions”.61
 
Benefits justifying taxation at source can therefore extend beyond national 
boundaries and physical presence.  This line of reasoning is especially compelling 
when applied to electronic commerce, where markets become more accessible and 
physical presence becomes less critical.  Furthermore, a state from which revenue is 
sourced may invest heavily in telecommunication infrastructure, which 
infrastructure renders electronic commerce possible.62  Most importantly perhaps, 
the source state provides protection of intellectual property rights.   This protection 
does not depend on whether the vendor has a physical presence in the source state, 
but is nonetheless vital to dealings in intangible products, services and rights.  It is 
the only legal process that protects the value of the supplies.  Without such process, 
the supplies may be copied, duplicated, reverse-engineered and manipulated  to the 
extent that no real value could be preserved, and thus, no profits could be secured 
by the unshielded non-resident vendor. 63   
 
Thus, the benefit/entitlement doctrine provides sound justifications for states to 
have extremely broad fiscal boundaries in circumstances enabling electronic 
commerce.  The doctrine validates the imposition of source taxation on non-
residents in the electronic commerce context.   
 
3.4 The Faculty Doctrine 
                                            
61 White J Quill Corp. v North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), 328 (discussed in relation to state 
taxes). 
62 UN EC Report (2001), p. 10. 
63 McLure (2000), p.6. 
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The faculty doctrine embraces the basic notion underlying the benefit/entitlement 
doctrine that the provision of benefits by a state costs money and that a state should 
recover the costs involved.  However, whereas the benefit/entitlement doctrine 
seeks to allocate or apportion tax amongst taxpayers by reference to the benefit they 
derive, under the faculty doctrine the cost of government is allocated among 
taxpayers on the basis of their ability to pay.64  The faculty doctrine does not seek to 
link benefits levels and tax liabilities, but rather, to link income levels and tax 
liabilities.  Smith, in his classic work on the wealth of nations, explained this 
interaction of the benefit and ability to pay principles as follows: 
 
“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, 
in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of 
the state.  The expense of government to the individual of a great nation is like the 
expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to 
contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate”.65
 
The faculty doctrine is predominantly concerned with the allocation of tax burdens 
and progressive taxation.66  It is not directly concerned with fiscal boundaries.  
                                            
64 See discussion on the faculty doctrine in e.g. Green (1993), p. 29; Adams (1917), pp. 189-192; 
League of Nations 1923 Report, pp. 18-20; Seligman (1894), pp. 127-150; Skaar (1991), p. 24; 
League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 18.  It was argued by some that the faculty doctrine does not 
involve a benefit analysis and has no relation to government benefit but to redistribution of wealth 
and welfare of society – see Kaufman (1988), pp. 158 and 197.  Yet, at p. 163, Kaufman herself 
notes: “in the wider context, benefit theory and ability-to-pay theory each determine an amount a 
government might fairly collect from the goods an individual might otherwise wish to consider his or 
her own”.  It is seems difficult to separate faculty from benefit as the former ultimately funds the 
latter (even if the measure of tax may be unrelated to such benefits). 
65 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 310 (Erwin Cannan 
ed., Methuen & Co 1925) (1776) as quoted and cited in Adams (1917), p. 190 and Kaufman (1988) 
p. 157. 
66 The faculty doctrine assumes that higher income indicates higher ability to pay.  It is therefore 
employed to promote progressive taxation, as ability to pay increases more than proportionally with 
income – see Pechman (1990), pp. 6-7 and detailed consideration in Seligman (1894), pp. 127-149. 
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From that point of view, it is a ‘provincial’ doctrine.  Under the faculty doctrine, the 
source of income of a resident is irrelevant since tax liability is assessed on the basis 
of total income from all sources, that is, on a worldwide basis.67  However, the 
doctrine cannot be applied to non-residents since the source state has no information 
by which it is able to determine the worldwide income of non-residents and their 
ability to pay.  And obviously, a state cannot legitimately tax a non-resident simply 
and solely because that non-resident is able to pay a certain amount of money to the 
state.68  A strict application of the faculty doctrine would not favor, therefore, 
taxation of non-residents.69  In practice, nevertheless, a state has more pressing 
needs, compromising the purity of the faculty doctrine.  A state may use ‘second-
best’ and limited measurements of the non-resident’s faculty, which would concern 
only local income, and impose tax on a net or gross basis accordingly.70  
 
Such compromised faculty principles may enable taxation of non-resident, but by 
themselves, they do not assist in defining fiscal limits.  Nevertheless, if one 
considers the core concepts of the faculty doctrine, one may determine the issue by 
reference to benefit/entitlement principles.  Since the faculty doctrine ultimately 
seeks to enables a state to raise revenue to fund benefits (which the non-resident 
uses to derive the income), the benefit/entitlement rationale should also mark the 
fiscal limits of a state under the faculty doctrine.71  Thus, under the faculty doctrine, 
a state’s fiscal limits should be identical to the broad fiscal limits defined by the 
benefit/entitlement doctrine, and would capture remote vendors who derive income 
from or in a state through websites and electronic commerce transactions.   
                                            
67 Green (1993), p. 29; Fleming, Peroni and Shay (2001), p. 311; Kaufman (1988), p. 155. 
68 Lokken (1981), p. 239. 
69 Green (1993) , p. 29;  Skaar (1991), p. 24; Palmer (1989), pp. 30-31; McLure (2000), p. 3. 
70 See in general discussion in Vann (1989), p. 4. 
71 See discussion in Lokken (1981), p. 239. 
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3.5 The Economic Allegiance Doctrine 
After the First World War, there was a growing concern that double taxation would 
harm the growth of international trade and commerce.  As a result, in 1921, the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations invited four leading economists - 
Professor Bruins from the Netherlands, Professor Einaudi from Italy, Professor 
Seligman from the United States and Sir Stamp from the United Kingdom - to 
prepare a report on double taxation.  One of the tasks assigned was to formulate, 
essentially for the first time, the “general principles as the basis for an international 
convention to remove the evils consequences of double taxation”.72   
 
The four economists alluded to the benefit/entitlement and the faculty doctrines, 
stating the latter is preferable “because it includes what there is of value in the 
benefit theory”.73  They then discussed the question of where one should be taxed 
on the basis of one’s ability to pay.  Yet the four economists did not focus upon the 
benefit rationale, but rather, on the concept of economic allegiance, a relatively new 
concept at the time,74 which was considered to be “the starting point of modern 
theory”.75  The essence of the concept was explained as follows: 
 
“A part of the total sum paid according to the ability of a person ought to reach the 
competing authorities according to his economic interest under each authority… 
The ideal solution is that the individual’s whole faculty should be taxed, but that it 
                                            
72 League of Nations 1923 Report, Introduction. 
73 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 18. 
74 The economic allegiance doctrine was developed by the German economist Georg von Schanz in 
1892 – see Mann (1973), pp. 95-96; Sassiville, p. 2. 
75 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 20. 
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should be taxed only once, and that liability should be divided among the tax 
districts according to his relative interests in each”.76
 
The four economists discussed four possible factors which could link a person to a 
tax jurisdiction: (a) political allegiance, or citizenship: (b) temporary residence: (c) 
permanent residence, or domicile; and (d) location of wealth.   
 
Political allegiance was not considered to be an appropriate fiscal nexus because 
people are mobile; political ties with “the mother-country may often be merely 
nominal”.77  Likewise, temporary residence was rejected since the relations between 
a temporary resident and the local government “are too slight”.78  Permanent 
residence was regarded as an appropriate fiscal nexus on benefit grounds: “Those 
who are permanently or habitually resident in a place ought undoubtedly to 
contribute to its expenses”.79  The four economists considered that the location of 
wealth, that is, the location of property and situs of income (which may not be the 
same place) was also an important consideration to be taken into account.80  These 
connecting factors (permanent residence and location of wealth) are the basis upon 
which the economic allegiance of a person vis-à-vis a state is to be determined.  The 
respective fiscal assertions of the states would depend on the strength of these 
connecting factors in the particular factual context concerned.   
 
The economists then contented that the permanent residence and location of wealth 
factors require the examination of three considerations.  Firstly, the production or 
                                            
76 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 20. 
77 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 19. 
78 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 19. 
79 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 19. 
80 League of Nations 1923 Report, pp. 19-20. 
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acquisition of wealth, which alludes to “all the stages which are involved up to the 
point of the wealth coming to fruition”.81  This corresponds to the origin of the 
wealth, i.e., “the place where the wealth is produced, that is, to the community the 
economic life of which makes possible the yield or the acquisition of the wealth”.82  
Secondly, the disposition of wealth, which corresponds to the principle of 
permanent residence, and alludes to “the stage where the wealth has reached its 
final owner, who is entitled to use it in whatever way he chooses”.83  The third 
consideration concerns the possession of wealth, which refers to the location of the 
wealth and enforceability of legal rights to the wealth.84  The four economists 
extracted from these three considerations four questions by reference to which 
economic allegiance is to be determined: 
 
“(1) Where is the yield physically or economically produced? 
(2) Where are the final results of the process as a complete production of 
wealth actually to be found? 
(3) Where can the rights to the handing-over of these results be enforced? 
(4) Where is the wealth spent or consumed or otherwise disposed of?”85
 
In its purest form, the economic allegiance doctrine would allocate tax revenue to 
each state that rightfully claims economic allegiance with a person in accordance 
with these four questions.  Nevertheless, the impossibility of applying the pure 
economic theory in practice meant that economic allegiance should be determined 
                                            
81 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
82 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
83 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
84 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
85 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 25. 
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by reference to the first and the fourth questions; leaving aside the second and third 
questions:86
 
“…income is such a composite product and such a complex conception that even 
theoretically it is not easy to assign in a quantitative sense proportions of allegiance 
of the different countries interested”.87   
 
Another reason why it was appropriate to consider only the first and fourth question 
was that the economists were contemplating bilateral, rather than multinational, 
solutions to double taxation.  Seligman subsequently noted that it made more sense 
to concentrate on two, rather than four, concepts:  
 
“… insomuch as the four preceding considerations may be deemed to refer to sets 
of two countries at the time, we must select the two major considerations and then 
attempt to ascertain how each of these is influenced by the lesser considerations.  It 
is obvious that from this point of view the most important factors in the situation 
are the acquisition or origin of the wealth an, and the residence or the domicile of 
the owner who consumes the wealth”.88
 
The League of Nations 1923 Report, the economic allegiance doctrine and the 
twofold focus on residency and origin (or source), have strongly influenced 
international tax thinking and principles.89  However, the doctrine has weaknesses.  
Relevantly, the economic allegiance doctrine does not clearly mark fiscal limits, or 
                                            
86 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 25. 
87 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 27. 
88 Seligman (1928), pp. 122-123. 
89 See e.g. Avi-Yonah (1996), pp. 1305-1311; Forst (197), p. 1460. 
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the extent to which a state can assert taxing rights over non-residents.90  Whilst the 
concept of permanent residence is well accepted and broadly understood, the 
attempt to define fiscal boundaries by reference to concepts such as origin and 
economic interest can produce a too high degree of flexibility and uncertainty.  This 
leaves considerable room for subjective or biased fiscal assertions, as pointed out by 
Adams:  
 
“As a theoretical guide through the tax maze which we are discussing, economic 
authorities whom both the business and the scientific worlds properly respect, have 
sponsored a theory of ‘economic allegiance.’  I find this theory, I regret to say, little 
more than a generalized label covering a number of separate judgments which the 
authors of the theory have reached about the expedient place to tax certain persons 
or transactions, conclusions based upon diverse considerations which unfortunately 
vary with the business habits and stage of development of the various countries of 
the world.  With most of the judgments under this theory I happen to agree.  But 
their justifications are practical not "scientific," and "economic allegiance" is 
distinctly different in different states.  The theory leads many of its advocates to 
endorse exaggerated claims concerning the rights of the jurisdiction of domicile”.91   
 
The last point made by Adams goes to the heart of the interaction between the 
economic allegiance doctrine and electronic commerce.  Under the economic 
allegiance doctrine, physical presence is not a prerequisite for economic allegiance 
to exist.  As mentioned above, production of wealth focuses upon “the community 
                                            
90 See further criticism of the economic allegiance doctrine in e.g. Palmer (1989), pp. 30-31 (arguing 
that its main drawback is its reliance on the faculty doctrine); Albrecht (1952), p. 149 (arguing that it 
does not add much to existing theories).  
91 Adams Thomas S, Interstate and International Double Taxation, in Lectures on Taxation, 101 
(Roswell, Magill ed., 1932), p. 126, as quoted by Graetz and O’Hear (1997), p. 1092. 
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the economic life of which makes possible the yield”.92  This broad focus embraces 
“all the stages up to the point when the physical production has reached a complete 
economic destination and can be acquired for wealth”.93  On this basis, the place of 
demand and consumption - the market - can an essential part of wealth production, 
and thus give rise to economic allegiance even if there is no physical presence.94  
Seligman in his subsequent reflection on the League of Nations 1923 Report, made 
similar observations: 
 
“Physically indeed the wealth is created or connected with some service or object, 
situated in a particular place.  Economically the case is not so simple.  The wealth 
may owe its inception not only to the particular object with which it is associated, 
but also to the activity of an individual who may reside elsewhere.  Moreover, if 
production in the wider sense includes transportation, the wealth cannot be said to 
be actually produced until it is brought to the consumer”.95
 
Thus, the economic allegiance doctrine defines fiscal limits over non-residents by 
reference to the concept of origin, which concept is applied on a broad and 
somewhat uncertain substantive-economic basis.  Consumption and demand can 
constitute places of origin.  In principle, therefore, under the economic allegiance 
doctrine, a state has no difficulty in imposing tax on a non-resident that deals with 
its residents over the Internet.  True, the non-resident may owe much stronger 
economic allegiance to the residence state, but this is a question of revenue 
allocation between two states that have valid fiscal assertions.  It does not negate 
                                            
92 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
93 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23. 
94 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23 (emphasis added). 
95 Seligman (1928), p. 111 (emphasis added). 
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the in-principle right of the source state to claim in the electronic commerce context 
fiscal jurisdiction on the basis of the economic allegiance doctrine. 
  
3.6 The Realistic Doctrine 
The sovereignty theory suggests that without jurisdiction there is no power to tax.  
The realistic theory suggests the opposite - without the power to tax there is no 
jurisdiction.  As “[no] rules of international law exist to limit the extent of any 
country’s tax jurisdiction”,96 a state’s tax jurisdiction is effectively defined by 
reference to its enforcement competence.  As contended by Qureshi: 
 
“In formulating the circumstances in which a state will tax when confronted with a 
foreign element that state is not concerned with the question whether or not it 
should exercise fiscal jurisdiction - it in fact assumes that.  Operating from this 
premise it is concerned with exercising its jurisdiction in an effective manner”. 97
 
The realistic doctrine rejects the notion that international norms, if any, concerning 
fiscal nexus can make inroads in the domestic fiscal domain the state.  Since fiscal 
jurisdiction primarily concerns wealth acquisition by the state, the reasonable nexus 
link “is not as much of an imperative”.98  The only relevant connection between the 
state and the non-resident is the ability to enforce, which is almost always intra-
territorial, even if the underlying assertion is extra-territorial.99   
 
                                            
96 Norr (1962), p.431. 
97 Qureshi (1987), p. 18.  See also Norr (1962), pp. 431-432; Palmer (1989), p. 4; Creuzzi (1979), p. 
45; Dale (1980), pp. 49-50.  See also Avery Jones et al (1998), stating that “[a] state decides on the 
extent to which under its internal laws it taxes the income of non-residents” (p. 222). 
98 Qureshi (1987), p. 18, who also argues (at pp. 16-17) that by enacting tax laws that apply to non-
residents that states notifies non-residents of their potential obligations and discharges the minimum 
required standard in favor of non-residents. 
99 Qureshi (1987), pp. 16-17. 
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The realistic doctrine has been subject to fierce criticism.  It was argued that the 
doctrine ignores the important distinction between jurisdiction and power.100  It was 
also stressed that the realistic doctrine runs contrary to international law, as it would 
justify taxes that are inconsistent with international norms.101  For example, the 
doctrine would warrant the imposition of worldwide taxation on non-residents 
merely because they happen to hold bank accounts or other assets in a state, or 
indeed, taxing anyone or anything that the state has power over, regardless of 
whether there is any reasonable nexus between the tax and the state.102  Moreover, it 
was maintained that the doctrine is capable of bringing about a “destructive 
influence…upon international trade and co-operation…and cause inter-state 
conflicts”.103   
 
However, there are stronger counter arguments.  The realistic doctrine does not 
ignore the distinction between jurisdiction and power - it equates them.  More 
importantly, it is true that the doctrine, if strictly applied, can give rise to unfair, 
draconian and ridiculous results.  But that can be also and equally said about all 
other fiscal doctrines, which, as shown above, are flexible enough to tax non-
residents in an extremely broad range of circumstances.   
 
Furthermore, the realistic doctrine, due to its very nature, connotes pragmatism, and 
may be best understood on that basis.  The world, according to the realistic doctrine 
“is not one of total chaos or the complete anti-thesis of reason, but rather a 
competitive environment where state astuteness is the order”.104  States do not 
                                            
100 Skaar (1991), p. 20. 
101 Jeffery (1999), p. 43. 
102 Skaar (1991), pp. 20-21. 
103 Skaar (1991), p. 21-22. 
104 Qureshi (1987), p. 18. 
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exercise tax jurisdiction in a vacuum, and the ability to enforce or collect does not 
necessarily entail assertion, enactment or enforcement.  States effectively must, and 
do, exercise self-restraint for a range of reasons, such as reciprocity and retaliation, 
encouragement of foreign investment, consumption by foreign visitors, fiscal 
competition, and broader economic and political objectives.105  As Norr observed: 
 
“The necessities of commercial and fiscal co-existence and a decent self-restraint, 
often grounded in considerations of administrative convenience, have led the 
nations of the world voluntarily to limit the scope of their tax jurisdiction”.106
 
This pragmatic behavior may best explain those international taxation norms 
alluded to by those who have criticized the realistic doctrine.  The realistic doctrine 
cogently and rationally fits into, and operates within, the broader and more 
sophisticated framework of national and international relations, and economic and 
political interests.  It is able to explain how and why states, motivated by self-
interest, can reach a fiscal equilibrium in the form of a tax treaty.  The doctrine does 
not rely on intriguing yet abstract concepts of location of intangibles, use of benefits 
or economic allegiance.  Other theories may have more economic depth, but the 
realistic doctrine may accurately explain the operation of fiscal systems around the 
world.  For example, Graetz, who had examined the tax policies of the United 
States in the past century, suggested: 
 
“All of the available evidence suggests that these policies were pursued because 
U.S. policymakers regarded it as in our nation’s best interests, not because they had 
                                            
105 Dale (1980), p. 50; Kaufman (1998), pp. 151-152.  In some instances, states promote broader 
economic interests by reducing taxes to a degree that can be unacceptable by other states See e.g. 
OECD Harmful Tax Report; Edwards and de Rugy (2002). 
106 Norr ((1962), p. 439. 
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accepted the enhancement of worldwide economic efficiency as the appropriate 
policy norm”.107   
 
And as Sasseville explained: 
 
“While there can be endless discussions about what should constitute a sufficient 
link between an enterprise and a country for that country to have a legitimate claim 
to tax the profits of that enterprise, the truth is that tax authorities are probably 
more concerned about enforcing and collecting taxes with a minimal disruption of 
economic activities, than they are about what constitutes sufficient ‘economic 
allegiance’”.108  
 
Given that states do not, in general, enforce each other’s fiscal assertions or 
judgments,109 under the realistic doctrine the taxation of non-residents (who have no 
physical presence or readily accessible assets in the taxing state) often relies on 
withholding tax.  Withholding tax has been regarded for centuries as an effective 
enforcement method that enables the state can pursue extra-territorial assertions by 
imposing intra-territorial measures: 
 
“The tax is trifling – in fact it is rather an exoneration than an imposition; three-
fourths of the duty formerly payable on teas exported to America is taken off; the 
place of collection is only shifted; instead of retention of a shilling from the draw-
back here; it is three-pence Custom paid in America’.  All this, Sir, is very true.  
But this is the very folly and mischief of the Act.  Incredible as it may seen, you 
                                            
107 Graetz (2001), p. 293.  
108 Sasseville (2000), p. 3. 
109 See discussion in Jeffery (1999), pp. 117-131; Johnson, Nirenstein and Wells (1980); Silver 
(1992); Brown (1989); Denham (1992); Dodge (2002). 
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know that you have deliberately thrown away a large duty which you held secure 
and quiet in your hands, for the vain hope of getting one three-fourths less, through 
every hazard, through certain litigation, and possibly through war”.110   
 
From an enforcement point of view, therefore, withholding taxes can effectively 
replace physical presence: 
 
“The physical presence of taxpayers within the boundaries of the taxing authority is 
seen as increasing the probability of full satisfaction of their tax obligations since it 
is much easier to audit their accounts and enforce tax deficiencies against them.  As 
the present time, however, this belief is of limited validity as the widespread use of 
withholding taxes imposed at the source on gross remittance, with liability imposed 
on the remitter for failure to withhold, has greatly diminished the importance of the 
taxpayer’s physical presence, especially where the withholding tax represents the 
sole or maximum tax imposed by the source country”.111   
 
The electronic commerce context, however, stretches the competence of 
withholding taxes to new limits, especially because collection may not be confined 
to commercial or sophisticated resident entities.  Enforcement will give rise to 
considerable challenge to the extent that the obligation to withhold is imposed upon 
private consumers who have little interest, incentive and often ability to comply 
with such an obligation.  Thus, the realistic doctrine supports source taxation of 
remote vendors selling things over the Internet, but this support is qualified, as it 
depends upon the actual ability of the state to realize its fiscal assertion using new 
measures of enforcement and collection.  This appears to be the main challenge 
                                            
110 Burke (1774), p. 106.  
111 Irish (1974), p. 296. 
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arising from the interaction between international taxation and the electronic 
commerce.112     
 
3.7 Conceptual Bases - Summary  
The examination of the conceptual bases indicates that all of them can explain and 
justify the imposition of tax on the remote non-resident vendor in the electronic 
commerce context.  The sovereignty doctrine allows it to the extent that the non-
resident has some legal interest or property in a state, which interest or property 
may be defined by local laws to be located within the state.   The benefit/entitlement 
doctrine justifies the taxation of a non-resident vendor on the basis that the vendor 
benefits from the existence of demand, consumption and market for goods and 
services sold.  In addition, the non-resident benefits from telecommunication 
infrastructure that makes the transaction possible, and in particular, intellectual 
property laws that preserve and protect the value of the supplies concerned.  The 
faculty doctrine also links a non-resident to a state on the basis of benefits used, and 
thus would result in the fiscal limits that define the tax jurisdiction of the state under 
the benefit/entitlement doctrine.  The economic allegiance doctrine, with its broad 
focus on origin and economic interest, would enable a state where the goods and 
service are purchased to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident vendor by virtue of 
the fact that wealth is fully or partially realized in it.  Lastly, the realistic doctrine 
defines fiscal limits by reference to enforcement competence, which would 
probably require strong emphasis on withholding tax, which may, however, be 
problematic in the absence of effective collection measures. 
 
                                            
112 The issue is discussed at some length below (Part 7.5).   
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These conclusion confirm and support the operation of source rules the world over.  
Physical nexus is by no means the only criterion to source taxation.  Source taxation 
is also imposed by reference to the location of the payer or a broader set of factors, 
such as whether the non-resident carries on a business in the state or whether the 
income is effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business within the 
state.113  One of the most obvious examples of a widely accepted international norm 
is the taxation of royalties and interest at source by many states and under many tax 
treaties. Source taxation of business profits without physical presence may be less 
common, but not unusual, as noted by Vogel: “Time and again states have claimed 
to tax income received from sales to their residents”.114   
 
                                            
113 The detailed examination of national source rules falls beyond the scope of this paper.  For a 
review of source rules in the context of electronic commerce refer to IFA (2001) (dealing with 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and 
Uruguay); Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 185-289 (dealing with United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, United Kingdom, Japan and selected European 
countries, China, India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico). 
114 Vogel (1988), p. 400.  The OECD Software Report noted at para 25 that 6 member countries tax 
payments for goods and services at source. 
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 4 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND TAX TREATIES – 
PRESENT POSITION CLARIFIED 
4.1 Background 
The interaction between electronic commerce and tax treaties has triggered two 
questions central to the present enquiry.  The first is whether a website can, without 
more, give rise to a permanent establishment, and thus enable a source state to tax 
the business profits attributable to the website.115  The second concerns the 
categorisation of payments arising under electronic commerce transactions, and 
more specifically, whether a particular payment is a royalty or business profit.  This 
part of the paper examines these questions under existing rules - which are 
ultimately questions of treaty interpretation, as distinct from treaty policy.    
4.2 Tax Treaties - Functions 
Double taxation may be shortly defined as: “the imposition of comparable taxes in 
two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and 
for identical periods”.116  Double taxation can occur where the tax jurisdiction over 
non-residents of the source state overlaps with the tax jurisdiction to tax residents of 
the residence state, or where both states assert jurisdiction on the same basis, due to 
different definitions of residency or source.117   
 
                                            
115 It should be noted that there has been ample discussion on whether servers and Internet service 
providers can give rise to a permanent establishment.  The focus of this paper is however on 
websites as this is the key issue in future tax policy in terms of both policy and revenue - See e.g. 
Sasseville (2000), pp. 9-10 and Ward (200), p. 8 suggesting that servers can be easily moved among 
states and thus questions of permanent establishment and servers are essentially about tax planning. 
116 OECD Commentary, Introduction, para 1.   
117 See e.g. Rigby (1991), pp. 305; Goldberg (1983), p.840; Martha (1989), pp. 141-179. 
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The chief objective of tax treaties is to prevent double taxation.118  The flip side of 
preventing over taxation is preventing under-taxation.  Double taxation and under 
taxation inflict a negative impact on cross-border commerce, as they create 
distortions and provides inefficient incentive to invest domestically or abroad (as 
the case may be).119  Thus, the chief objective of tax treaties is reflective of the 
underlying objective stated by the four economists: “the individual’s whole faculty 
should be taxed, but … it should be taxed only once”.120
 
 Since “[n]o rules of international law forbid international double taxation”,121 states 
may act unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally to prevent double taxation.   
Bilateral tax treaties seek to prevent or minimize double taxation by framing rules 
which define the states’ respective tax jurisdictions.  They deal with dual residency 
and dual sources by defining and allocating residence to one of the competing 
states,122 and by defining and prescribing source rules applicable to various income 
categories.123  Conflicts between source and residency jurisdictions are addressed 
under tax treaties by classification and assignment of income conferring full or 
partial taxing rights on one or another of the competing states.  The respective 
taxing rights of each state are delineated with respect to each income category.  The 
residence state prevents double taxation by either exempting income allocated to the 
source state or by crediting source state taxes against its own taxes.124  The source 
                                            
118 Para 3, OECD Commentary, Introduction; para 2, UN Model Treaty, Introduction. 
119 Avi-Yonah ((1997), p. 518. 
120 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 20. 
121 Norr (1962), p. 438. 
122 See e.g. Article 4, OECD Model Treaty, UN Model Treaty and US Model Treaty.  See also 
discussion on source in Avery Jones et al (1998).  This is an important advantage of tax treaties over 
unilateral measures, which typically do not resolve instances of dual claims as to residency or source 
– see Rigby (1991), p. 307; Dagan (2000), p. 983. 
123 See e.g. Article 11(5), OECD Model Treaty; Article 12(5), UN Model Treaty.   
124 See e.g. Articles 23A and 23B, OECD Model Treaty and UN Model Treaty; Article 23, US 
Model Treaty. 
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state, in turn, lowers its tax rates where source jurisdiction is retained, essentially in 
relation to dividends, interest and royalties.125   
  
The functions fulfilled by tax treaties are not confined to tax issues.  Tax treaties 
also serve a state’s broader economic, trade and investment objectives: 
“While the principal purpose of double tax agreements…is stated to be the relief of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, their underlying goal is the 
facilitation of international economic relations.  They are designed to balance 
economic efficiency in relation to trade and investment flows (eg. through 
reduction of source taxation) with a fair sharing of taxing rights between the two 
countries”.126
 
In addition, tax treaties fulfill political goals.  A broad tax treaty network can also 
constitute an important series of political statements, and at times, broader political 
objectives may supersede pure economic and fiscal considerations.127  The interplay 
of fiscal, economic and political objectives is best illustrated in tax treaties between 
developed and developing countries, where income and capital flows are unequal.  
The UN Model Treaty, although based on the OECD Model Treaty, reflects the 
interests of developing countries conferring broader taxing rights on the source 
state.128  The allocation of taxing rights - the basic quid pro quo - is therefore a 
                                            
125 See e.g. Articles 10(2) and 11(2), OECD Model Treaty; Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2), UN 
Model Treaty. 
126 Pickering (2001), p. 1. 
127 For example, during the mid-1970s period of ‘detente’, the United States entered into tax treaties 
with the Soviet Union, Romania and Poland despite limited and investment relationships between 
the United States and these countries – see Reese (1987), p. 380. 
128 See discussion in UN Commentary, paras 1-33; UN Guidelines (1974); Surrey (1978); Goldberg 
(1983), Reese (1987). 
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product of the states’ economic and political objectives, and of course, their relative 
bargaining positions.129   
 
4.3 OECD’s Electronic Commerce Project  
The OECD has embarked upon a comprehensive review and examination of various 
issues concerning the interaction between taxation and electronic commerce.130  The 
OECD’s work on taxation and electronic commerce is vital to further developments 
and agreements.  No other international organization appears capable of driving a 
process resulting in substantial international consensus.  In addition, the OECD’s 
work on tax treaties in general has been highly influential; tax treaties the world 
over are based on the work of the OECD.131  It is broadly accepted that the OECD’s 
views on treaty interpretation, as reflected in the OECD Commentary, are of 
considerable relevance to treaty interpretation.132  Furthermore, the OECD work on 
tax treaties in general is not confined to OECD members.  The UN Model Treaty 
and UN Commentary were influenced by the OECD work,133 and non-OECD states 
participate in treaty development or interpretation processes.134
                                            
129 See further discussion in Irish (1974). 
130 The OECD’s electronic commerce project also deals, for example, with attribution of profits to a 
permanent establishment involving electronic commerce transactions and the impact of the 
‘communication revolution’ on the ‘place of effective management’ as a tie breaker rule, and 
enforcement and collection issues.  For further details and developments of the OECD’s electronic 
commerce project refer to www.oecd.org. 
131 Which work is reflected in the OECD Model Treaty and previous OECD models - see Vann 
(1989), p. 2; Thorpe (1997), pp. 656-657.  The United States has drawn heavily on the work of the 
OECD in developing the US Model Treaty – see US Technical Explanation (Purpose of Model 
Convention and Technical Explanation). 
132 Jeffery (1999), p. 33; Skaar (1999), pp. 39-63; Australian Taxation Office, TR 2001/13, paras 
111; Avery Jones (1999), pp. 19-25; Thorpe (1997), pp. 656-657.   
133 UN Commentary, Introduction, para 9 and references to the OECD Commentary throughout the 
UN Commentary. 
134 See e.g. OECD Non-Members Positions Report. 
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In 1998 the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs submitted the OECD Ottawa 
Report, outlining broad taxation policy principles that should apply to electronic 
commerce:135
Neutrality - Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of 
electronic commerce and between conventional and electronic forms of 
commerce.  Business decisions should be motivated by economic rather than tax 
considerations.  Taxpayers in similar situations carrying out similar transactions 
should be subject to similar levels of taxation. 
 
Efficiency - Compliance costs for taxpayers and administrative costs for the tax 
authorities should be minimized as far as possible. 
 
Certainty and simplicity - The tax rules should be clear and simple to 
understand so that taxpayers can anticipate the tax consequences in advance of a 
transaction, including knowing when, where and how the tax is to be accounted. 
 
Effectiveness and fairness - Taxation should produce the right amount of tax at  
the right time.  The potential for tax evasion and avoidance should be minimized 
while keeping anti-avoidance measures proportionate to the risks involved 
 
Flexibility - The systems for the taxation should be flexible and dynamic to 
ensure that they keep pace with technological and commercial developments. 
 
                                            
135 OECD Ottawa Report, p. 4 (Box 2). 
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These principles are, by themselves, not controversial.136  However, their actual 
application often involves compromises, prioritization, and choice.  For this reason 
perhaps, the OECD Ottawa Report placed great importance on existing rules, 
stating that “[t]he taxation principles which guide governments in relation to 
conventional commerce should also guide them in relation to electronic 
commerce”.137
As part of its broader comprehensive electronic commerce and taxation project, the 
OECD sought to address the treaty interpretation issues on permanent establishment 
and income characterisation.138  The views developed and adopted by the OECD in 
relation to these issues were recently incorporated into the OECD Commentary, and 
are discussed below.   
4.4 The Permanent Establishment Rules Applied to Websites 
Under the OECD Model Treaty and the UN Model Treaty, a permanent 
establishment will exist if one of two tests is met: the general ‘fixed place of 
business’ test, or the ‘dependant agent’ test.139  Under the general test, a permanent 
establishment means a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.  The definition varies from treaty to treaty, 
and in general it contains specific inclusions, such as a place of management, a 
branch, and an office.  It also contains specific exclusions, such as the use of 
                                            
136 For further general discussion on these principles refer to e.g. Azzi (1993), pp. 547-555; NFTC 
(2001), Ch 2, Part A; Palmer (1989), pp. 42-46. 
137 OECD Ottawa Report, para 4. 
138 OECD WP1 (1999); OECD WP1 (2000) and OECD PE Report; OECD Characterisation Draft; 
OECD Characterisation Report.   
139 Article 5, OECD Model Treaty and UN Model Treaty.  The definition in Article 5 of the UN 
model is broader - see discussion on earlier models in Goldberg (1983), pp. 863-876; Surrey (1978), 
pp. 11-24.  For comprehensive technical discussion on the permanent establishment definition, 
inclusions, exclusions, examples and operation, refer to Skaar (1991) and Huston and Williams 
(1993). 
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facilities for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise; the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery, 
and the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying 
on any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character.140  Under the 
‘dependant agent’ test, a person, other than an agent of an independent status acting 
in the ordinary course of its business, constitutes a permanent establishment if that 
person is acting on behalf of the enterprise and has, and habitually exercises an 
authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, unless the activities of 
that person are limited to activities that are specifically excluded from the general 
permanent establishment definition.141   
 
The interaction of electronic commerce and the permanent establishment concept 
has triggered intensive discussion.142  The dependant agent requires the existence of 
a person, which a website simply cannot satisfy.  But the general permanent 
establishment definition gives rise to interesting interpretation questions.  The 
general permanent establishment definition focuses upon three conditions: (a) the 
existence of a ‘place of business’; (b) this place of business must be ’fixed’; and (c) 
the carrying on of the business of the enterprise through this fixed place of 
business.143  The ‘place of business’ condition gave rise the basic question of 
whether a non-physical place can be sufficient to constitute a permanent 
                                            
140 See Articles 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4), OECD Model Treaty. 
141 See Articles 7(5) and 7(6), OECD Model Treaty. 
142 See e.g. IFA (2001), pp. 25-26 (General Report by Sprague Gary D and Boyle Michael P) and pp. 
222-238 (Argentina National Report by Gutman Marcus Gabriel); Doernberg, Hinnekens, 
Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 204-223; Thorpe (1997), pp. 656-687 (national laws survey set out 
therein); Buchanan (2001), pp. 2135 – 2148 (the country-survey set out therein); Tadmore (2001) pp. 
1823-1827 (references to tax authorities and commentators set out therein).   
143 OECD Commentary, Article 5, para 2. 
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establishment.  The prevailing thinking was that a 'place of business' must be 
physical, but other views were also proposed:  
  
“An alternative view, however, is that the existence of a “place of business” should 
be determined having regard to the functions performed through that place.  A 
place of business should be regarded as existing at the place where business 
functions are carried out, irrespective of whether that “place” occupies physical 
space such as an office or factory, or electronic space, such as a website”.144  
The second condition requires that the place of business must be fixed.  The OECD 
Commentary states that in order to satisfy the second condition, “it must be 
established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence”.145  This 
condition gives rise to two requirements: fixedness and permanence.  These 
requirements seem associated with physical presence and thus may not apply to 
websites, as the Internet is not defined in geographic terms and websites have no 
permanence characteristics.  Again, however, alternative views were raised: 
“Although there are no hard and fast rules concerning the time that a place of 
business must exist before it will be regarded as “fixed”, it is generally accepted 
that, in most cases, the necessary degree of permanence will not be achieved if the 
place of business exists for less than six months.  Ordinarily, this time requirement 
would apply to each site.  However, in the electronic commerce environment, the 
ease with which websites can be moved suggests that the time requirement should 
apply to the economic presence rather than a particular location of a website”.146
                                            
144 Australian Taxation Office (1999), para 5.3.12. 
145 OECD Commentary, Article 5, para 2. 
146 Australian Taxation Office (1999), para 5.3.18. 
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After examining these issues, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs reached the 
conclusion that a website cannot, without more, give rise to a permanent 
establishment.147  This conclusion is now incorporated into the OECD Commentary 
on Article 5 of the OECD Model Treaty, which states that the general permanent 
establishment definition cannot be satisfied because a website cannot be ‘a fixed 
place of business’, as it lacks tangibility.   
 
...”an Internet web site, which is a combination of software and electronic data, 
does not in itself constitute tangible property.  It therefore does not have a location 
that can constitute a ‘place of business’ as there is no ‘facility such as premises or, 
in certain instances, machinery or equipment’…as far as the software and data 
constituting that web site is concerned”.148   
 
The OECD Commentary on Article 5 also confirms that a website cannot satisfy the 
dependant agent test since no matter how sophisticated and ‘intelligent’ the 
technology involved might be, a website is not a person: 
 
“It is also clear that since the web site through which an enterprise carries on its 
business is not itself a ‘person’ as defined in Article 3, paragraph 5 cannot apply to 
deem a permanent establishment to exist by virtue of the web site being an agent of 
the enterprise for purposes of that paragraph”.149   
 
These views are not controversial.  Most tax authorities and commentators agree 
that the current permanent establishment definition cannot apply to a website.150  As 
                                            
147 See OECD PE Report. 
148 OECD Commentary, para. 42.2. 
149 OECD Commentary, para 42.10. 
150 See sources referred to in footnote 142.     
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discussed below, the real debate is not on the application of existing rules, but 
rather, on the rules themselves. 
 
4.5 Income Characterisation Applied to Electronic Commerce  
In the electronic commerce context, income characterisation predominantly 
involves the distinction between business profits and royalties.  The term ‘business 
profits’ typically refers to profits from commercial and industrial activities, e.g., the 
sale of goods.  Under the OECD Model Treaty, the term also includes profits from 
independent personal services.151  The term ‘royalties’ is defined in Article 12(2) of 
the OECD Model Treaty as follows: 
 
“The term ‘royalties’ as used in this Article means payments of any kind received 
as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, 
artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning 
industrial, commercial or scientific experience”.152
  
The 1977 version of the OECD Model Treaty, the UN Model Treaty, and many 
treaties include a broader definition, which also refers to: “payments… for the use, 
or right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment”.153   
                                            
151 Article 14 of previous OECD model treaties, dealing with independent personal services, was 
eliminated from the present OECD Model Treaty.  Income from professional services or other 
activities of an independent character are now dealt with under Article 7 - see discussion in OECD 
Article 14 Report.  Article 14 of the UN Model Treaty provides that in the absence of sufficient 
personal presence in the source state (which is typically irrelevant in the electronic commerce 
context), the profits will be taxed at source if a ‘fixed base’ threshold test is met.  In practice, this 
threshold is similar to the permanent establishment threshold – see OECD Article 14 Report, paras. 
21-37. 
152 Article 12(2) of the OECD Model Treaty.   
153 Which is still included in some tax treaties – see the OECD Characterisation Report, para 5; 
Article 12(3), UN Model Treaty.  
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 The distinction between royalties and business profits under a tax treaty is 
important.  Under the OECD Model Treaty and the UN Model Treaty, the source 
state may only tax business profits which are attributable to a permanent 
establishment.154  If the treaty incorporates ‘force of attraction’ provisions, the 
source state may also tax business profits attributable to sales of goods or 
merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through the permanent 
establishment or other business activities carried on in the source state of the same 
or similar kind as those effected through the permanent establishment.155  When 
business profits are subject to source taxation, they are taxed on a net basis allowing 
deductions to be taken into account.156     
 
Royalties are treated differently.  The OECD Model Treaty provides that in the 
absence of a permanent establishment, royalties may not be taxed by the source 
state.157  Yet this recommendation is generally not adopted in practice.158  Thus, 
absent a permanent establishment, the source state normally has the right to impose 
royalty withholding tax, the rate of which varies from treaty to treaty.159   
 
                                            
154 Article 7(1) and 7(3), OECD Model Treaty. 
155 Article 7(1) and 7(3), UN Model Treaty. 
156 Article 7(3), OECD Model Treaty; Article 7(3), UN Model Treaty. 
157 Articles 12(1) and 12(3) of the OECD Model Treaty.  See also Article 12(1), US Model Treaty. 
158 No fewer than 12 OECD Members have entered a reservation against the zero royalty 
withholding tax suggested by the OECD Model Treaty (see OECD Commentary on Article 12, paras 
32-48 OECD Equipment Report, paras 16-17), and only three OECD members do not levy royalty 
withholding tax (see OECD Software Report, para 25).  The OECD Non-Members Positions Report 
sets out the position of 17 non-OECD Members in relation to the OECD Model Treaty and 
Commentary.  With respect to Article 12, all 17 Non-Members reserved the right to tax royalties at 
source (refer to paras 3-4).  The UN Model Treaty allows the source state to impose royalty 
withholding tax (article 12(2)).  The US Model Treaty, under which no royalty withholding tax is 
imposed, is a notable exception (clause 12(1)).  Also see discussion in HPC (2000), p. 80.   
159 In instances where the non-resident has a permanent establishment in the source state, royalties 
attributable to that permanent establishment may be taxed on a net basis like business profits. 
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The growth of electronic commerce, and in particular, digitization, has given rise to 
concerns about the clarity of the distinction between business profits and royalties: 
 
“The substitution of digital products for the more traditional physical products has 
led to new markets and new ways of providing access to those products… 
Payments for these digital products are likely to differ both as to amount and as to 
character for tax purposes.  In particular, the line traditionally drawn between 
royalties and payments for goods and/or services is likely to become increasingly 
blurred”.160
 
Given the different tax treatment of business profits and royalties, an increasingly 
blurred line can be problematic.  It is likely to undermine neutrality, give rise to 
inconsistent views and outcomes, facilitate manipulation, and render the distinction 
between business profits and royalties itself largely artificial and meaningless.161   
 
The OECD Characterisation Report attempted to prevent such results by clarifying 
that distinction.  The objective was “[t]o examine the characterisation of various 
types of electronic commerce payments under tax conventions with a view to 
providing the necessary clarifications in the Commentary”.162  The OECD 
Characterisation Report (the conclusions of which are now contained in the OECD 
Commentary) sought to clarify the distinction by considering the following issues:  
 
                                            
160 Australian Taxation Office (1999), paras 5.4.3 – 5.4.6.   
161 See discussion in Canadian EC Committee (1998), para 4.2.3; US Treasury (1996), para 7.3.2.; 
Spanish Ministry of Finance Report (2000), pp. 39-41; UK Revenue (1999), paras 8.26-8.38; Irish 
Revenue (1999), paras 8.19-8.24; Hong Kong Revenue, paras 19-25; Netherlands Secretary of 
Finance (1998), para 3.2.5;  Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), Ch. 4; Hardesty 
(2000), Ch. 4; McLure (1997), pp. 355-359; Owens (1997), pp. 1847-1848; Hardesty (2000), Ch. 4;  
Cockfield (1999), pp. 161-162; Reid (2000); Jensen 2001, paras 8-11; Doernberg (1998), paras 6; 
IFA (2001), pp. 29-40 (General Report by Sprague Gary D and Boyle Michael P). 
162 Annex 3, OECD Characterisation Report. 
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Business profits and payments for the use of, or the right to use, a copyright - 
The distinction between business profits and payments for the use of, or the 
right to use, a copyright is to be determined by identifying the essential 
consideration for the payment.  If the consideration is essentially paid for the 
product, and the use of copyright is merely a necessary incidental part of the 
process involving the actual purchasing the product, then the use of copyright 
will be disregarded and the payment will not be a royalty.163   
 
Business profits and payments for know-how - Again, the focus should be in 
the substance of the transaction; does the transaction involve the provision of 
services or the purchase of know-how?   This should be essentially determined 
by reference to the contractual relationship concerned.  For example, under 
contracts for the provision of services, the supplier undertakes to perform 
services which may require the supplier to use know-how, but not to transfer 
it.164
 
Provision of services - The distinction between payments for services and 
payments for assets is important under some tax treaties and national laws.  The 
OECD Characterisation Report discussed the distinction between the provision 
of services, such as consulting, and the acquisition of property, such as video 
images.  It emphasized again the question of what the consideration is 
essentially paid for.  In general, if the customer owns the property after the 
                                            
163 See OECD Characterisation Report, paras 13-16.  See further discussion at Part 6.5.1 below.  The 
approach of focusing upon the essence of the payment (ignoring incidental parts of the process 
making the acquisition possible but involving the use of copyright) is not new.  It has been used in 
the OECD Commentary in relation to software (see OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 14).  It 
has also been adopted under internal laws - see e.g. Australian Taxation Office, TR 93/12; United 
stated Treasury Regulations, section 1.861-18(c)(1)(ii) and discussion in US Treasury (1996) on the 
(then) proposed regulations at para 7.3.3). 
164 See OECD Characterisation Report, paras 17-23.  See further discussion at Part 6.5.2 below. 
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transaction, but the property was not acquired from the provider, the transaction 
is one of services provision.165     
 
Business profits and payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, 
commercial or scientific equipment - This category was divided into digital 
products and computer equipment.  The former concerns, for example, 
payments for the use of digital products for a limited time.  Such payments 
cannot be for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment.166   As to computer equipment, the question is whether a person uses 
computer equipment of another person, rather than purchasing services from 
that other person.  The OECD Characterisation Report referred to factors which 
may be applied to distinguish between the lease of equipment and the provision 
of services, which factors include physical possession, control, economic 
interest, risk, expenditure, and rental value.167
 
Technical fees - Although the OECD Model Treaty does not refer to ‘technical 
fees’ certain tax treaties allow source taxation of ‘technical fees’, which often 
refer to: “payment of any kind to any person, other than to an employee of the 
person making the payment, in consideration for any service of a technical, 
managerial or consultancy nature”.168  The OECD Characterisation Report 
briefly discussed these three types of services.  The provision of technical 
services requires use by the provider of special skills or knowledge related to a 
                                            
165 See OECD Characterisation Report, paras 32-35.  See further discussion at Part 6.5.2 below. 
166 Mainly because: (a) the word ‘equipment’ connotes tangibility, (b) the reference to ‘equipment’ is 
intended apply to an accessory in a particular process, and (c) the words ‘for the use of, or the right 
to use’ do not generally apply to payments made to definitively acquire a property for a short useful 
duration.   
167 See OECD Characterisation Report, paras 24-31. 
168 OECD Characterisation Report, para 37. 
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technical field.  For example, the development of software, or services requiring 
techniques related to applied science or craftsmanship would be technical 
services, whereas the services of a psychologist would not be technical services.  
Managerial services are services rendered in performing management functions, 
which involve the running of the business, as distinct from carrying on the 
business.  Consultancy services simply concern services concerning the 
provision of advice by a person who is qualified to do so.169
 
Mixed payments - The OECD Characterisation indicated that certain payments 
might be of a mixed nature.  Where a payment is made for a mixed purpose and 
there is, by far, a principal purpose underlying the payment, the treatment of that 
principal part should generally apply to the whole amount.170   
 
4.6 The Next Step - From Clarification to Broad Policy 
Decisions 
The overall effect of the OECD’ conclusions on the permanent establishment and 
the income characterisation issues operate in favor of the residence state.  Firstly, 
business profits would be typically untaxed at source because of the vendor has no 
permanent establishment in the source state.  Secondly, the emphasis upon 
substance prevailing over form in income characterisation further compromises the 
source state’s fiscal limits, as payments which may technically give rise to royalties 
(typically subject to withholding tax) may be now categorised as business profits 
and thus escape source taxation.  
                                            
169 See OECD Characterisation Report, paras 36-45. 
170 See OECD Characterization Report, paras 46-49. 
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The OECD’s work on the permanent establishment and the income categorisation 
issues deals with the application of existing rules to electronic commerce, and as 
such, should mark the beginning of a broader enquiry on the interaction of tax 
treaties and electronic commerce.  The OECD indicated that, as far as the 
permanent establishment issue is concerned, treaty interpretation is a starting point 
of a process aiming at determining whether the concept of permanent establishment 
provides an appropriate threshold for allocating tax revenues, whether there is a 
need for special rules relating to electronic commerce, and whether such rules 
would be a viable alternative to existing international norms.171  It was expressly 
indicated that the clarification of the application of existing permanent 
establishment rules did not deal with “the broader and ultimately important issue of 
whether any changes should be made to the definition or whether the permanent 
establishment concept should be abandoned”.172   
On the other hand, the OECD’s work on income characterisation, a more involved 
and controversial issue, was not driven by core policy objectives questioning the 
validity and relevance of the distinction between business profits and royalties.  The 
objectives were rather immediate and technical in nature: (a) to identify different 
types of electronic commerce transactions and the particular characteristics of such 
transactions which might enable distinctions to be drawn between payments for 
services and income from sales or leasing of property; (b) to identify characteristics 
of electronic commerce transactions which might enable distinctions to be drawn 
between business profits and royalties and, in particular, the circumstances, if any, 
in which electronic commerce payments may be considered to be payments for use 
of copyright or use of know-how; (c) to comment on whether there are reasons for 
                                            
171OECD BP Mandate 2001.   
172 OECD WP1 (2000), para 5 (emphasis added).   
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preferring one characterisation to another; and (d) to identify the circumstances in 
which electronic commerce transactions can be considered to give rise to payments 
for industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.173   
This narrow approach is questionable.  The OECD has not explained why the re-
examination of these policy issues is unnecessary.  Electronic commerce, and 
digitization in particular, have given rise to broader, and more important, issues not 
only in relation to the permanent establishment concept, but also in relation to 
income characterisation.174  The latter seems to require not only clarification, but 
also review and re-assessment of policy.  
Moreover, it is somewhat incomplete to examine permanent establishment policy 
without considering characterisation policy.  The definitions of royalties and 
permanent establishment work together.  The treaty firstly categorises a payment 
and then subjects it to a particular tax treatment.  There is little point is focusing on 
the correct treatment of business profits if the categorisation process itself is flawed 
or unnecessary.  The permanent establishment and income categorisation issues 
affect each other in the most direct manner.  It would be incoherent to limit the 
policy enquiry to the former.  Both policy issues should be examined; and reform 
should be considered accordingly.    
                                            
173 Annex 3, OECD Characterisation Report. 
174 See discussion in sources referred to in footnote 161 above. 
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 5 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT  
5.1 Introduction 
The first broader and ultimately important issue dealt with here is the interaction of 
electronic commerce with the business profits threshold.  As just noted above, this 
interaction goes beyond mere treaty interpretation; it involves fundamental policy 
questions.  The essential policy question is whether electronic commerce renders 
the present permanent establishment rules, as interpreted above, in need of reform.  
This question is the focus of this part of the paper.  It examines the history of the 
permanent establishment concept, the rationales which support it, and policy 
considerations relevant to its application to electronic commerce.  It concludes that 
the existing permanent establishment rules are inappropriate in the electronic 
commerce context and that reform is required. 
5.2 Permanent Establishment - Historical Perspective  
The permanent establishment concept emerged as a general legal concept, and 
subsequently as a fiscal concept, in Prussia and a small group of German states in 
the second half of the 19th century.175  The concept was then used in the first tax 
treaty, the 1899 treaty between Prussia and Austria-Hungary, which provided:  
 
“The term ‘permanent establishment’ includes branch establishments, factories 
offices, places where purchaser and sales are effected and other business facilities 
                                            
175 It was used at the municipal level as a fiscal nexus, a means to impose taxation, rather than a 
concept preventing double taxation – see Skaar, (1991), p. 72; Vogel (1998), p. 226.   
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by which the owner, partner, manager, or other permanent representative carries on 
his normal business activities”.176
 
This definition did not prescribe a general ‘fixed place of business’ rule and differed 
in many other respects from the modern permanent establishment definition, but it 
contained the general twofold notion of the modern concept: commercial operations 
conducted in another state through an established presence and a person 
representing the enterprise in that state.177   
Most subsequent Central European treaties concluded before and shortly after the 
First World War contained similar permanent establishment definitions.178  These 
European treaties influenced the early League of Nations’ work on tax treaties, 
including the permanent establishment concept.  A 1928 League of Nations model 
treaty provided that: 
“Income derived from any industrial, commercial or agricultural undertaking and 
from any other trades or professions, and not referred to in Article 7 [dealing with 
income from movable assets], shall be taxable in the state in which the permanent 
establishments are situated. 
 
The real centers of management, branches, mining and oil fields, factories, 
workshops, agencies, warehouses, offices, depots, shall be regarded as permanent 
establishments.  The fact that an undertaking has business dealings with a foreign 
country through a bona-fide agent of dependant status (broker, commission agent, 
                                            
176 Translation from German, Huston and Williams (1993), p. 3. 
177 Skaar (1991), p. 76. 
178 Skaar (1991), pp. 75-78; Huston and Williams (1993), pp. 3-5. 
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etc.) shall not be held to mean that the undertaking in question has a permanent 
establishment in that country”.179
 
The permanent establishment concept continued to evolve after the 1920s.  Among 
other things, the general ‘fixed place of business’ rule was introduced, and overall, 
its evolvement was marked by reduction in scope in favor of the residence state.180   
 
The above 1928 permanent establishment definition, nonetheless, has remained the 
basis of the permanent establishment definition found in tax treaties today:  “It is 
remarkable how many of the items found in treaties today were included… branch, 
factory, office, agency, and an exclusion for independent agents such as a broker or 
a commission agent”.181  It appears that the main reasons for the continued 
existence of the permanent establishment concept throughout the decades were 
workability and conservatism.  As put by Sasseville:  
 
“The adoption of the permanent establishment concept as an international norm for 
taxing business profits has more to do with the power of precedent than with 
economic analysis.  The League of Nations adopted the permanent establishment 
concept in its models because it had been used in previous bilateral treaties and was 
perceived to work relatively well…When the OECD picked up the work on 
bilateral treaties in 1956, it relied on previous models…and on the recent treaty 
practices of its member countries in order to develop its own model”.182
 
                                            
179 League of Nations 1928 Report, p. 19 (Article 3 of draft No. 1c).   
180 See review in Skaar (1991); 76-100; Huston and Williams (1993), pp. 5-10. 
181 Avery Jones (2000), p. 1. 
182 Sasseville (2000), pp. 2-3. 
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The ‘power of precedent’ has thus preserved a concept that was developed at the 
end of the 19th century and became integral part of tax treaties in the 1920s.  What 
was, then, the initial scope and intention of the permanent establishment concept?  
This question can be answered by looking at the world and commercial realities at 
the time.   
 
The emergence of the permanent establishment concept occurred against the 
backdrop of the Second Industrial Revolution, between 1870 and 1920.183  This era 
was marked by significant commercial and economic developments.  Capital in 
industrialized countries changed from being circulating or working capital to being 
fixed capital invested in substantial assets, such as factories, plants and 
equipment.184  These development were associated with a number of factors: 
industrial development and growth was driven almost entirely by the manufacturing 
of goods and merchandise; raw material was not generally available in 
industrialized states; raw material was required to support new emerging industries; 
there was an increase in trade between industrialized states and states that produced 
raw materials; and although communication and transportation improved 
significantly, means for temporary movement of labor forces were not well 
advanced.185   
 
In other words, it was an period where investments were made in long-term 
possession of physical assets, where income was mainly derived from 
manufacturing of physical products, where raw material and consumption markets 
were located in different jurisdictions, and where labor and production-lines were 
                                            
183 Skaar (1991), p. 66.   
184 Skaar (1991), p. 65. 
185 Skaar (1991), p. 66. 
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not mobile.  If an enterprise was serious about making money from operations 
abroad, it had to establish some substantial presence there, and maintain it over a 
significant period of time to try to recoup its investment and then generate profits.    
 
This is precisely why the initial compromise made by the source state in agreeing to 
the permanent establishment threshold was insignificant.  Apart from visits abroad 
by itinerant crafts and sales persons, not much else happened in the mobile 
international business arena.186  The source state had access to the predominant 
source of business profits generated by non-residents in its territory.  Little tax 
revenue was lost by relinquishing the right to tax the occasional itinerant crafts or 
sales person, and it made perfect sense to give up that right in the broader context of 
revenue sharing under a tax treaty.   
  
5.3 Permanent Establishment - Rationales 
The main rationales of the permanent establishment concept concern the general 
definition, that is, the ‘fixed place of business’ test and the need to have physical 
presence in the source state.  The dependant agency permanent establishment test is 
based on different, yet related, rationales.  The two types of permanent 
establishment and their respective rationales are set out below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
186 Skaar (1991), p. 66. 
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5.3.1 General Permanent Establishment Test - ‘Fixed Place of 
Business’  
The OECD Commentary explains the permanent establishment concept as follows: 
 
“[Article 7(1)] is concerned with two questions.  First, it restates the generally 
accepted principle of double taxation conventions that an enterprise of one state 
shall not be taxed in the other state unless it carries on business in that other state 
through a permanent establishment situated therein.  It is hardly necessary to argue 
here the merits of this principle.  It is perhaps sufficient to say that it has come to be 
accepted in international fiscal matters that until an enterprise of one state sets up a 
permanent establishment in another state it should not properly be regarded as 
participating in the economic life of that other state to such an extent that it comes 
within the jurisdiction of that other state’s taxing rights”.187
 
However, the above assumption is not entirely correct.  Physical presence is not a 
prerequisite for source taxation in many jurisdictions.188   In addition, participation 
in the economic life of a state can occur without physical presence, for example, by 
non-residents that sell to its economy 65% of the software used.  Since matters are 
not as simple, it may be necessary to further consider, and in particular develop, the 
merits of the permanent establishment principle.   
 
Under all conceptual bases, a nexus that is based on immovable property, such as 
land or a fixed place of business situated in a state, is the strongest connecting factor 
between the state and a non-resident.  A threshold based on immovable property 
                                            
187 OECD Commentary, Article 7, para 3 (emphasis added).   
188 Refer to text accompanying footnotes 114-113 above. 
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accords perfectly well with the realistic doctrine.  Immovable property obviously 
provides the state with sound enforcement and collection abilities, as it be readily 
accessed, attached, and seized.  As far as the sovereignty doctrine is concerned, 
immovable property unquestionably falls within the state’s territorial sovereignty; a 
threshold based on immovable property provides certainty in that it avoids 
questions on the situs of other types of property.  The benefit/entitlement (or the 
faculty) doctrine would also favor a compromise based on physical presence as such 
presence entails a sufficient level of use of public goods and services.   
 
The economic allegiance doctrine leads to similar conclusion.  The four economists 
discussed the business enterprises category in some details, and divided business 
enterprises into three subcategories: (a) those that depend directly on the land, such 
as mines and oil wells; (b) those where the land has a somewhat less important role, 
such as industrial establishments or factories; and (c) those where elements other 
than land are of increasing importance, such as commercial establishments with a 
fixed location.189  The economists concluded that although some economic 
allegiance could be attributable to permanent residence, land is an overwhelming 
factor: 
 
“Where all four factors are in agreement, no difficulty can arise: where they are in 
disagreement a choice must be made between them or a compromise must be 
adopted.  If the first three principles are of overwhelming importance as compared 
with the fourth, i.e., if situs and the place of enforcement re-enforce the place of 
origin to such an extent as to make it far more important than domicile, the 
                                            
189 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 29.   
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presumption is clearly in favour of the composite principle of origin being 
predominant”.190
 
Conversely, where there is no attachment to, or reliance upon, immovable property, 
the relative weight of domicile would increase, and probably prevail.  The source 
state would provide the market enabling the creation of the wealth, but the majority 
of factors would focus on the place where the business is actually managed, where 
the goods are normally located and purchased, where legal rights may be protected, 
and where wealth is spent.  For example, the economists considered income from 
“movables dependent not so much on the land as on the individual”,191 and 
concluded that domicile was “the one outstanding factor”.192  Accordingly, a 
threshold based on physical presence, or immovable property, would make sense 
under the economic allegiance doctrine in a bilateral context, where taxing rights 
are assigned to one of two states.  Since, “it is not easy to assign in a quantitative 
sense proportions of allegiance of the different countries interested”,193 where the 
economic allegiance attributable to one of the state is minor, it would be practical to 
assign all taxing rights to the other state.   
 
This is essentially the way the permanent establishment concept operates in tax 
treaties.  In the absence of a permanent establishment, the residence state, the place 
of domicile, has the stronger claim of economic allegiance, and thus has the 
exclusive right to tax the profits of the enterprise.  When a permanent establishment 
is created, the source state is the place generating the stronger claim of economic 
allegiance, and thus has the exclusive right to tax the profits of the enterprise.   
                                            
190 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 26. 
191 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 32. 
192 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 33. 
193 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 27. 
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5.3.2 Agency Permanent Establishment  
Whereas physical presence operates well within the various conceptual frameworks 
as a threshold dividing taxing rights, an agency threshold results in much weaker 
links with the source state.  It does not focus on land, buildings, or duration, and 
does not even require that the agent be a resident of the source state or have a place 
of business in it.  In principle, the agency threshold could be met by a number of  
visits of a dependant agent in the source state.194   
 
No doubt, such a nexus could, in principle, warrant taxation under all conceptual 
bases since all of them provide for extremely broad fiscal limits, which as seen 
above, can apply to non-residents who have not physical presence in the state.  The 
sovereignty doctrine would rely not only upon territorial sovereignty, but also upon 
personal sovereignty over the agent itself.  The realistic doctrine would seek to 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of property belonging to the non-resident 
principal by the agent, or moneys payable to the principal by the agent.  The 
benefit/entitlement (or faculty) doctrine would justify taxation on the basis of some 
use of assets by the agent, and mainly on the basis of the market, consumption, 
economy and legal system within which the agent operates and transacts on behalf 
                                            
194 The OECD Commentary on Article 5 states (at para 32 that) “the use of the term ‘permanent 
establishment’ presupposes, of course, that the person makes use of this authority repeatedly and not 
merely in isolated cases”. 
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of the non-resident.  The economic allegiance doctrine would chiefly focus upon the 
interaction between the agent and the market in which wealth is created.  As the 
four economists noted, the yield or acquisition of wealth is due: 
  
“not only to the particular thing but to the human relations which may help in 
creating the yield…[for example]…[t]he selling end, that is, the place where the 
agent for selling ply their calling and where the actual markets are to be found”.195   
 
However, the above application of the conceptual bases to agency permanent 
establishment highlights, and does not resolve, certain anomalies involving the 
agency permanent establishment concept.  The connecting factors associated with 
agency permanent establishment stand in almost the sharpest contrast possible to 
the connecting factors associated with the general permanent establishment concept, 
which connote long-term physical presence and are therefore overwhelmingly 
strong.  A number of one-day visits by an agent in a state give rise to connecting 
factors that are much weaker than land.  Moreover, even if agency can result in 
sufficiently strong connecting factors, the conceptual bases do not explain the 
distinction made between independent and dependant agent.196     
 
These anomalies can be resolved on the basis of two rationales.  The first is based 
on the ‘long arm’ principle: “The personal attachment is justified by the 
intermediation of the local entity”.197  In other words, an agency relationship 
operates to extend the presence of the non-resident into the source state.  The 
                                            
195 League of Nations 1923 Report, pp. 23-24. 
196 It was noted by Avery Jones that the distinction between dependant and independent agents was 
made since at common law all agents create legal relations, which is not the position in civil law 
jurisdictions – see Avery Jones (2000), p. 2. 
197 Martha (1989), p. 95. 
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connecting factors associated with personal presence in the state are thus extended, 
through the agent, to its non-resident principal.  This intermediation notion seems to 
be reflected in the OECD Commentary as well: 
 
 “It would not have been in the interests of international economic relations to 
provide that the maintenance of any dependent person would lead to a permanent 
establishment for the enterprise.  Such treatment is to be limited to persons who in 
view of the scope of their authority or the nature of their activity involve the 
enterprise to a particular extent in business activities in the state concerned”.198
 
The second consideration rationalizing the agency permanent establishment concept 
is based upon considerations of neutrality and integrity (or anti-avoidance).  in 
certain circumstances, a non-resident may implement an agency structure, in lieu of 
physical presence, to derive profits in the source state.  In the absence of dependant 
agency permanent establishment, different structures would result in different tax 
treatment.  As noted by Professor Skaar: 
 
“Taxation would infringe neutrality if the tax position of an enterprise’s foreign 
business operations depended upon whether the enterprise conducted the business 
itself or through an agent who was integrated to a large extent in the principal’s 
business.  Moreover, it would be too easy to circumvent unwanted PE taxation if no 
PE fiction applied to the use of foreign agency”.199
 
 
 
                                            
198 OECD Commentary, Article 5, para 32. 
199 Skaar (1991), p. 463.  See also Peschcke-Koedt (1998), Part II. 
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5.4 Permanent Establishment and Electronic Commerce – 
Interaction Examined 
 
There is little doubt that the present permanent establishment concept sits extremely 
awkwardly within any intangible commercial medium.  After all, the permanent 
establishment concept is a species of a world where commercial frameworks, and 
economic values, were predominantly based upon physical presence and assets.  
Conversely, in a world where electronic commerce were the only commerce, the 
permanent establishment concept, as presently defined, would be utterly 
meaningless and could not exist.  The focus of the enquiry here is what should be 
the role of the permanent establishment concept in a world where commerce 
consists of both physical and intangible attributes.   
 
If nothing is done and the permanent establishment remains unchanged, business 
profits derived from electronic commerce will only be taxed by the residence state.  
It has been argued, notably by the US Department of Treasury among others, that 
this should be the natural result of electronic commerce: 
“The growth of new communications technologies and electronic commerce will 
likely require that principles of residence-based taxation assume even greater 
importance.  In the world of cyberspace, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to 
apply traditional source concepts to link an item of income with a specific 
geographical location.  Therefore, source-based taxation could lose its rational and 
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be rendered obsolete by electronic commerce.  By contrast, almost all taxpayers are 
resident somewhere…Unites states tax policy has already recognized that as 
traditional source principles lose their significance, residence-based taxation can 
step in and take their place.  This trend will be accelerated by developments in 
electronic commerce where principles of residence-based taxation will also play a 
major role”.200
Leaving aside the apparent self-serving flavor of this particular proposal,201 the 
conceptual flaw here is not the suggestion that traditional source-based principles 
are becoming increasingly irrelevant, which is unquestionably correct.202  Rather, 
the basic flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that source-based principles will 
not change to accommodate electronic commerce.  If effective source-based rules 
are developed, the above conclusion of the US Department of Treasury will be 
undermined.  
 
The central point of the debate is thus whether the growth of electronic commerce 
renders the permanent establishment concept in need for reform.  This question is 
discussed below from a number of perspectives: conceptual bases, neutrality 
functionality, other economic changes, revenue, and enforceability.  The conclusion 
is that change is required, although in the absence of effective enforcement 
measures, reform would be ineffective. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
200 US Treasury (1996), para 7.1.5. 
201 Avi-Yonah (1997), p. 530; McLure (2001), para 3.1.7. 
202 Li (1999), p. 1459; see also discussion in sources referred to in footnote 113 above. 
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5.4.1 Economic Allegiance and Benefit/Entitlement Principles 
A recent report by the eComTaxpert Group on the taxation of electronic commerce 
in India examined the policy issues associated with the interaction between the 
permanent establishment concept and electronic commerce.  It stated the following 
view on the benefit/entitlement and the economic allegiance doctrines: 
“Nothing in the ‘new’ economy changes the proper justification for a state to 
impose an income tax on an enterprise.  The policy conclusion, which underlies the 
existing rules, is that only activities, which create value, are relevant in determining 
a state’s right to impose income tax.  The mere fact that an enterprise is able to sell 
into a jurisdiction’s marketplace, standing alone, is not a relevant factor in the 
analysis.  This is because market accessibility does not indicate that the foreign 
enterprise is creating value in the state.  Accessibility to a market does not 
necessarily entail an enterprise’s ‘participation in the economic life of a country’.  
It simply reflects the enterprise’s participation with the economic life of a 
country’…It remains appropriate therefore to limit the right of income taxation to 
those jurisdictions that serve as the origin of that income by virtue of providing the 
economic life that made possible the yield of the acquisition of the wealth” .203  
 
On a close examination, this argument may be disputed as it seems to be based on 
the assumption that origin, as defined under the economic allegiance doctrine, 
connotes physical presence.  This assumption is, however, incorrect.  Economic 
allegiance based on origin can be established without physical presence.  As stated 
above, economic allegiance is to be determined by reference to a number of 
questions, one of which is: “Where is the yield physically or economically 
                                            
203 eComTaxpert (2002), pp. 9-10. 
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produced?”204  The four economists had no difficulty in concluding that the latter 
overrides the former: 
 
“The true economic location is to be distinguished from the physical location, 
usually termed situs.  Frequently, of course, they coincide.  But in the case of many 
classes of wealth the temporary situs may be quite distinct from the true economic 
location…Physical situs is one thing ; origin or economic location is quite another 
thing ; they do not necessarily coincide.  Physical situs is of importance in 
economic allegiance only to the extent that it reinforces economic location”.205
 
In other words, permanent establishment is only “a piece of evidence of economic 
allegiance”.206  Economic allegiance, use of benefits, or indeed participation in a 
state’s economic life, can be established and can occur without physical presence: 
 
“It seems that an enterprise which does not need to invest in immovable facilities, 
or other fixed places of business, may still derive considerable advantages from the 
community in which its income source are located.  Today, the performance of a 
business activity in another country, the duration of the activity, and the profits 
arising from it, are per se significant arguments against the assumption that these 
enterprises do not have economic allegiance to another state”. 207
Moreover, the acquisition of wealth, and the creation of value, can be solely based 
upon demand.  The four economists illustrated the point as follows:  
 
                                            
204 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 25 (emphasis added).  See also text accompanying footnote 95 
above. 
205 League of Nations 1923 Report, pp. 24-25 (emphasis added). 
206 Skaar (1991), p. 559 (emphasis added). 
207 Skaar (1191), pp. 559-560. 
 69
“The oranges upon the trees in California are not acquired wealth until they are 
picked, and not even at that stage until they are packed, and not even at that stage 
until they are transported to the place where demand exists and until they are put 
where the consumer can use them”.208
 
In addition, electronic commerce will only operate to enhance the economic 
allegiance between the remote non-resident vendor and the state because markets, 
representing demand and consumption, are becoming increasingly accessible.  
Electronic commerce will also enhance source claims made by reference to 
benefit/entitlement arguments.  Growing remote sales indicate growing use of 
source benefits, such as telecommunications infrastructure, protection of intellectual 
property rights, and the markets accessible by the non-resident vendors.209  As a 
result, growing remote sales may mark a sufficient degree of participation in the 
economic life of a state. 
 
5.4.2 Neutrality 
The OECD Ottawa Report identified neutrality as one of the broad taxation policy 
principles which should apply to the taxation of electronic commerce, and outlined 
three neutrality objectives: (a) taxation should be neutral and equitable between 
conventional and electronic forms of commerce; (b) business decisions should be 
motivated by economic rather than tax considerations; and (c) taxpayers in similar 
situations carrying out similar transactions should be subject to similar levels of 
taxation. 210
                                            
208 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 23 (emphasis added).  See also text accompanying footnote 95 
above. 
209 McLure (2000), p.6. 
210 OECD Ottawa Report, p. 4 (Box 2). 
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 The interaction of electronic commerce and physical presence creates tension 
among the above neutrality objectives.  The first neutrality objective requires that 
the tax treatment of sales of products and services should not depend on whether 
electronic or traditional methods are used.  This neutrality objective concerns 
instances where the choice of physical structure gives rise to disadvantages.211  
Electronic commerce obviously undermines this objective.  Similarly, electronic 
commerce creates more opportunities to create structure to bring about particular 
tax results: “there is considerable scope for an Internet business to structure its 
activities to ensure they do, or do not, result in a PE being established in the source 
country”.212  This consideration also undermines the second neutrality objective.   
 
On the other hand, electronic commerce may not offend the third neutrality 
objective, which justifies different tax results in different situations.   Electronic 
commerce business models and traditional business models differ.  It may be 
difficult to argue that traditional and electronic commerce transactions are ‘similar’, 
as different methods, mediums and processes are employed, and in particular, 
electronic commerce may not require investment in the source state.  Thus, as far as 
the general permanent establishment definition is concerned, the consideration of 
neutrality objectives leads to  inconclusive outcomes.   
 
By contrast, the dependent agency test, requiring that the agent be a person, 
significantly harms neutrality in the electronic commerce context.  As discussed 
above, that test is justified on the basis of intermediation, neutrality and integrity.213  
                                            
211 UN EC Report (2001), para 36.  See also general discussion in McIntyre (1997), p. 19. 
212 Australian Taxation Office (1999), para 5.3.31. 
213 See Part 5.3.2 above (‘Agency Permanent Establishment’). 
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The application of these justifications to a website would lead to the conclusion 
that, as far as neutrality is concerned, a website should constitute a permanent 
establishment.   
 
As to intermediation, transaction are concluded through websites.214  Websites 
behave like dependant agents and fulfil functions substantially similar to those 
fulfilled by dependant agents.215  It is true that there are significant legal differences 
between agents that are legal persons and ‘agents’ that are not legal persons, and 
that these differences are unlikely to be eliminated by technological 
developments.216  However, such differences may not be significant for neutrality 
purposes.  The legal status of the agent is one thing; functionality is another:  
 
“To argue that an electronic agent should be deemed a ‘person’ is to miss the point 
that electronic agents present simply another mode by which natural persons can 
conduct their business”.217   
 
Hence, the use of a website, like the use of a traditional dependant agent, extends 
the presence of the non-resident into the source state.  Indeed, disintermediation has 
been regarded as one of the major consequences of electronic commerce.218  As a 
result, the intermediation rationale would endorse a position where a website 
constitutes a permanent establishment. 
 
                                            
214 See text accompanying footnote 11 above. 
215 See discussion in e.g. Jennings and Woolbridge (1996); Smed (1998); Pugh (2000), pp. 43-44; 
Sher (1999), p. 423; Bourgeois and Blanchette (1997), p. 1392; Andrews (2001), Furnari (1999). 
216 E.g. a non-person cannot be sued and cannot possess property – see discussion in Bellia (2001), 
pp. 1066-1067. 
217 Bellia (2001), p. 1067. 
218 See references in footnote 19 above. 
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As to integrity, or anti-avoidance, an agency permanent establishment may be 
readily avoided by the use of a website - websites may replace a traditional agent in 
the same way that traditional agents once replaced physical presence.  If the rational 
behind the dependant agency test was to address harmful tax planning, them this 
concern ought to support the inclusion of websites in the permanent establishment 
definition.   
 
5.4.3 Functionality and Capabilities 
One of the first arguments put forward in favor of retaining the present permanent 
establishment definition was that the Internet is merely a new medium enabling 
enterprises to conduct virtually the same old business: 
“Developing new means of commercial distribution that allows businesses to gain 
access to jurisdictions they would otherwise be unable to penetrate is not a new 
concept.  Mail order catalogues and telephone and television solicitation have been 
used for quite some time.  These new avenues allowed business to reach more 
customers without having to have a substantial physical presence in the customers’ 
jurisdictions.  The permanent establishment rules were not modified for this change 
in commercial transactions”.219   
And therefore, so the argument goes, the Internet should not change the permanent 
establishment definition: 
“These concepts are not novel.  On the contrary, it is well settled that arrangements 
to contact customers via remote telecommunications (e.g. telephone, television, 
mail), even if supported by local advertising, do not give rise to taxable nexus, and 
                                            
219 Jensen (2001), p. 173. 
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there is no reason that the use of the Internet (or similar electronic communications) 
should alter this analysis”.220  
However, a sophisticated and interactive website does much more than a catalogue 
or a telephone call, or indeed, much more than many physical places of business.  
Traditional methods may handle some functions, but not the whole range of 
activities performed by a website.  A website performs a range of function, and in 
particular, facilitates the conclusion of contracts and delivery of supplies.221  Put it 
another way: “The interactivity, speed and direct payment options of electronic 
commerce over the Internet…mean that it potentially can be used in ways that were 
not possible with traditional mail order sales”.222  These attributes place websites at 
a different level of functionality and capabilities, far superior to that occupied by the 
above traditional business methods.223   Put simply, these attributes are the very 
reason why electronic commerce has grown so fast over the past few years to levels 
exceeding traditional methods of remote business processes.  The comparison 
between traditional methods and electronic commerce therefore seems misguided. 
5.4.4 Previous Economic Changes are Distinguishable 
Another contention against changing the permanent establishment definition is that, 
although electronic commerce can mark significant economic changes, the world 
has witnessed similar large-scale economic changes before, without the need to rush 
and re-write tax treaties every time such a change occurred.  The eComTaxpert 
Group report observed that:   
                                            
220 Boyle Peterson, Sample, Schottenstein and Spargue (1999), p. 367.  See also e.g. Netherlands 
Secretary of Finance (1998”), para. 3.2.3.3. 
221 See also text accompanying footnote 11 above. 
222 Avi-Yonah (1997) p. 516.   
223 Avi-Yonah (1997), p. 516; Cockfield (1999), p. 168.  
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“New business models have emerged in the past, and industries have migrated 
across borders.  For example, in the past the manufacturing activities of entire 
industries, such as consumer electronics, footwear or clothing, have migrated from 
developed to less developed countries.  Yet, the change in location of that value-
adding activity was accommodated within the existing tax framework.  Today’s 
economic shifts, though significant, should not necessarily cause any greater 
disruption to the accepted global allocation of tax revenue than did past shifts”. 224
 
However, there are important distinctions between these examples and the growth 
of electronic commerce.  Firstly, the migrations of industries to developing states 
represented capital investments there, which normally conferred benefits, such as 
additional revenue and jobs, upon the recipient state.  Electronic commerce, by 
contrast, may cause cash to flow from a destination (without a corresponding capital 
investment or benefit).  An online retailer can generate substantial sales from a state 
without investing any money in it.   
 
Secondly, it is rather trivial that such past changes were accommodated within the 
existing tax framework.  These changes and investments were associated with 
physical assets at the destination.  Whether it was footwear or automobiles, there 
were factories, production lines, administration offices, and the like.  The 
permanent establishment definition was specifically designed to handle long-term 
investment in physical assets.  Indeed, it would be a real concern if traditional tax 
concept could not accommodate the emergence of new business models and the 
movement of industries that are based on production and overwhelming physical 
                                            
224 eComTaxpert (2002), p. 8. 
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attributes.  The principal point about electronic commerce is that it brings about 
significant economic shifts without the use of physical assets in the source state. 
 
Thirdly, the permanent establishment concept had been under a constant process of 
erosion over the decades, as stated by Professor Skaar, who had studied the 
permanent establishment concept in detail:  
 
“Changes in communications and technology have created new industries where 
the performance of extensive and profitable business activities does not require 
substantial machinery or equipment, or established at one specific geographical 
location for a long period of time.  The conclusion is that the effects of the PE 
concept in international fiscal law have changed, in particular during the last few 
decades.  Rather than protecting the tax base in the source state, the PE principle 
today has become instrumental in ensuring avoidance of source-state taxation for 
some economically important business operations”.225
 
It seems inaccurate, therefore, to suggest that the permanent establishment concept 
had reflected and accommodated treaty policy prior to the recent growth of 
electronic commerce.  The erosion of the concept commenced prior to the recent 
expansion of electronic commerce.  Electronic commerce accelerates the erosion 
process and brings it to new levels because its lacks tangibility, the very 
characteristic by reference to which the permanent establishment concept was 
originally created.   
 
 
                                            
225 Skaar (1991), p. 559. 
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5.4.5 Revenue Reallocated - Leakage of Source Taxation Revenue  
The main role of the permanent establishment concept is to divide the tax revenue 
from business profits between the two states.  A state’s broad fiscal powers are 
confined by agreement under a tax treaty aimed at preventing double taxation and 
fulfilling other fiscal, economic and political functions.  When entering into a tax 
treaty, the states are in a position to roughly know in advance the circumstances in 
which they will be required to compromise their tax assertions.226  The permanent 
establishment provisions form a restriction imposed by the treaty upon the state as 
part of the overall set of compromises made by both states under the treaty.  The 
treaty establishes a threshold below which the source state cannot tax a non-resident 
on business profits, even if the source state would otherwise be able to tax such 
profits under its internal tax laws.   
“When the taxing state decides in its internal law to tax an item of income in the 
hands of non-residents it may well not be on the same source basis as that permitted 
by the [OECD] Model because there are no universally accepted definitions of 
source.  If the internal law of the source state is wider, the treaty will cut it down; to 
the extent that it is narrower, the source state may not tax”.227   
As discussed above, the genesis and evolution of the permanent establishment 
concept indicate that the compromise made by the source state was never intended 
to be overly generous.  However, the attributes of electronic commerce and the 
Internet create conditions which can erode the reliance on physical points of sale.  
The concern is that if the permanent establishment definition remains unchanged, 
the source state will lose tax revenue.  Put simply, every dollar that an online 
                                            
226 See discussion in Ceruzzi (1979), pp. 50-51; Kingson (1981), p. 1153. 
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retailer derives from sales in a state is a dollar that a local retailer does not derive, 
and a dollar that the source state cannot tax.228   
It was argued that this concern is effectively detached from reality.  Electronic 
commerce would not bring about such dreaded revenue reallocation, as electronic 
commerce is incapable, by itself, to undermine traditional business models: 
 
“Non-resident enterprises that maintain no physical presence in a jurisdiction 
generally are not able to achieve the same level of economic success as companies 
that are physically established in the jurisdiction…It is thus quite unlikely that 
remote sellers will manage to achieve a substantial market share in a jurisdiction 
consequentially displacing local vendors, without even maintaining a physical 
presence in that country, as evidenced by the recent collapse of so many dot.com 
companies”.229
 
Unquestionably, for many years to come this view will reflect the reality in many 
commercial contexts and of many industries.  A recent report by the United States 
Department of Commerce, for example, stated that: 
 
“To date, the Internet as a commercial medium has disappointed initial 
expectations.  E-Commerce as a share of total U.S. retails sales remains at 
approximately 1 percent.  At the industry level, reliance on e-commerce has been 
widespread but uneven…e-commerce accounts for less than 1 percent of shipments 
among retailers and selected service providers”.230
 
                                            
228 The shift in taxing rights may be described in terms of net supply and consumption rather than 
traditional residence and source rules - see footnote 33.   
229 eComTaxpert (2002), p. 7.  See also e.g. Avi-Yonah (2001). 
230 US Department of Commerce (2002), pp. vi-vii.  
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However, as noted above, matters must be considered in their proper perspective.231  
Electronic commerce as a mainstream business has just started to emerge, and has 
done do so extremely rapidly.  Electronic commerce connotes broad and rapid 
changes.  The history of the Internet during the past 10 years is an example on 
point.232  Electronic commerce is already a global phenomenon,233 and the value 
and share of intangibles continue to increase rapidly.234  A report of the Spanish 
Ministry of Finance defined the growth of electronic commerce as a “[c]risis in the 
ideas of permanence or fixedness”,235 and the Australian Taxation Office noted the 
“unacceptable shift in the traditional balance between source and resident country 
taxing rights”.236  A report commissioned by the UN noted that: “the potential for 
[source] loss revenue is staggering”.237  Wherever today's line dividing reality and 
perception may be, there is a widely-held concerns that electronic commerce will 
ultimately mark an economic realignment of the role of the source and residence 
states compared with their roles in traditional commerce, which will in turn mark a 
reallocation of revenue under tax treaties. 238   
 
The Internet today is a mere “‘read-only’ experience”.239  The basic ingredients of 
electronic commerce - speed, bandwidth, software, hardware and applications - 
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have merely achieved workable and reasonable levels.  Inevitably, the Internet, or 
its successors, will develop into a far more competent and effective commercial 
medium.  The impact of electronic commerce on traditional business structure will 
continue to increase as technology and consumption patterns change and evolve.  It 
seems illogical to assume that that reliance by enterprises on physical presence will 
remain intact.   More and more enterprises will be able to derive business profits 
through transactions with residents of a state without having a permanent 
establishment there, or having only a limited permanent establishment there, to 
which only a small portion of the business profits may be attributable.   
The OECD Ottawa Report noted that “[e]lectronic commerce has the potential to be 
one of the great economic developments of the 21st Century”.240  It acknowledged 
that the taxation of electronic commerce involve revenue considerations: 
“Any arrangements for the application of these principles to electronic commerce 
adopted domestically and any adaptation of existing international taxation 
principles should be structured to maintain the fiscal sovereignty of countries, to 
achieve a fair sharing of the tax base from electronic commerce between countries 
and to avoid double taxation and unintentional non taxation”. 241     
 
This statement seems to have an important political substance.  It recognizes that 
any international electronic commerce tax regime will have to be applied 
consistently, which will not occur if certain states believe that they are being denied 
their fair share of tax revenue.242  This political issue is important as it can 
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potentially result not only in lack of international consensus, but also in self-help 
unilateral measures. 
In the immediate and near future, however, sweeping treaty reform may be 
premature:  
 
“Electronic commerce is still very much in its infancy.  Electronic commerce 
transactions as a whole present only a small fraction of business operations, and, as 
a general rule, the business-to-consumer segment shows relatively little 
profitability.  Thus, there is no urgent reason to replace the existing treaty norms 
for taxing business profits merely to take care of electronic commerce operations… 
Modern ways of doing business, including e-commerce, impose increasing pressure 
on the permanent establishment concept (as is the case for many other tax treaty 
rules).  It is far from clear, however, that such pressure has reached a critical 
point”.243     
 
Nevertheless, a ‘wait and see’ approach has to be carefully monitored.  It was 
suggested that the transition period necessary for tax policy makers to measure the 
effects of electronic commerce would be between 5 and 10 years.244  Once leakage 
of tax revenue becomes noticeable, it is unlikely that states would wait that long 
before seeking to resolve this problem.  If no action is taken in the interim at the 
international level, states simply act unilaterally.245   
 
Unilateral action, or self help measures, can be manifested in a variety of ways, e.g.,  
the introduction of broader scope of source rules and more expansive interpretation 
                                            
243 Sasseville (2000), pp. 10-11.   
244 Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), p. 544-545. 
245 UN EC Report (2001), para 44; Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 343-344; 
HPC (2000), p. 58; Tadmore (2001), pp. 1828-1829; Cockfield 1999), p. 168.   
 81
of definitions of royalties, treaty overrides, indirect taxes, and treaty termination.246  
Unilateral action could be extremely undesirable.  It could result in double taxation 
of electronic commerce, it could be uncoordinated and non-uniformed, it could 
develop into a range of incompatible systems varying in form and substance, and, 
like other tax measures, it would be difficult to change or uproot.  Unilateral action 
was examined and illustrated in the OECD Treaty Override Report of 1989.  For 
internal reason, state A introduces a new withholding tax on specific items of 
income with no refund to be provided, notwithstanding that state A’s tax treaties 
prohibit state A from imposing such tax.247  The OECD Treaty Override concluded 
that this unilateral action would be “an outright material breach”.248  It then 
considered the consequences: 
 
“The breach being a material one, the treaty partners of state A would be justified 
in terminating their tax treaty relationship with state A.  However, termination 
could do even more harm economically and endanger the possibility of finding an 
acceptable solution in the future.  Any willful treaty override could thus have very 
serious implications”.249
 
And once the process begins, it will gather its own momentum, as more states will 
seek to secure their own tax bases, or otherwise adopt counter measurers: 
 
“If tax authorities fail to develop tax rules that can effectively tax e-commerce 
transactions, they may resort to alternative strategies in order to protect their 
revenue bases.  This development could have the unfortunate consequence of 
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moving tax systems toward greater incoherence from a tax policy perspective, 
inhibiting the ability of governments to effectively tax certain transactions and 
leading to greater revenue losses”.250
 
If tax treaties do not deal effectively with electronic commerce, and the amounts 
concerned are significant, unilateral action driven by electronic commerce will 
weaken the relevance of tax treaties in general.   A concrete reform process on 
policy, not only interpretation, should be undertaken before electronic commerce 
growth to a critical size.  At that point, pressure would have reached critical levels, 
and the opportunity to generate international consensus may be limited.  By that 
time the international process runs its course (e.g. committees are selected, issue 
and options are debated, mandates are framed, draft papers are released, comments 
are received, matters are reconsidered, and actual decisions are eventually made), 
unilateral solutions may already be implemented at the state level.   
Moreover, a reform process that actually starts before matters reach a critical point 
would say something important about the general role and direction of tax treaties:  
“One general issue that seems pertinent to the debate, but which has not been 
articulated thus far, concerns the role of tax treaty policy in general – specifically, 
whether it should be a leader, or a follower, of international trade and investment 
patterns.  In other words, the issue posed is whether tax treaties must adapt to the 
normal modes in which international trade and commerce are presently conducted, 
or whether policymakers dare take the view that business practices must adapt to 
tax measures enacted in pursuit of longer-term policy goals”.251
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Thus, the inevitability of further electronic commerce expansion combined with its 
slower than expected growth to-date create a rare opportunity for tax treaties to 
lead, rather than follow, international trade patterns.   
5.4.6 Enforceability  
Traditionally, the realistic doctrine and enforcement considerations supported 
source taxation:  
“…the real rationale for taxing non-residents on domestic source income is a 
revenue one; the source country is in a position to tax the income first; therefore, it 
makes sense from a revenue gathering perspective to impose the first layer of tax 
on that income”.252   
In the context of electronic commerce, this rationale operates in the opposite 
direction.  In the absence of property or assets of the non-resident in the source 
state, special withholding tax or bilateral cooperation, enforcement by the source 
state can be difficult.  The residence state may be in a better position to tax the 
income first.  The residence state maintains the same ability to collect tax, 
irrespectively of the method by which, or medium through which, its residents 
derive income.253   
 
Inability to enforce collapses the whole argument supporting source taxation of 
business profits from electronic commerce.  Whatever benefit or economic 
allegiance rights the source state has, however fair its claim about its diminishing 
tax base maybe, however convincing the neutrality considerations might be, as the 
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realistic doctrine suggests, there is no point in imposing taxes which cannot be 
collected.  Any viable reform proposal will have to address this issue. 
 
5.5 Permanent Establishment - Summary 
The permanent establishment concept emerged at the end of the 19th century, a 
period when physical presence represented a reasonable compromise between the 
residence state and the source state.  Absent physical presence, there was little 
scope to generate business profits and assert tax claims over non-residents.  
Physical presence also presented pragmatic consistency with the conceptual bases, 
particularly in a treaty-bilateral context, where a state either had the right to tax or it 
did not.   However, the permanent establishment concept did not follow the pace 
and scope of economic developments and changes, causing the continuing 
expansion of the gap between the rationales of the concept and the actual outcome 
produced by its operation.   
 
Electronic commerce accelerates this process.  The attributes of electronic 
commerce have a far greater potential to capture sizeable market segments than 
tradition methods.  Yet, these very attributes also undermine the source state’s 
ability to collect tax.  Material shifts of tax revenues caused by electronic commerce 
appear to be a question of time; states may experience leakage of tax revenue 
without the benefits associated with direct investment.  The lower-than-expected 
growth of electronic commerce means that immediate (and ill-informed) action may 
not be necessary.  Nevertheless, this does not justify complacency.  If it is accepted 
that electronic commerce will grow to a size affecting noticeable impact on 
revenue, the risk of unilateral action and inconsistent and uncertain national rules 
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aimed at recapturing the revenue lost could not be ignored.  Reform will be 
required, and the process will take some time.  The short history of the commercial 
Internet demonstrates the ability of electronic commerce to grow extremely fast.  If 
the aim is to maintain the relevance of tax treaties, then treaty development ought to 
accord with economic development.  The time is ripe to embark upon the next stage 
of the international process and to closely consider policy issues and reform the 
permanent establishment rules themselves. 
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 6 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INCOME 
CHARACTERISATION 
6.1 Introduction 
The second ‘broad and ultimately important issue’ in the study of the interaction 
between tax treaties and electronic commerce is income characterisation and the 
distinction between business profits and royalties.  As discussed above, the 
application of the distinction to electronic commerce was considered in great detail 
by the OECD.  However, the OECD did not seek to examine the important policy 
issues concerned.  This part of the paper focuses upon these policy issues.  It 
explores the historical perspective of income categorisation, the development of the 
distinction between business profits and royalties, the various rationales justifying 
the distinction, and issues pertaining to its practical application in the electronic 
commerce context.  It is concluded that, in the electronic commerce context, the 
distinction is almost irrelevant and is inconsistent with policy and fundamental 
treaty objectives. 
6.2 Income Categorisation – History 
As mentioned above, the League of Nations 1923 Report was commissioned to 
address “the evils consequences of double taxation”.254  When the four economists 
approached this task, they focused upon bilateral, and not multinational, 
arrangements: 
 
                                            
254 League of Nations 1923 Report, Introduction. 
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“The point that the [League of Nations 1923 Report] desired to emphasise here is 
that in default of any supreme central authority the problem of international fiscal 
cooperation will in all probability be solved for a long time to come only through 
bilateral agreements on the part of the two countries concerned or, at all events, by 
agreements in which at any given time only two respective countries will be 
interested”.255    
 
Within this bilateral context, which has not lost any grounds over the decades, the 
four economists examined possible solutions.  Relief from double taxation requires 
the surrender of revenue by Governments; “The question therefore at once arises: 
Which Government should give up revenue, and to what extent?”256  The four 
economists explored four methods to determine the question: (a) ‘deduction for 
income from abroad’; (b) ‘exemption for income going abroad’; (c) ‘division of the 
tax’; and (d) ‘classification and assignment of income’.257
 
Under the ‘deduction for income from abroad’ method, the residence state deducts 
from the tax due from its residents any tax paid by them in the source state.  The 
four economists flatly rejected this method on the basis that it would be unfair to the 
residence state in that it “throws the whole burden of increased taxation in debtor 
countries upon the creditor country.”258   
 
The ‘exemption for income going abroad’ method, by contrast, requires the source 
state to give up its right to tax non-residents.  This method found more favor with 
the four economists.  It reflected what governments were doing to attract foreign 
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investment, it accorded with the economic interests of those who invest in the 
source state, and it did not require complex allocations of income.  They thus 
concluded that this method was “the most desirable practical method of avoiding 
the evils of double taxation and should be adopted wherever countries feel in a 
position to do so”.259
 
The ‘division of the tax’ method concerns the division of taxes between the states 
on a formula basis, so that a portion is allocated to the source state and the 
remainder to the residence state, which should give relief by reference to a definite 
amount that has been levied in the source state.  The economists noted the attractive 
simplicity of this method and asked whether this simplicity should override 
economic theory, thus whether they should: 
 
“not attempt to get the exact elements of economic allegiance but to adopt a broad 
line and say that where double taxation of income is involved each country shall 
give up a flat or fixed proportion of the sum due to it”. 260   
 
However, the economists then decided to reject this method for two reasons.  The 
first concerned the practicalities involved in actually applying this method.  
Different tax systems, different tax rates, different treatment of corporate income, 
administrative difficulties and limited access to information would render this 
method overall unworkable.  Secondly, there would be inherent difficulties involved 
with fixing such a flat portion because economic relationships among states 
differ.261  
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 Under the ‘classification and assignment of income’ method, income is classified 
into classes, and the two states allocate revenue on the basis of this classification.  
The four economists, who apparently favored residence-based taxation, stated 
unequivocally that on pure economic allegiance grounds, this method “would be the 
soundest”.262  However, they rejected this method because they considered that, in 
the real world, the classification of income and the resulting allocation of taxing 
rights would be fraught with difficulties.  It would be: 
 
“almost impossible in economic theory to get a direct assignment of a quantitative 
character of finally resultant income amongst all the national agents who may be 
said to have a finger in the pie”.263   
 
The economists then explained these difficulties by way of example.   A resident in 
country A owns half of a farm in Country B.  The return produces by the farm 
contains the elements both of rent and business profits.  The Country A resident 
also has another property and carries on other activities in Country A, which 
produces an income similar to that produced in Country B.  This simple example 
was sufficient to expose some of the drawbacks of the ‘classification and 
assignment of income’ method:  
 
“Is the income derived from the rent or from profits, or from a combination of 
these with possible losses in other directions, or to what it is due?  If there is no 
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systematic valuation of annual yields on proper lines, how is the rental value to be 
determined when it is mixed with other elements? “264   
 
They then developed the example by interposing a company between the Country A 
resident and the farm in Country B: 
 
“The rent or produce of the farm is only one of the items of income of this legal 
entity.  This company receives a real or constructive rent, it mixes this rent with 
losses from other sources, and as a result it pays a very small sum in the shape of 
dividends to the resident in country A.  Has the resident received, or has he not, the 
rent of the farm?” 265   
 
The four economists concluded that the classification and assignment of income’ 
method is extremely limited and impractical: “It will be seen that simplicity only 
exists in a minority of cases involving income tax and that we soon get into the 
region of impracticability if we attempt to apply [this method] in precision”. 266
 
The work of the four economists was supposed to be the basis upon which a group 
of nominated technical experts would draft a model tax treaty for the League of 
Nations.  The technical experts produced their first report in 1925.267  They did not 
follow the recommendations, or the reasoning, of the four economists.  Rather, the 
technical experts chose to draft a model treaty on the basis of the ‘classification and 
assignment of income’ method.  Their recommendation allocated personal taxes (or 
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income taxes) to the residence state, and impersonal taxes (or impôts rées) to the 
source state.268   
 
The technical experts openly stated that their conclusion was made  
 
“for purely practical purposes and no inference in regard to economic theory or 
doctrine should be drawn from this fact”.269   
 
A close examination of the process and its background indicates that the technical 
experts made their decision on the basis of four practical considerations.  The first 
consideration concerned collection and administration.  It is easier for the source 
state to collect impersonal taxes than personal taxes because the collection of 
impersonal taxes would not involve the declaration by the taxpayer of total 
income.270  The second consideration related to the interests of the source state, and 
the composition of the group of technical experts.  One of most important 
background facts of League of Nations process was that three of the four 
economists came from creditor nations, whereas most of the technical experts came 
from debtor nations.271  Naturally, as distinct from the economists who favored 
exclusive residence taxation, the technical experts had different concerns:  
 
“New countries which need foreign capital for their general development desire to 
have a share in the taxes levied on income arising in their territory, and they are 
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unwilling to leave them to the countries, often already very rich, which have 
provided the capital”.272
 
Thirdly, most of the technical experts were familiar with impersonal tax systems, 
and most European jurisdictions did not have at the time a system of personal 
taxes.273  Impersonal taxes were common in Europe at that time.  They were 
imposed on various types of income on a source basis such as taxes on land, 
business profits, immovable property, industrial or commercial establishment, 
mortgages, director fess, transferable securities and various credits and annuities.274     
 
Fourthly, the model recommended was based on precedent.  It was commonly used 
in central European states before and after the First World War.275  It was a familiar 
model.   It did not mark any significant departure from existing practice and norms.  
The technical experts, as distinct from the economists, did not seek novel solutions, 
but rather, a solution that would be acceptable by the various members of the 
League of Nations.  As Seligman noted, the decision had a strong political flavor: 
 
“When…the technical experts came together, their concern was primarily to enter 
into some arrangement which would be politically agreeable to their respective 
governments”.276   
 
Viewed from that perspective, the adoption of a familiar treaty structure as a model 
made sense.  It followed the path of least resistance and reinforced existing and 
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familiar arrangements concerning the allocation of tax revenue and methods of 
preventing double taxation.  
 
The model suggested by the technical experts - impersonal taxation by the source 
state and personal taxation by the residence state - was incorporated into the first 
model treaty produced by the League of Nations in 1927.   The impersonal taxes 
included income from immovable property, public funds, bonds, shares, industrial, 
commercial or agricultural undertakings, trade and profession, pensions and 
annuities, reflecting many of the income categories of modern tax treaties (a 
separate royalty category was absent).277   
 
Following concerns that the 1927 model did not interact well with tax systems that 
by then were not imposing impersonal taxes, a subsequent League of Nations 
Report was released in 1928, setting out three models.278  The first, ‘Draft No. 1a’, 
was in essence based on the 1927 model.  The second and third, ‘Draft No. 1b’ and 
‘Draft No. 1c’, did not distinguish between personal and impersonal taxes.  They 
identified specific tax categories, and allocated them (each draft on a different 
basis) to the source or residence state.  The rest is indeed history - the ‘classification 
and assignment of income’ method prevailed: 
 
 “…we already have the basis of articles 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 21 of 
the current OECD Model Treaty …Obviously, there have been a lot of refinements 
since then but the basic pattern has not changed.  Source taxation today is therefore 
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the direct successor of separate source-based taxes on different types of income.  
Indeed, with an exemption system, there is little difference between an income tax 
and those separate source taxes; the charge on domestic income may be more 
comprehensive under an income tax but foreign income basically is taxed only on a 
source basis, just as it was for imports reals, except for investment income where 
the taxes are shares”.279
 
The work of the League of Nations continued to be based on the ‘classification and 
assignment of income’.  When the OECD picked up the development of model tax 
treaties from the League of Nations, it retained the method and based its models 
upon it.280  The method is now reflected in the OECD Model Treaty, the UN Model 
Treaty, the US Model Treaty, and over 1,500 tax treaties around the world.281  
6.3 The Distinction between Business Profits and Royalties - 
History  
Traditionally, royalties, in the fiscal context, referred to two classes of payments; 
the first associated with intangibles or intellectual property and the second with 
natural resources:  
 
“the…applications of the term [‘royalties’] seem to fall under two heads, namely 
the payments which the grantees of monopolies such as patents and copyrights 
receive under licences and payments which the owner of the soil obtains in respect 
of the taking of some special thing forming part of it or attached to it which he 
suffers to be taken… In the case of monopolies and the like the essential idea seems 
to be payment for each thing produced or sold or each performance or exhibition in 
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pursuance of the licence.  In the same way in the case of things taken from the land 
the essential notion seems to be that the payment is made in respect of the taking of 
something which otherwise might be considered to belong to the owner of the land 
in virtue of his ownership".282
 
It appears that royalties were, initially, not as important as other income categories. 
There is little information on the early development of royalty taxation under tax 
treaties.283 The early League of Nations drafts did not contain a specific royalty 
income category.  Under the 1928 Draft No. 1c, for instance, royalties were taxable 
by the residence state under the ‘other income’ provision.284  This can be drawn 
from the fact that when the four economists discussed the intangible personality and 
incorporeal movable category, they did not even mention royalties.  They confined 
the discussion to real estate mortgages, corporate securities, government bonds and 
private credits, which were the “most important classes in this category”.285   
 
A royalty category subsequently appeared in the League of Nations 1931 draft, 
which provided that in the absence of a permanent establishment in the source state, 
income from patent rights were taxable exclusively by the residence state.286  In 
1933, another League of Nations draft treaty was produced, containing a separate 
category of royalties: 
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“Rentals or royalties arising from leasing personal property or from any interest in 
such property, including rentals or royalties for the use of, or for the privilege of 
using, patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulae, goodwill, trademarks, 
trade brands, franchises and other like property, provided the enterprise is not 
engaged in dealing in such property”.287     
This specific reference to royalty income seems to have followed the emergence of 
royalties as a stand-alone income category in tax treaties in the 1930s.  This process 
lacked the relative uniformity that underpinned the development of the permanent 
establishment, although in many instances the residence state obtained exclusive 
taxing rights.288   
 
The tension between source and residence in the particular context of royalties 
became an important issue in subsequent League of Nations work. Following two 
conferences in Mexico, dominated by representatives of Latin America states, in 
1943 the League of Nations issued a new model treaty (the ‘Mexico Model’), which 
placed considerable emphasis on source taxation.289  The royalty provisions stated, 
among other things: 
 
“Royalties and amounts received as a consideration for the right to use a patent, a 
secret process or formula, a trademark or other analogous right shall be taxable 
only in the state where such right is exploited. 290
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In 1946, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations convened in London to 
review the Mexico Model, and submitted a new model treaty (the ‘London Model’).  
The strong emphasise of the Mexico Model upon source taxation was effectively 
reversed under the London Model.291  It accordingly stated: 
 
“Royalties derived from one of the contracting states by an individual, corporation 
or other entity of the other contracting state for the right to use a patent, a secret 
process or formula, a trademark or other analogous right shall not be taxed in the 
former state”.292
 
The Fiscal Committee acknowledged that the provisions of the Mexico Model 
might appear more attractive to some states, and observed that there was an 
effective divergence between the views of the 1943 Mexico meeting and those of 
the London meeting in relation to a number of passive income items, including 
royalties, which “has always been in dispute”.293   
 
The tension and disagreement surrounding the taxation of royalties, reflected in the 
Mexico Model and London Model, has all but disappeared.  As noted above, the 
OECD Model Treaty and the US Model Treaty disallow taxation of royalties by the 
source state if there is no permanent establishment there, but most states, and the 
UN Model Treaty, impose, or allow the imposition of, royalty withholding tax.294  
The real compromise concerns the rate of the withholding tax, and not the waiver of 
the right to tax.  The royalty withholding tax mechanism lends itself to a concrete 
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and practical negotiations process, enabling concessions and decisions to be made 
on the rate of tax, rather than the right to tax.295   
 
6.4 The Distinction between Business Profits and Royalties –
Rationales Applied in the Electronic Commerce Context 
The modern definition of royalties found in tax treaties does not typically include 
income from immovable property, and the OECD Model Treaty also omits the 
reference to industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.  The objective is to have 
an income category based upon the realization of value embodied in intangible 
property, or as noted by the OECD, “income from intangibles with a substantial 
intellectual content”.296  This objective is central to the understanding of the 
rationalization of the distinction between business profits and royalties. 
6.4.1 Balanced Competing Fiscal Claims 
The realistic and sovereignty doctrines do not seem to support any distinction 
between business profits and royalties.  With respect to the realistic doctrine, the 
ability or inability of the state to compel its resident to withhold tax on behalf of the 
non-resident is indifferent to the category of the income concerned.  Competence to 
collect the tax vests in the state jurisdiction to tax the non-resident if the state can 
collect the tax, typically by withholding measures.   
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The sovereignty doctrine focuses on the existence of “some property or interest”297 
within a state’s boundaries.  This has little to do with the category of the income 
concerned.  Rather, the sovereignty doctrine would have to deal with the particular 
difficulties associated with the situs of such interest or property.  For example, in 
some jurisdictions, general information and know-how are not property.298  As a 
result, a non-resident who receives royalties in relation to, say, know-how may not 
have any proprietary rights in the source state, apart perhaps, from the right to sue 
for payment in the event of default.  To assert jurisdiction, the state would need to 
ensure that its internal laws are sufficiently broad to create legal interests within its 
borders.   
 
However, the benefit/entitlement (and faculty) and economic allegiance doctrines 
can lead to different results on the basis of income categorisation.  A royalty 
payment can be divided into three types of compensation: (a) for the reduction in 
the value of the underlying property caused by the granting of the right to use, and 
the use of, that property, (b) for maintaining the underlying property, and in most 
cases of periodic payments, bearing the risk throughout the period of the grant, and 
(c) for return on the licensed capital.299  The first and second types of compensation 
have their economic source in the residence state (where the acquisition or creation 
of the underlying property and its ongoing development take place), whereas the 
third type of compensation has its economic source in the source state (where the 
licensee uses the property).300   
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The rationale adopted by the OECD in disallowing source taxation of royalties 
assumes that the totality of the royalty payment has a much stronger connection 
with the residence state.  This reasoning is unequivocally reflected in the OECD 
Software Report in which it was asserted that a treaty that allows taxation in source 
gives rise to a paradox: 
 
“Taxation on a gross basis occurs only in the absence of a permanent 
establishment; if a royalty is effectively connected with a permanent establishment, 
the effect of Article 7 together with paragraph 3 of Article 12 is to ensure taxation 
on a net basis.  Paradoxically the less the connection of the payee with the state of 
source, the greater his tax burden there”.301
 
However, the assumption that the residence state has the strongest fiscal connection 
to the royalty is not necessarily correct.  It undervalues the return on capital 
component of the total payment constituting a royalty.  This component is by no 
means minor.302  Lokken contents that it is the stronger consideration component:  
 
“The services and protections provided by the government of the country in which 
the licensee uses the property are quite obviously more important for this income 
than are the services and protections provided to the licensor by the country of his 
residence, the country in which the license is made or any other country that may 
be touched by the license transaction.  Intellectual property derives its value from 
the right of the owner to exclude others from using it.  The income from a 
particular use therefore is, at least to some extent, a product of the laws that provide 
the right to exclude others from using the property at that place and time.  The laws 
                                            
301 OECD Software Report, para 40(c) (emphasis added).   
302 Vogel (1988), p. 401. 
 101
and legal system at the place of use constitute, in sum, the governmental services 
and protections of greatest consequence for royalty income”.303   
 
It appears, on balance, that both the residence and the source state have a strong 
claim to tax royalties under the economic allegiance and benefit/entitlement 
doctrines.304   In a perfect world, the taxing rights should be divided in accordance 
with the respective strengths of the fiscal claims made by the states.305  But this is 
not a perfect world, and such a division is obviously impossible.  Therefore, as 
Vogel appears to suggest in another context, an arbitrary division of taxing rights 
may be the only feasible reflection of the operation of strength and competing 
claims.306  This is basically the function fulfilled by gross taxation in the form of 
royalty withholding tax, although not always on the basis of equality.   
 
The requirement to have a threshold for source taxation of business profits, and not 
royalties, may be understood against that background.  In the context of a mere sale 
of goods or provision of services, the fiscal claims of the residence state would 
typically be much stronger than those of the source state.  The four economists 
briefly touched upon the provision of professional services.  They took the view that 
unless the individual has a commercial enterprise in the source state that “Inasmuch 
as these [professional services] are due wholly to the activity of the individual, the 
sole factor involved is that of domicile”. 
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Royalties, on the other hand, give rise to different and more powerful source claims.  
The source state protects the right which preserve the value of the property 
concerned, and thus the claim over the non-resident is too substantial to be ignored 
or be superseded by residence claims.  
 
This very reasoning also negates the need to have a threshold for the taxation of 
business profits from electronic commerce transactions.  In this particular (and 
digital) context, the source state has a strong claim over the business profits of the 
online non-resident vendor.  This view was also endorsed by McLure: 
  
“In the pre-digital world the argument for source-based taxation based on the 
benefit principle suggests that a physical presence should probably be required to 
establish nexus for source-based income taxation…The situation seems to be 
different in the digital world.   Most obviously, protection of intellectual property is 
crucial to vendors of intangible products and digitized services and does not depend 
on whether the seller has a physical presence in the taxing nation…Thus, in the 
digitized world perhaps a physical presence should not be required to justify 
source-based taxation under the benefit theory”.307
 
Thus, the distinction between business profits and royalties may be traditionally 
warranted on economic allegiance and benefit/entitlement grounds, yet it loses 
much of its validity in the electronic commerce context, where the source state 
fulfills a crucial role in protecting the value of the thing supplied by the non-
resident.     
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6.4.2 Pure Income Interest 
The traditional distinction between royalties and business profits can be explained 
in terms of return on investment or expenditure: 
 
“…the tax policy justification for allowing gross-based taxation is that royalties, 
like dividends and interest, generally represent pure income interest.  Because no 
expenses are directly attributable to the generation of this sort of income, gross-
basis taxation is warranted.  Gross-basis taxation is unreasonable for business 
profits, however, because the real economic return in such cases is only the net 
income after expenses…Since gross-basis taxation is justified only for pure income 
streams, royalty treatment is appropriate only for commercial reproduction licenses 
and similar partial transfers of intellectual property rights”.308  
 
However, this view ignores amortization and costs associated with the creation, 
maintenance, protection and updates of the property concerned.  This was the key 
issue debated between developing and developed states in relation to Article 12 of 
the UN Model Treaty.309  The developing states argued that the source state should 
have the primary right to tax royalties arising in developing states since patents and 
processes are licensed to developing states after they had been fully exploited 
elsewhere and after the expenditure incurred in connection with their development 
had already been largely recouped.  The developed states responded by stating that 
it would be unrealistic to assume that enterprises selected the older patents for 
licensing to developing states.  Normally, an enterprise would license a patent to a 
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foreign subsidiary and therefore select the most up-to-date inventions to expand or 
open markets.  The UN Commentary accordingly noted that:  
 
“…the country of source should recognize both current expenditures allocable to 
the royalty and expenditure incurred in the development of the property whose use 
gave rise to the royalty.  It should be considered that the costs of developing the 
property are also allocable to profits derived from other royalties or activities, past 
or future, associated with these expenditures and that expenditure not directly 
incurred in the development of that property might nevertheless have contributed 
significantly to that development”.310
 
Moreover, the argument that royalties represent pure income interest (and business 
profits do not) sits uncomfortably in a framework where income from services is 
categorised as business profits (e.g. under the OECD Model Treaty).  If, as that 
argument suggests, the cost of goods sold justifies the distinction, then this factor is 
inapplicable in relation business profits derived from independent personal services.  
Furthermore, the argument that royalties are distinguishable because they generate 
pure income interest is particularly undermined in the context of electronic 
commerce, where business profits are generated over the Internet and reproduction 
costs are nominal:  
 
“The literature discusses two principles relating to information economics: (i) the 
cost of creating an information good is fixed and can be quite high (for example, 
the cost of writing and producing a new song); and (ii) the marginal cost of 
distributing an information good approaches nil because digital goods and services 
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can be copied and transmitted for almost no cost (for example, the cost of copying 
and transmitting a digital file of a song--an MP3 file--to a consumer located 
anywhere in the world is almost zero)”.311
 
Thus, the pure income interest argument seems to lose its force in the electronic 
commerce context.  If anything, it operates to actually support the elimination of the 
distinction between business profits and royalties in that context.   
 
6.4.3 Passive Income v Active Income 
It was argued by Professor Avi-Yonah that, broadly speaking, tax treaties seek to 
allocate active income to the source state and passive income to the residence 
state.312  This argument may be somewhat simplistic.  As a matter of fact, this goal 
has not been achieved, and royalty withholding tax is an example on point.  
Nevertheless, the reasoning behind this argument may assist to better understand the 
distinction between business profits and royalties.      
 
Professor Avi-Yonah indicated that central to the distinction between active and 
passive income is the fact that generally passive income is primarily derived 
directly by individuals, or closely held entities; and active income is primarily 
derived by large publicly traded corporations.313  The distinction between active and 
passive income is by and large based upon the considerations concerning the type of 
taxpayer, that is, whether the taxpayer is an individual or a corporation.   
 
                                            
311 Cockfield (2002), pp. 341-342. 
312 Avi-Yonah (1996), p. 1307; Graetz (2001), p. 262. 
313 Avi-Yonah (1996), p. 1310; Avi-Yonah (1997), p. 519.  See also Frisch (1990) at p. 587 
suggesting that capital markets have become efficient and investors can invest directly without the 
assistance of large corporations. 
 106
Residence-based taxation of individuals is justifiable for a number of reasons.314  
Firstly, residency of individuals can be readily ascertained.  Secondly, since most 
individuals are part of only one society, distributional concerns can be addressed 
most effectively by the residence state.  Thirdly, residence often overlaps with 
political allegiance, and in democratic jurisdictions, residence-based taxation is a 
proxy for taxation with representation.  Taxation of corporations, on the other hand, 
gives rise to considerations warranting taxation at source.315  Firstly, the fiscal 
connections, especially under benefit/entitlement doctrine, warrant taxation by the 
source state once the non-resident meets a threshold indicating a critical level of use 
of local benefits when deriving active income there.  Secondly, residence of 
corporations is a rather artificial concept, which lends itself to manipulation.  
Thirdly, the relationship between a corporation and its place of residence do not 
necessarily accord with the relationship between an individual and his or her state 
of residence.   
 
Another layer of considerations distinguishing between passive and active income 
concerns the theories of capital export neutrality (“CEN”) and capital import 
neutrality (“CIN”).316  In brief, under CEN, worldwide efficiency in the allocation 
of resources would be achieved if taxes do not affect the decision of where to 
invest.  This goal can be achieved if a resident of any nation pays the same marginal 
tax rate no matter where the investment is made.  CEN, therefore, focuses upon  
residence taxation.  Yet since, in theory, it does not matter which state collects the 
tax revenue, CEN can also be achieved if the residence state grants a credit (in 
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theory, a full credit) for the tax collected by the source state.317  CIN, on the other 
hand, focuses upon neutrality in the state where the investment is made.  
Competitiveness in that state requires that all investments be subject to the same 
marginal tax rate regardless of the investor’s place of residence.  CIN therefore 
implies source-based taxation and exemption from foreign tax granted by the 
residence state.318   
 
Taxation of passive investment, especially portfolio investment by individuals, 
better accords with CEN.319  If a foreign equity or debt market offers an investor a 
better return than the domestic market, the investor should invest accordingly, as 
foreign taxation should not affect the ability to access the higher foreign return.320  
By contrast, active and direct investment by corporations better accords with 
CIN.321  Whereas investors can readily shift portfolio investments across 
jurisdictions in accordance with the returns offered, it is often not efficient or 
practical to shift direct investment, which often requires time to produce return.  
Competitiveness within a state is therefore important, and accordingly, the rates of 
tax in that state assume greater relevance.322      
 
However, it seems that the rationalization of the general distinction between active 
and passive income may apply to debt and equity investment, but not in a 
framework when the passive income is royalties.  The factual assertion that most 
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passive investment is made by individuals is not extended to royalties.323  Thus, the 
set of factors that distinguish residence/individual taxation and source/corporate 
taxation is simply incorrect as a matter of fact in respect to royalties.  Likewise, the 
CIN/CEN arguments supporting that distinction lose force when applied to royalties 
(as distinct from portfolio investment).  Royalties are based on contractual 
arrangements specifying duration, and other terms and conditions which render 
income derivation a completely different exercise in terms of commitment, 
mobility, maintenance and ongoing performance of obligations.   
 
Electronic commerce adds another challenge to the debate on CEN and CIN.  In 
general, it may be assumed that electronic commerce is conducted by corporations.  
The difference is that there is no investment by the non-resident corporation in the 
source state from which income is derived.  The investment is in infrastructure, 
hardware, administration and the like, and can be made anywhere.  Residence-based 
taxation of corporations may therefore be warranted under CEN on the basis that 
source taxation is, as a matter of fact, irrelevant to the location of the investment.  
Yet CIN would validly suggest that electronic commerce increases the importance 
of source taxation of electronic commerce profits.  Firstly, although the online 
vendor makes no investment in the source state, it still needs to compete with other 
online vendors in the same market.  Different rates of residency taxation would 
affect the competition among different vendors in the destination markets.   
Secondly and more importantly, residence-based taxation of electronic commerce 
would simply direct investment to, and the establishment of corporate residency in, 
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low-tax jurisdiction.324  This practice could only be avoided by source taxation, as 
put by Professor Li:  
 
“…in the world of high-speed and secret electronic communications, it is almost as 
difficult to determine where people and corporations reside as it is to determine 
where transactions occur.  Enforcing residence-based taxation on the global income 
of individuals and corporations, especially from tax havens, can be difficult, 
particularly for developing countries.  As e-commerce grows the mobility of capital 
is likely to increase substantially; thus, there is an even greater risk of capital flight 
and greater demand for enforcement efforts.  Rules based on corporate residence 
may be just as susceptible to manipulation as source rules are, if not more so”.325   
 
Thus, the rationalization of the general distinction between active and passive 
income in tax treaties loses relevance and validity when applied to royalties.  This 
very rationalization would suggest that royalties should be taxed at source, thereby 
undermining the already questionable coherence of the distinction between active 
and passive income.  This is even more apparent in the electronic commerce 
context, where the income is normally derived by corporations that compete with 
each other in the same markets but may reside in low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
6.5 Applying the Distinction between Business Profits and 
Royalties to Electronic Commerce  
Income characterisation can trigger tricky and hard questions.  It is often difficult to 
draw a line, for example, between employment and business income, profits and 
                                            
324 See recent discussion on tax havens and electronic commerce in Cockfield (2002), pp. 345-346. 
325 Li (1999), p. 1457. 
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capital gains, or dividend and interest income.326  It was even noted that: “[t]here is 
no practical way of distinguishing between different types of income under an 
income tax”.327  The four economists illustrated the point with their example on that 
farm in country B, and the rental/business/dividend income it generated.   
 
Similarly, the business profits/royalties distinction is supportable by certain 
economic rationales, but its application may be complex and fraught with difficulty: 
 
“The tax law has struggled for decades to distinguish among royalties, services and 
sales: Is the transfer of copyright rights for a lump sum a sale or a royalty?  Does an 
artist who sells his own painting earn sales or service income?  Does a musician 
performing in the United States for a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of 
records earn services or royalty income?  How about an inventor working for a 
pharmaceutical company that pays him a percentage from the sale of his 
invention?”328
 
This is particularly correct where one attempts to distinguish business profits and 
royalties in the context of electronic commerce.  The OECD Characterisation 
Report sought to clarify matters, but it seems that in doing so, it also exposed the 
inherent limitations and drawback of the distinction.  This is demonstrated by the 
examination below of the two main distinctions associated with the OECD Model 
Treaty’s definition of royalties outlined in OECD Characterisation Report: (a) 
                                            
326 See e.g. Sasseville (2000), p. 8; Avery Jones (1999), pp. 15-17; Rosenbloom (1996), pp. 610-615; 
Easson (1997), p. 422; Graetz (2001), pp. 315-316. 
327 Avery Jones (1999), p. 17. 
328 Avi Yonah (1997), pp. 543-544 (footnotes omitted). 
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business profits / payments for the use of, or the right to use, a copyright; and (b) 
payments for know-how / provision of services.329  
 
6.5.1 Business Profits and Payments for the Use of, or the Right to 
Use, a Copyright 
The OECD Characterisation Report indicated that one of the most important 
characterisation issues arising from electronic commerce was the distinction 
between business profits and payments for the use of, or the right to use, a 
copyright.  The definition of royalties applies to ‘payment for’ an item listed in the 
definition, and therefore, the distinction concerns the identification of the 
consideration for the payment.330  Since, at times, electronic commerce transactions 
inevitably involve the use of copyright (mainly by reproduction), it is necessary to 
determine what is the essence of the consideration: 
“Where the essential consideration is for something other than the use of, or the 
right to use, rights in the copyright (such as to acquire other types of contractual 
rights, data or services), and the use of copyright is limited to such rights as are 
required to enable downloading, storage and operation on the customer’s computer, 
network or other storage, performance or display device, such use of copyright 
should be disregarded in the analysis of the character of the payment for treaty 
purposes”.331  
This view is now reflected in the OECD Commentary: 
                                            
329 As noted above, the OECD Characterisation Report also discussed technical fees and payments 
for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, which categories 
are not included in the definition of royalties in the OECD Model Treaty (see text accompanying 
footnotes 167, and 168-169 above). 
330 OECD Characterisation Report, para 14. 
331 OECD Characterisation Report, para 14 (emphasis added).   
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“In deciding whether or not payments arising in [transactions concerning digital 
products] constitute royalties, the main question to be addressed is the 
identification of that for which the payment is essentially made”.332
However, it is not always easy to identify the essence of the consideration.  A 
simple example was raised a few years ago by the US Treasury: one may purchase 
ten hard copies of a book, ten electronic copies of the book, or one copy with the 
right to reproduce nine additional copies.333  Say one chooses the third option, what 
would be the essence of the consideration?  The payment may be a royalty since it 
concerns the acquisition of the right to reproduce nine copies (which reproduction is 
not an incidental mechanical consequence of the delivery process such as capturing, 
storing and displaying the data).  On the other hand, it could be argued that 
reproduction is merely a convenient way of acquiring ten copies, which acquisition 
is the essence of the consideration.   
Obviously, transactions that involve more sophisticated products will complicate 
matters further.  Commercial enterprises may deal with such questions, but 
consumers in mass-markets are unlikely to expend time and resources on questions 
such as what is the essence of the consideration of the thing purchased.    
This is why, perhaps, the OECD Commentary, on the basis of the OECD 
Characterisation Report, draws a distinction between private use and commercial 
exploitation of copyright.  If the purchaser downloads digital products for his or her 
own use or enjoyment, use of copyright should be ignored.334  By contrast, the right 
to commercially exploit the copyright would give rise to a royalty.335  This approach 
                                            
332 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para. 17.1 (emphasis added).   
333 US Treasury (1996), para 7.3.2.  See also discussion in Li (1999), pp. 1434-1436. 
334 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 17.3. 
335 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 17.4; OECD Characterisation Report, Annex 2, Category 
3. 
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seems practical.  It bypasses the difficulties associated with imposing unrealistic 
compliance liabilities on private consumers.   
However, this approach marks a considerable departure from the language of the 
definition of royalties, which makes no reference to any distinction on the basis of 
private or commercial exploitation purposes.  The definition simply alludes to use 
of copyright.  There is a fine line between interpretation or clarification of treaties, 
and setting policy or effectively re-writing treaties.   The decision to disregard 
incidental or inevitable use of copyright probably accords with the former.  The 
exclusion of private consumption from the scope of the royalty provisions probably 
accords with the latter, and in addition, could have significant neutrality 
consequences and come at the expense of importing states.   
Another questions arising from the OECD’s approach concerns the distinction 
between commercial use and commercial exploitation.  It appears that reproduction 
by commercial entities for internal use and purposes would not give rise to 
royalties.  This is supported by the OECD Commentary on software, which 
discusses distribution arrangements in which the transferee obtains rights to make 
multiple copies of the program for operation only within its own business.  The 
conclusion is that the reproduction right does not give rise to royalties: 
“Although these arrangements permit the making of multiple copies of the 
program, such rights are generally limited to those necessary for the purpose of 
enabling the operation of the program on the licensee’s computers or network, and 
reproduction for any other purposes is not permitted under the license.  Payments 
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under such arrangements will in most cases be dealt with as business profits in 
accordance with Article 7”.336    
The OECD seems to suggest that the intention of the treaty is to distinguish between 
royalties and business profits by distinguishing between transactions where the data 
transmitted stays with the purchaser and instances where it is on-sold in the market.  
Although, the royalty provisions do not expressly support such a proposition, it 
seems like a reasonable interpretation of such provisions.  However, it can result in 
peculiar outcomes.  Two simple examples will illustrate this difficulty.  Firstly, a 
non-resident software house may sell to a large local corporation the right to 
reproduce 10,000 copies of a program, strictly for internal needs and the use by the 
10,000 employees of that corporation.  This would not give rise to royalties, as there 
is no further exploitation of the program by the purchaser.  Another non-resident 
software house gives a local distributor the right to reproduce and sell a similar 
program, and the distributor sells 10,000 copies.  This would give rise to royalties 
since the distributor uses the copyright to exploit and market the program.  
Secondly, the other non-resident software house decides to sell and physically 
deliver to the distributor 10,000 CDs containing the program, without any 
reproduction rights.  This would not involve the use of reproduction rights, and 
thus, would not give rise to royalties, as the only use of copyright would be 
incidental (e.g. downloading the program into a computer).   
It does not seem that the OECD Characterisation Report has resolved matters.  
Indeed, the narrow scope of its mandate, which did not extend to policy issues, left 
no room for dealing with the real issues.  Fundamental and inherent difficulties 
come into play when the distinction is applied to electronic commerce.  
                                            
336 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 14.2. 
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Interpretation and clarification alone cannot address these difficulties and merely 
provides short-term solutions to the symptoms the cause of which requires attention 
at the policy and treaty level. 
6.5.2 Payments for Know-How / Provision of Services 
The second important distinction discussed in the OECD Characterisation Report 
and in the OECD Commentary is between payments for services and the provision 
of know-how.  The distinction, it is suggested, can be made by reference to the 
following general criteria:337  
• Contracts for the supply of know-how concern information which already exists 
or which has already been developed or created, and contain provisions dealing 
with the confidentiality of such information;338   
• Under contracts for the provision of services, the supplier undertakes to perform 
services which may require the supplier to use special knowledge, skill and 
expertise, but not to transfer know-how; and 
• Most contracts for the supply of know-how do not impose on the supplier 
additional substantial obligations subsequent to supply.  By contrast, under most 
                                            
337 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 11.3. 
338 In the particular case of a contract involving the provision of information concerning computer 
programming, as a general rule the payment will only be considered to be made in consideration for 
the provision of such information so as to constitute know-how where it is made to acquire 
information constituting ideas and principles underlying the program, such as logic, algorithms or 
programming languages or techniques, where this information is provided under the condition that 
the customer not disclose it without authorization and where it is subject to any available trade secret 
protection – see OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 11.5. 
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contracts for the performance of services, the supplier is required to incur during 
the term a considerable level of expenditure.339  
A similar approach may be used to distinguish between the provision of services 
and payments for assets.340  In general, a transaction will involve the provision of 
services if, after that transaction, the customer owns the property, but the property 
was not acquired from the provider.  For instance, the customer may engage the 
provider to create an item of property that the customer will own from the moment 
of creation, such as a computer program or video images.  By contrast, if the 
customer acquires valuable property, such as an investment report that was not 
created specifically for the customer, the transaction will be that of sale of property.   
The approach taken by the OECD in relation to the distinction between services and 
the supply of know-how, or the supply of assets, appears at first glance logical.  
However, as noted by the OECD, the distinction remains one that “sometimes gives 
rise to practical difficulties”.341  The criteria are based on normal or usual 
contractual arrangements and transaction patterns.  It will be difficult to apply such 
criteria to transactions that do not follow the usual pattern, or that are made in 
contexts warranting different transactional structures.  In addition, the applicability 
of Article 12 under this category heavily relies on the particular terms of the 
relevant contract, which reliance may give rise to ample tax planning opportunities, 
inconsistent results, and high compliance costs.   
These issues will become even more challenging in a mass-market context, where 
the range of products and combinations is enormous and the detailed examination of 
                                            
339 Where contracts concern both the supply of know-how and services, a reasonable apportionment 
should be made, unless one part of the supply is ancillary and largely unimportant in the context of 
the supply, it should be disregarded – see OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 11.6. 
340 See detailed discussion in OECD Characterisation Report, paras 32-35. 
341 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 11.3.   
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contractual terms may not be feasible.  Moreover, terms such as ‘know-how’, 
‘information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience’ and ‘trade 
secrets’ are, by their nature, vague and incoherent.  Courts have found it particularly 
difficult to apply such terms in practice, and internal laws can vary significantly in 
relation to confidential information and trade secrets.342   The definition of know-
how adopted in the OECD Commentary, for example, refers to:  
“…all the undivulged technical information, whether capable of being patented or 
not, that is necessary for the industrial reproduction of a product or process, directly 
and under the same conditions; insomuch as it is derived from experience, know-
how represents what a manufacturer cannot know from mere examination of the 
product and mere knowledge of the progress of technique”.343  
Whilst obvious examples may be readily determined, there are many instances 
where it is unclear whether the information concerned is know-how or not, or 
whether information is necessary, or, say, just required, for industrial reproduction.  
Also, it is often a difficult question of fact to determine what a hypothetical 
manufacturer could or could not know from mere examination and knowledge.  A 
distinction that is based on such concepts will therefore echo their ambiguous 
characteristics and create uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the rather extensive analysis that may be required can lead to peculiar 
and small corners from which it is easy to overlook the real issue, namely the  logic 
of the distinction, bearing in mind the different tax treatments that may result from 
its application.  Viewed from this perspective, the distinction gives rise to a number 
of challenging questions.  Does it matter whether the supplier sold services or 
know-how?  Is not the derivation of profit the issue?  If so, should that profit be 
                                            
342 See e.g. discussion in Fisk (2002); Ricketson (1999), para 25.55; Dean (1990), pp. 107-110. 
343 OECD Commentary on Article 12, para 11. 
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treated differently if, say, the supplier sells an available investment report or writes 
a new investment report for a particular customer?  Should any fiscal difference be 
drawn from the fact that the supplier sells information that is not technical, 
commercial or scientific in nature?  Should a pure commercial decision of who 
owns the intellectual property at the end of the transaction, which may vary from 
contract to contract, drastically change the tax consequences?    
 
The OECD Commentary and the OECD Characterisation Report do not address 
such questions.  If one takes a step back and look at the OECD’s attempt to 
distinguish between services and the supply of know-how or assets, one may 
conclude that, at best, the OECD dealt with some of the symptoms, but not with the 
cause.  The core problem is the distinction itself. All these fine distinctions - 
between know-how and general information; transfer of knowledge and use of 
knowledge; the creation of property for a customer before and after the transaction; 
the existence of confidentiality provisions and ongoing obligations of the supplier; 
or valuable and less valuable property – demonstrate that know-how and services 
are so intertwined that it may take considerable legal and factual analysis to draw a 
line between business profits and royalties in this context.  The distinction sits 
awfully uncomfortably in a fiscal framework that is supposed to achieve reasonable 
levels of neutrality, certainty and simplicity.   
 
6.5.3 OECD’S Approach to Income Characterisation – Further 
Observations 
The Australian Taxation Office noted prior to the publication of the OECD 
Characterisation Report that: 
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“…the application of traditional tax principles to digital products may lead to 
impractical results, with minor differences in the nature or mode of delivery of a 
product leading to significantly different tax results, thus offending principles of 
neutrality”.344
Similarly, Professor Doernberg argued:  
“Categorization of income from an economic standpoint is inherently artificial.  In 
the marketplace, a seller does not care (aside from tax considerations) how a 
payment received is categorized, as long as the payment is fair value for what was 
transferred…determining the difference between a royalty for licensing an 
intangible, and sales proceeds (or rental income) for the sale (or lease) of an article 
that embodies the intangible, may be untenable.  Problems of categorization are 
likely to intensify as electronic commerce becomes more widespread”.345
The above discussion of the OECD’s attempt to clarify the distinction between 
business profits and royalties shows that the guidelines proposed solve some 
problems, but give rise to new ones.  The OECD electronic commerce project did 
not satisfactory address the important issues raised above.  In addition to that, 
further observations may be made about the OECD’s approach, and its inability to 
promote coherence and effectiveness.   
 
Firstly, the OECD’s approach operates in favor the residence state.  It ignores 
inconsequential instances of copyright use which would be otherwise subject to 
royalty withholding tax, and removes private consumption from the scope of the 
royalty definition in certain circumstances.  Although, as with the permanent 
establishment issue, it is difficult to determine what is the scope of the resulting 
                                            
344 Australian Taxation Office, para 5.4.55. 
345 Doernberg (2000), Part IV. 
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revenue implications or their potential, revenue considerations are likely to make it 
harder for exporting states to accept the OECD’s approach.   
 
Secondly, electronic commerce, technology, business models and transactional 
structure will continue to evolve.  The OECD’s conclusions on interpretation and 
categorisation have thus limited life because they are based upon the application of 
guidelines reflecting contemporary practices and technologies, which may be 
obsolete in the near to medium term.     
 
Thirdly, it is doubtful whether the OECD’s work on income characterisation will 
generate international consensus.  As distinct from the permanent establishment 
concept, the definition of royalties differs among treaties.346  Also, internal source 
rules significantly differ on basic source concepts and their application to concepts 
such as services and intellectual property rights.  A recent survey noted, for 
example, that “[e]ven a cursory review of the various national reports shows that 
there is widely divergent treatment of taxation of services around the world”.347   
 
Fourthly, the OECD’s approach involves the balancing of complicated set of 
factors, contractual provisions and assumption.  Such an exercise, by its very nature, 
lacks certainty and can often produce different results on the basis of similar factual 
settings.  This can offend simplicity, and is likely to produce distortions 
undermining equity and neutrality.  For example, the Indian High Powered 
Committee on E-Commerce took a view different to that of the OECD 
Characterisation Report in relation to 13 of the 28 relatively simple categorization 
                                            
346 See footnote 153 and accompanying text. 
347 IFA (2001), p. 26 (General Report by Sprague Gary D and Boyle Michael P).   
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examples discussed in the OECD Characterisation Report.348  Leaving aside the 
technical arguments, this example demonstrates that the clarification of the 
distinction between royalties and business profits is almost destined to produce 
inconsistency as tax authorities may attach different weight to the various criteria 
and factors set out in the OECD Characterisation Report.     
 
 
6.6 Income Characterisation – Summary  
The four economists thought that the ‘classification and assignment of income’ 
method was sound in theory but problematic in practice, as it is not always easy to 
identify income categories and the division into categories in itself can be often 
artificial.  The technical experts, however, pursued pragmatism and decided to 
adopt the ‘classification and assignment of income’ method notwithstanding its 
drawbacks.  This method has remained the method underlying the operation of tax 
treaties today.  The business profits/royalties distinction evolved within the 
framework created by the ‘classification and assignment of income’ method.   
The taxation of royalties at source can be rationalized on benefit/entitlement and 
economic allegiance grounds, since royalties have in general stronger fiscal links 
with the source state than profits from remote sale of goods or provision of services.  
However, this rationalization loses much of its relevance and validity in the context 
of electronic commerce, where the protection of intellectual property rights can 
apply with equal importance to business profits.  Put it another way, if royalties 
should be taxed at source, then electronic commerce profits should be taxed at 
source.   
                                            
348 HPC (2000)”), pp. 96-145.  See also discussion in eComTaxpert (2002), pp. 21-22 and 38-1 
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The OECD sought to address the practical issues by clarifying the distinction, rather 
than examining its validity.  This lack of focus on policy issues resulted in a 
cosmetic treatment, rather than a remedy targeting the core problem.   
 
The above discussion leads to a clear and inescapable conclusion.  In the context of 
electronic commerce, the distinction between business profits and royalties is an 
extension of an historical hangover and has no valid reason to exist.  It is not 
supported by any of the conceptual bases.  It undermines simplicity, neutrality and 
equity.  It ought to be eliminated.   
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 7 REFORM PROPOSALS  
7.1 Introduction  
Whilst interpretation and clarification of existing rules is crucial in the short term, 
the medium to long term requires treaty reform, the case for which is argued above.   
 
In the electronic commerce context, there should be no distinction between business 
profits and royalties, and new rules governing electronic commerce profits are 
required.  This part of the paper focuses upon reform options and makes reform 
proposals.  The scope of the reform discussed is confined to electronic commerce.  
It is suggested that reform should not aim at restoration of the pre-electronic 
commerce revenue equilibrium, but rather, at a compromise where the states 
equally share the electronic commerce revenue.   
 
The discussion examines two reform approaches: the economic threshold and the 
base-erosion approaches.  The base-erosion approach, under which a low-rate 
withholding tax is applied to electronic commerce payments, appears preferable.  
However, the base-erosion approach is flawed in that it excludes the business-to-
consumer market to minimize collection difficulties.  This can offend neutrality and 
trigger negative revenue allocation consequences.  A number of collection methods 
are therefore explored to determine whether the base-erosion approach can be 
expanded to include the consumer market.  It is concluded that a collection 
mechanism based on financial institutions may be the basis of a viable and 
workable solution.  
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7.2 Scope of Reform 
Feasible reform should, at least initially, be confined to electronic commerce.  
Although the present permanent establishment concept does not work well in the 
electronic commerce context and has been eroded over the decades, it continues to 
fulfill a central role in tax treaties.349  In addition, the overall reform of the 
permanent establishment rules, beyond electronic commerce, would be an 
overreaction to electronic commerce.  Income categorisation, including the 
distinction between business profits and royalties, may well require broader and 
fundamental reform.  However, such a core issue requires separate and more 
comprehensive evaluation and examination processes.   Conclusions applicable to 
electronic commerce may not necessarily be correct in other contexts. 
Reform may best be accomplished on an incremental basis.  The fact that tax 
treaties serve fiscal, economic and political purposes perhaps best explains why the 
history of tax treaties has been underpinned by conservatism.  If reform in respect 
of electronic commerce is part of a broader reform agenda, it is likely that the 
proposed changes will be too far reaching, and thus, reform will be hindered.  Given 
that electronic commerce has not grown to a critical size, it will be much easier to 
debate and implement electronic commerce reform at the early stages of its growth.  
If the electronic commerce reform works well, then its principles and lessons may 
be used (as a pilot) in the future as the foundation of broader reform.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
349 Sasseville (2000), p. 12; Avery Jones (2000), p.3; Cockfield (1999), pp. 186-191. 
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7.3 Reform Options 
The elimination of the distinction between business profits and royalties needs to be 
incorporated into a system that taxes electronic commerce profits and overrides the 
existing permanent establishment rules.  Thus, the remaining question is how to 
deal with the permanent establishment issue.  A number of electronic commerce 
reform options have been raised in relation to the permanent establishment and 
income categorisation issues.350  This paper focuses upon two reform proposals: the 
economic threshold approach and the base-erosion approach.   
7.3.1 The Economic Threshold Approach  
Under the economic threshold approach,351 all electronic commerce income will fall 
under the scope of the business profits Article (Article 7 of the OECD Model Treaty 
and UN Model Treaty).  This Article will then be applied on the basis of a new 
threshold concerning economic, rather than physical, presence.  The threshold can 
be measured in a number of ways.  Many writers suggested that an effective 
indication of economic presence would be gross sales made to residents of the 
source state.352   
A non-resident that does not reach the threshold will not be subject to tax in the 
source state.  If, on the other hand, the threshold is met during the tax year, the 
source state will have the right to tax the non-resident by the imposition of 
                                            
350 Covering the spectrum ranging between exclusive residence-based taxation for all income and 
exclusive source-based taxation on all income.  See e.g. review of options in Lui, Thorp, de Zilva 
and Dixon (2001/2002), p. 296; Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 344-385; Li 
(1999), pp. 1463-1476; McLure (2000), pp. 8-10, Portner (2000), pp. 3-9; Cockfield 1999), pp. 167-
217. 
351 This approach was discussed and explored by a number of writers - see in particular Avi Yonah 
(1997), pp. 535-536; Cockfield (1999), pp. 198-203; McLure (1997), p. 417; Portner (2000), pp. 4-5; 
Thorp, De Zilva and Dixon (2001/2002), p. 296.  The description set out below is mainly based on 
Avi-Yonah's discussion. 
352 See references in footnote 351. 
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withholding tax.  The tax will be subject to the usual relief from double taxation, 
and would normally be creditable in the residence state.  The tax will not be 
necessarily final.  The non-resident will be able to file returns in the source state and 
be taxed on a net basis.  As the most effective way to determine whether the non-
resident has met the threshold is the filing of tax returns by the non-resident in the 
source state, it was thought that the withholding tax rate should be high, e.g. equal 
to the corporate tax rate, in order to encourage (or effectively compel) the non-
resident to file returns.353   
7.3.2 The Base-Erosion Approach 
The base-erosion approach, associated with the work of Professor Doernberg,354 is 
principally concerned with the revenue equilibrium between the states: “Consider 
the possibility of permitting increased source state withholding on payments that 
erode the tax base of the source state (i.e., the base-erosion approach)”.355   
There are significant similarities between the base-erosion approach and the 
economic threshold approach.  Under the former as well, all electronic commerce 
income will fall under the scope of the business profits Article.  Similarly, all such 
income would be subject to withholding tax imposed by reference to the gross 
payment, which tax will be subject to relief from double taxation, normally by way 
of credit.  In addition, under both approaches the non-resident will be entitled to 
lodge tax returns and be taxed on a net basis.   
                                            
353 See detailed discussion in Avi-Yonah (1997), pp. 535-540 and Cockfield (1999), pp. 198-203. 
354 Doernberg (1998); Doernberg and Hinnekens (1999), pp. 315-323; Doernberg (2000); Doernberg, 
Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 354-365. 
355 Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 357-458. 
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However, there are core differences.  Firstly, under the base-erosion approach there 
is no threshold below which the non-resident will not be taxed.  Source taxation is 
not dependent on the non-resident meeting some threshold.  Secondly, the base-
erosion approach concerns the imposition of tax by reference to a drastically lower 
withholding tax rate (e.g. 3%).356  As a result, the incentive to file returns in the 
source sate will be much weaker.  Thirdly, the base-erosion approach only applies 
to payments that are deductible by the payer.  Thus, transactions with private 
consumers in the source state will not be subject to the tax.357  This can be justified 
on the premise that the tax base of a state is eroded if the payment is deductible.  In 
addition, the nexus between the withholding tax and deductibility should make the 
tax readily enforceable.358   
7.4 Reform Options Examined 
There are no perfect solutions in taxation, and electronic commerce drives this point 
home.  The economic threshold and base-erosion approaches give rise to a range of 
issues, inherent difficulties and problems which will need to be resolved to render 
any reform viable.  The discussion below examines these issues and proposes ways 
by which they may be addressed. 
7.4.1 Withholding Tax and Low Profit Margins 
                                            
356 Various rates have been suggested.  Initially, the rate suggested was not that low: 10% 
(Doernberg (1998)).  Subsequently, references were made to a rate of 3% (Doernberg (2000); HPC 
(2000); McLure (2000)).  It was suggested that the rate should be determined on the basis of 
empirical studies (Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), p. 360).   
357 The linkage between failure to withhold tax and prevention of deductibility (of otherwise 
deductible payments) is not new – see e.g. section 26-25 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(Australia). 
358 Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 359 and 363. 
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It was argued above that withholding tax has been used for many years as an 
efficient and effective revenue collection and enforcement mechanism.  The 
following statement succinctly summarises the point:   
"We have placed a flat tax of 10 percent on nonresident aliens, that is, people not 
citizens of the United States and not residing in the United States; and this 10-
percent tax is withheld at the source.  We expect to get considerably more revenue 
out of both nonresident aliens and foreign corporations having no place of business 
or not engaged in trade or business in this country, than we have been getting under 
the present plan, because we are going to withhold it at the source, and not take a 
chance on their making a report of it, or having to send our representatives to some 
foreign country to find what their net income is, and seek to induce them to pay 
their tax”.359
However, simplicity and enforceability come at the expense of accurate and fair  
taxation.  In particular, it was argued that active income should not be subject to 
withholding tax.  As Katz contended: 
“There is clear, longstanding international consensus on the fact that a gross 
receipts withholding tax should not be imposed on active business 
income…Otherwise, withholding could comprise an excessive percentage of, or 
even exceed, total net income”.360
This argument is not without merit, and is closely associated with ‘pure interest 
income’ argument examined above.361  However, it is not unique to active income.  
Business models aim at profits, regardless of whether the costs stem from 
                                            
359 Representative Hill of Washington, of the Committee on Ways and Means (80 Cong. Rec. 6005 
(1936), as quoted by J,  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Wodehouse 337 U.S. 369 (1948), 391.  
See discussion on gross taxation in e.g. Dale (1980). 
360 Katz (1997), p. 659. 
361 See text accompanying footnote 308 above. 
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production or acquisition of goods or the creation and acquisition of the intellectual 
property rights.  In other words, low margins are not confined to active income..362  
As tax treaties around the world allowing royalty withholding tax demonstrate, the 
argument has been overridden by consideration of simplicity and enforceability.   
As to the particular issue at hand, the above argument may not be as persuasive, 
since, as noted above, the cost structures of many ‘active’ electronic commerce 
business models are based on nominal reproduction costs.363  In addition, under 
both reform options withholding tax is not necessarily final.  The non-resident can 
lodge returns and be taxed on a net basis.   
Would that mitigate those perceived negative effects of gross taxation?  The answer 
depends on which approach is to be adopted.  The economic threshold approach 
seeks to encourage the substitution of gross taxation by net taxation by almost 
compelling non-residents, through high gross taxation rates, to file returns in the 
source.  Given the significant logistics, compliance costs and resources involved, it 
is probable that non-residents would file return in a number of states where there is 
sufficient sales volumes, and will not trouble themselves with the rest of the 
jurisdictions in which they have sales.  As a result, the economic threshold approach 
will operate to significantly increase the effects of gross taxation, as the high 
withholding rate will reduce a larger pool of real profits.  Even if returns are filed, 
there would be unfair cash-flow consequences.  In effect, the high withholding rate 
will simply enable the source state to grab disproportionate and excessive tax 
revenue dollars.   
                                            
362 See text accompanying footnote 310 above. 
363 See text accompanying footnote 311 above. 
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On the other hand, the base-erosion approach allows, but does not strongly induce, 
filing of returns.  A low rate will weaken the negative impact of gross taxation.  A 
tax as low as, say, 3%, can substantially shrink the number of instances where the 
withholding tax would be greater than the profit margin.364  As a result, the base-
erosion approach would reduce the undesirable effects of gross taxation described 
above.  
7.4.2 Relief from Double Taxation 
It was argued that both approaches could result in double taxation because the 
residence state may not be obliged to grant relief against double taxation in relation 
to the withholding tax imposed by the source state..  Firstly, the present source rules 
may determine that the income did not arise in the state imposing the withholding 
tax.365  Secondly, the residence state may take the view that the withholding tax is 
effectively a non-creditable turnover tax, which is not similar to existing taxes 
covered under the treaty with the source state. 366   
However, the scope of this risk should be defined.  If reform is agreed and 
implemented in a treaty, relief would be available since the new treaty provisions 
would presumably address this issue.  The risk that relief will not be available is 
therefore confined to instances where there is no treaty, or where no reform is 
implemented and the withholding tax is imposed outside the scope of the treaty, 
through unilateral measures.   
Moreover, there is a flip side to the issue.  Even in circumstances where relief is 
unavailable and reform based on the base-erosion approach is implemented 
                                            
364 Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), pp. 357-458.   
365 Doernberg (1998), para 21. 
366 See discussion in eComTaxpert (2002), pp. 13-14. 
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unilaterally, there would be other implications that may overall counter balance the 
above risk.  As suggested above, the proposed reform will do away with the 
distinction between royalties and business profits.  Presently, royalties are generally 
subject to withholding tax, imposed by reference to rates ranging between 5% and 
30%, depending on whether is a treaty or not, and on the treaty itself.367  Therefore, 
over-taxation may occur because the residence state taxes the enterprise on a net 
basis and may not be able to fully credit the foreign royalty withholding tax.368  A 
base-erosion withholding tax rate, lower than the present royalty withholding tax, 
would thus reduce such over- taxation.369  
7.4.3 Relationship with Free-Trade Agreements  
Another line of criticism advanced against the base-erosion approach, which can 
also apply to the economic threshold approach, concerns the interaction between the 
proposed withholding tax and free trade agreements: 
“…the base-erosion approach…is essentially an indirect tax, which essentially 
creates additional customs duties on all imports of goods and services.  This would 
expose India to intricate issues in relation to the [World Trade Organization]”.370  
The interaction between income tax and free trade agreements is a relatively large 
yet unexplored territory.371  However, it appears that there are some fundamental 
differences between excise or tariff duties, and withholding taxes: 
                                            
367 See e.g. the royalty withholding tax rates under the United States and Australian treaties. 
368 E.g., OECD Software Report, para 40(b).   
369 A high withholding rate imposed under a system modeled on the economic presence approach 
will not achieve this result.  
370 eComTaxpert (2002), p. 11. 
371 For further discussion refer to Warren (2001); Slemond and Avi-Yonah (2002); Rosenbloom 
(1994). 
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“Taxation at source is intended to raise the revenues needed for a government to 
carry on its functions.  Can the same be said about tariffs?  Withholding taxes are 
imposed by reason of the economic nexus between the imposing jurisdiction and 
the income in question, as a surrogate for the net basis residence taxation that is 
deemed impractical with respect to nonresidents.  Can the same be said about 
tariffs?  Even in an imperfect world, withholding taxes will be accorded relief in 
the residence country wither by way of a credit or by exemption of the income in 
question, and treaties may be used to fine tune the system if unilateral rules fail to 
work properly.  Can the same be said about tariffs?”372   
It may be premature to assume that the base-erosion approach will result in excise 
or tariff duties.  Firstly, the proposed withholding tax may not be an excise or a 
tariff to the extent that it is creditable in the residence state.373  Secondly, the 
proposed withholding tax is, in principle, a collection mechanism.  The non-resident 
will be entitled to file a tax return, be taxed on a net basis, and receive a refund of 
the difference between the gross tax collected and the net tax due.374  The fact that it 
will be available (whether exercised or not), may broaden the gap between the 
proposed withholding tax and tariffs to a point where the two cannot be equated.  
Naturally, this particular issue requires further examination, but it appears 
resolvable, especially if bilateral or broader consensus is reached on direct taxation 
and electronic commerce. 
7.5 The Most Difficult Reform Issue - The Business-to-
Consumer Market  
                                            
372 Rosenbloom (1994), p. 597.   
373 Doernberg and Hinnekens (1999), para 16. 
374 Doernberg and Hinnekens (1999), para 16.; Avi-Yonah (1997), p. 540. 
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It was noted many years ago by Adams that “tax should not be assigned to a 
jurisdiction which cannot effectively administer and collect the tax”.375  The base-
erosion approach certainly embraces this view by excluding transactions with 
private consumers, whereas the economic threshold approach does not deal with the 
issue directly.   
However, the ramifications of the exclusion of the business-to-consumer market 
should be considered prior to the implementation of reform, and if necessary, 
solutions enabling collection from private consumers may need to be developed. 
7.5.1 Exclusion of the Business-to-Consumer Market –
Advantages 
The attractive logic of the base-erosion approach is that its focus upon deductible 
payments makes the withholding tax self-enforceable; if tax is not withheld, no tax 
deduction in relation to the payment will be allowed.376  The economic threshold 
approach, by contrast, favors source taxation of all electronic commerce transaction 
once the threshold is met, and does not distinguish between deductible and non-
deductible payments.  Yet the enforcement logic of the base-erosion approach can, 
of course, be incorporated into an economic threshold system to facilitate collection 
(although the gross-sales threshold would probably be lower to compensate for the 
loss of tax revenue from private consumers). 
The exclusion of the private consumption market is in many ways reflective of the 
view adopted by the OECD in relation to the distinction between business profits 
and payments for the use of, or the right to use, a copyright.  As discussed above, 
                                            
375 Adams Thomas S, Interstate and International Double Taxation, in Lectures on Taxation 101, 
(Roswell Magill ed., 1932), p.112, as quoted by Graetz and O’Hear (1997), p. 1101.  
376 Doernberg, Hinnekens, Hellerstein and Li (2001), p. 363. 
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the OECD Commentary distinguishes between private use and commercial 
exploitation of copyright.377  No doubt, the exclusion of the private consumer 
market from the scope of withholding measures, avoids many acute enforcement 
difficulties and promotes simplicity.  
Royalty, interest and dividend withholding taxes have been successfully imposed 
for many years and in many jurisdictions, but the mass electronic commerce 
consumption market (where products are sold to almost all sectors of the 
community) presents a whole new set of challenges.  In principle, private 
consumers have no incentive to collect tax on behalf of their government and will 
not want to be troubled with the liability and compliance issues involved.  This is 
particularly relevant where delivery is digital.  In the absence of intrusive measures, 
the state may not have effective ways to monitor the movement of products.   
The exclusion of the business-to-consumer market was also justified on the basis of 
its relative small size.378  The OECD Business-to-Consumer Report indicates that 
business-to-consumer transactions represent only about 20% of total electronic 
commerce transactions, and that most business-to-consumer commerce takes place 
within the consumer’s own jurisdiction.379   
7.5.2 Exclusion of the Business-to-Consumer Market –
Disadvantages 
The validity of that above ‘small size consumer market’ argument is likely to 
diminish over time.  The business-to-consumer market is expected to grow:  
                                            
377 See text accompanying footnotes 334- 335 above. 
378 Doernberg and Hinnekens (1999), pp. 321-322. 
379 OECD Business-to-Consumer Report, paras 21 and 24. 
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“Business-to-consumer e-commerce may also have not meet the glorious 
predictions of the pundits who rained during the .com bubble, but the fact remains 
that it has grown substantially and it continues to grow at rates unmatched by 
offline commerce”.380   
The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, for example, recently 
reviewed the business-to-consumer electronic commerce market in that country: 
“While the growth of the conventional segments such PC, Books and music was 
rather small, the new segments such as Clothing, Hobbies and miscellaneous 
goods, Travels, Entertainment, Real estate, etc. showed a remarkable growth.  This 
contributed to the expansion of the BtoC market as a whole.  The size of Mobile 
BtoC market is estimated to have reached approximately 120 billion yen in 2001, 
double the size the year-ago level, mostly represented by the digital contents for 
entertainment such as the melody announcing the arrival of mails of cellular 
phones.  The size of BtoC market is predicted to grow to 16 trillion yen in 2006. 
The Mobile BtoC is expected to exceed 3 trillion yen in BtoC market, which will 
be greatly contributed by the expansion of Travels, Entertainment, and Services 
fields both in the mobile and fixed types.”381
 
The real growth is likely to occur in the mass-consumption industries where 
consumption will not be motivated by the fact that the supplier is local, for instance, 
gaming, gambling and entertainment.  The business-to-consumer market is 
estimated to only begin to realize its true potential as technologies, such as security 
of payment, bandwidth, Digital TV and Internet-enabled cellular/mobile devices, 
advance to workable and reasonable levels.382   
                                            
380 Stearns (2002), p. 1. 
381 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2002), p. 1. 
382 See e.g. Cerf (2002); Caswell (2000). 
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If it is accepted that the business-to-consumer is likely to be a significant 
contributor to the base-erosion problem, then its exclusion from treaty reform is 
problematic.  What will happen when the ratio between the business-to-consumer 
and business-to-business markets is not 20%/80, but say, 40%/60%?  The growth of 
the business-to-consumer market will create an ongoing pressure to increase the low 
withholding tax rate imposed on deductible payments (or lower the economic 
threshold) to avoid further erosion of the source state’s revenue base.  Such a 
solution will create an environment of uncertainty where tax rates and fiscal 
limitations are unstable.  Also, a higher withholding tax rate would weaken the 
attractiveness of the base-erosion approach, which relies on a low rate to minimize 
the negative impact of gross taxation. 
Moreover, the exclusion of the business-to-consumer market will undermine 
neutrality.  Tax consequences will be determined by reference to an industry (e.g. 
business consultancy and entertainment), or a product (e.g. accounting software and 
gaming software).  It is thus likely there will be a critical point in time where the 
very rationales supporting the base-erosion approach will mandate taxation at 
source of consumers.  There may be little point in solving existing problems created 
by electronic commerce by paving the way to new problems triggered by the 
exclusion of business-to-consumer transactions..  There is a risk that by deferring 
the issue, the opportunity to address such matters in a coherent and comprehensive 
manner will be limited.  By the time the business-to-consumer market reaches 
critical mass, norms will have been established.  The business community, the 
markets, the consumers and governments that will have already be adjusted to a 
particular system.  Looking at treaty history, conservatism and power of precedent 
that have slowed down treaty development may come into play yet again.   
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Reform which is almost destined to trigger difficult neutrality and distortion issues 
undermining its own rationalization is not good reform.  If there is an opportunity to 
debate and agree on electronic reform in an international forum, the opportunity 
must be seized to reach agreement that will work well in the foreseeable future.  
Such an agreement would need to deal with the difficult issue of collection from 
private consumers.      
7.6 Possible Enforcement Methods 
The obvious way to deal with the issues created by the exclusion of the business-to-
consumer market is to impose the tax on this market we well.  As noted above, 
however, the inclusion of private consumer transactions would be futile if 
enforcement and collection are not effective.  In this regard, three possibilities may 
be explored: (a) international cooperation, (b) self-assessment, and (c) collection 
through financial institutions.  None of them presents an easy and smooth way to 
resolve the issue, but it appears that the latter can form the basis of a workable 
solution. 
7.6.1 International Cooperation 
The inclusion of the business-to-consumer market in electronic commerce treaty 
reform can be possible through unprecedented bilateral or multinational 
cooperation.  The principle is straightforward.  The vendor will indicate in its tax 
return (filed in the residence state) in which states it has made sales, and the 
residence state will then transfer a portion of the tax collected by it to the source 
state.  This basic principle, however, gives rise to two momentous problems.  
Firstly, on what basis will that portion be determined?  There is an ongoing debate 
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of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the arm’s length and the formula 
application approaches.  This is not the place to debate the issue, but the matter is 
extremely complicated, and more relevantly, no consensus appears to be 
forthcoming.383   
 
Secondly, even if a method for dividing the pie is agreed upon in the near future, the 
required degree of cooperation required would probably remain a wishful thinking 
for many years to come.  Multinational cooperation has always been extremely 
limited, and bilateral cooperation has been largely concerned with exchange of 
information under tax treaties.384  States have been traditionally reluctant to collect 
foreign taxes.385  Indeed, assistance in the collection of taxes is not a new concept.  
Such a regime was suggested in 1928 by the League of Nations, when it published 
its first model treaty.386  Not much progress has taken place in this area since then.   
 
The recently-added Article 27 of the OECD Model Treaty, dealing with assistance 
in the collection of taxes, can enhance cooperation.387  However, Article 27 seems 
to be designed to deal with specific instances where assistance in collection is 
required, rather than create an ongoing mutual collection and remittance 
mechanism.388  It seems that states are not ready yet for a broader mutual collection 
regime, although the principle of broader mutual collection has been strongly 
                                            
383 For further discussion on attribution and allocation refer to Hudson and Turner (1984); OECD 
Attribution Report; Baron (2001); Avi-Yonah (2000); Cockfield (1999), pp. 194-197; Doernberg, 
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endorses, especially in the context of electronic commerce.389  Perhaps close 
cooperation will be more feasible where states are closely associated,390 but this 
would probably be the exception rather than the norm in the foreseeable future.   
 
7.6.2 Self-Assessment  
The OECD’s electronic commerce project included a discussion on the difficulties 
associated with the collection of indirect taxes in an electronic commerce 
environment, which is also relevant to direct taxes.391  One of the collection 
methods suggested was the ‘self-assessment’ method.392 Under this method, tax is 
collected directly from the customers through enhanced use of technology.  The 
consumer, for example, would be able to call up on an automated user-friendly 
virtual tax agent ‘working’ for the local tax authority that will calculate and collect 
the tax when the transaction is made.393   
Direct collection from consumers is problematic for two principal reasons: 
inconvenience and lack of incentive (such as deductibility of expenses).  As to 
inconvenience, the process should be exceptionally straightforward; not much more 
complicated then filling in credit card details.  Any complications compromising 
simplicity would also compromise enforcement.   
However, simplicity may address the problem of inconvenience, but not lack of 
incentive.  There seems to be little that governments may do in practice to induce 
                                            
389 See e.g. Australian Taxation Office (1999), paras 6.4.11 – 6.4.26; Canadian EC Committee 
(1998), para. 3.1. 
390 See general discussion in McLure (2001). 
391 OECD Collection Report. 
392 The other methods discussed were ‘trusted third party’, including financial institutions (discussed 
below), and ‘local registration’ and ‘tax at source and transfer’ (which appear less relevant for 
present purposes) – see OECD Collection Report, paras 11-13. 
393 OECD Collection Report, para 10.  See also discussion in Olders and DeVito (1999). 
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consumer to comply.  Governments may try to educate consumers, explaining that 
if not enough tax is collected from non-residents, someone else – the consumers - 
will ultimately have to pay more tax.  Yet education by itself may not solve matters.  
Government may penalize non-compliance, but this could be very unpopular, and 
politically undesirable.  Governments may also grant direct incentives, say a 2% of 
the tax collected as a ‘fee’ payment to the consumer, but some would passionately 
argue that this may create a dangerous precedent; citizens should not be paid a ‘fee’ 
for compliance with the law.  
The ultimate question is whether the vast majority of consumers will cooperate 
solely on the basis of a legal requirement to do so.  Enforcement in the context of 
business-to-consumer is of course not a problem unique to income tax.  It is an issue 
that poses real challenges in the context of indirect taxes as well.394  Much would 
depend on the local compliance culture.  Perhaps the introduction of consumer 
compliance mechanisms in relation to indirect taxes will create a culture of 
compliance and ultimately resolve this difficulty also in relation to direct taxes.395  
It is possible that an extremely simple system will solve many problems, and that 
with the passage of time, the system will be entrenched and people will be used to 
it.  Small businesses have learnt to cope with the introduction of value-added-taxes, 
which in many places was introduced together with unprecedented compliance 
difficulties.  Be that as it may, a culture of self-assessment and compliance is 
presently an assumption on which treaty reform cannot place critical reliance.   
7.6.3 Collection Through Financial Institutions 
                                            
394 See detailed discussion in OECD Collection Report. 
395 Cockfield (1999), p. 203. 
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Another method set out in the OECD Collection Report concerns tax withholding 
by financial institutions.396  The particular model discussed was designed to cater 
the particular needs arising under indirect tax systems, but there is no apparent 
reason why this method could not be modified (and simplified) to facilitate 
collection under a system of direct taxation.  
In the present context, it is submitted that the financial institutions method depends 
on certain assumptions that in practice apply to most (although not all) private 
consumers.  Firstly, private consumers will not pay with cash for electronic 
commerce purchases.  Secondly, private consumers will mostly pay using onshore 
funds held by local financial intuitions.  Thirdly, a low withholding tax will not 
trigger widespread avoidance, since for the vast majority of online consumers, the 
small effort and cost involved would not justify the effort and risk associated with 
non-compliance and tax avoidance.  
In a business-to-consumer transaction, the theory is that the purchaser will be able 
to withhold at the time of transaction (and the vendor will deliver, knowing that tax 
is being withheld at source).  Under a financial institution system, a consumer buys 
a product online, the financial institution is instructed by the consumer to transfer 
funds to a foreign bank account, the financial institution withholds a portion of the 
payment, and the financial institution remits that portion to the relevant tax 
authority.  It is anticipated that the forces of competition will eventually incorporate 
the value of the residence state's tax credit in the price. 
The main advantage of this system is that it significantly reduces the number of tax 
collectors and compliance burden at the consumer level, as it does not require the 
                                            
396 OECD Collection Report, paras 22-32. 
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active involvement of the purchaser.  In practice, the implementation of such a 
method would require the resolution of a broad spectrum of issues, for example: 
Excluded payments - The system will need to identify and properly handle 
payments that are not subject to withholding tax (e.g. a charitable donation or 
the purchase of bonds).  Yet feasible solutions can be found, for example, 
specific refund mechanisms could be implemented.   
Political pressures - Financial institutions may fiercely resist a system that 
renders them tax collectors.  Nonetheless, this is also a resolvable issue if 
governments decide that the tax revenue at stake is considerable.   
Local bank accounts - Non-resident vendors may seek to avoid tax by 
maintaining onshore bank accounts.  However, the local tax authorities should 
be able to monitor such accounts without great difficulties.   
Non-credit card transactions - Consumers could use offshore accounts and 
things like e-cash or e-money to purchase goods and services.397  Yet as noted 
above, it is reasonable to assume that the most consumers would not actively 
engage in tax avoidance or evasion.  The tax amount concerned will relatively 
small, and evasion or avoidance could be subject to penalties.  It would be 
unrealistic to expect full enforcement, but it seems that under this method the 
vast majority of consumers will comply (which compliance may increase with 
improved technologies and perhaps changes in compliance culture also driven 
by indirect taxes).   
                                            
397 See general discussion in e.g. HPC (2000), p. 159-160. 
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Technical and technology difficulties - The system may be simple at the 
consumer level, but it connotes complex arrangements between financial 
institutions and government, refund mechanism, access to information that may 
not be readily available, and sound, secure and stable technologies.  However, 
such issues are, by comparison, not fatal.  They can be resolved by advance 
technologies and the implementation of systems similar to those used to manage 
the collection of value-added taxes.   
Overall, this method seems to make the inclusion of the business-to-consumer 
feasible, and it can be implemented without reliance on unrealistic levels of 
international cooperation or consumer compliance.  In addition, it may be possible 
to extend this method to deductible payments by businesses to streamline and 
simplify collection. 
7.7 Sharing the Electronic Commerce Revenue - The 'Rough 
and Ready' Solution  
The final question, which is not directly addressed by the reform approaches 
examined above, is about revenue allocation.  To what extent should the source 
state be compensated due to the growth of electronic commerce?  This is an 
involved question which concerns the treaty policy and fiscal issues discussed 
above, and perhaps more so, a complex web of hard and practical revenue, 
economic and political considerations.  Be that as it may, it is important in this final 
part to consider this question against the issues examined above and suggest a 
viable solution that accords with the conclusions developed in this paper.     
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There seems to be an assumption that if electronic commerce erodes the source 
state’s revenue base, treaty reform should seek to preserve or otherwise restore that 
revenue base.  The Indian High Powered Commission, for example, contended: 
“The Committee is firmly of the view that maintenance of existing equilibrium 
between residence and source taxation is crucial to prevent shrinking of the tax 
base in source countries and has to be an important component of the policy 
relating to taxation of e-commerce in India”.398   
However, the preservation of existing revenue equilibriums may not be assumed as 
a reform objective.  This matter should be examined at policy and practical levels.  
At the policy level, a tax treaty is not some form of revenue assurance against 
economic changes, and more importantly, the residence state’s arguments discussed 
above, although not prevailing, have merit.  Both the residence and source states 
have strong assertions to electronic commerce income, which entails a balanced 
approach to reform.  Thus, having regard to the above fiscal claims, the residence 
state should not be fully entitled to the revenue shifted its way as a result of 
electronic commerce; however, the source state cannot rightfully suggest that the 
pre-electronic commerce tax base should be fully preserved.   
At the end of the day, a tax treaty is a bargain, and the ability of a party to secure 
additional benefits at the expense of another is not necessarily unfair.  The question 
is one of degree.  No reform may be viable if the revenue affected by electronic 
commerce is fully allocated to one of the states concerned.  The source and 
residence states may need to acknowledge that the revenue division issue may only 
be resolved by the core principle of tax treaties, namely, by compromise.   
                                            
398 HPC (2000), p. 58.   
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At the practical level, it must be appreciated that the consent of both states is 
required to bring about changes.  True, the source state has the ability to implement 
unilateral measures, but the residence state does not have to cooperate, and it can 
refuse, for example, to grant relief by way of credit or exemption.  One-sided 
proposals would be unlikely to succeed.399   
 
Since it is difficult, if not practically impossible, to determine whose claim is 
stronger in any given set of circumstances, equal sharing arrangements of electronic 
commerce tax revenue may make sense, at least as a general proposition.  An equal 
division of revenue and has been suggested in the past in relation to business 
profits.  Putting aside the merit of the proposal in the context of sale of goods, the 
point is that such an arbitrary division may be an appropriate 'rough and ready' 
resolution to a complicated issue that cannot be addressed in precise terms: 
 
“It cannot convincingly be denied that providing a market contributes to the sales 
income at least to some extent as providing the goods does.  There is no valid 
objection, therefore, against a claim of the sales state to tax part of the sales 
income.  Of course, how much is contributed to the income by providing a market 
cannot be measured exactly…Taxing half the sales margin in the state of sales - or 
equivalently, applying half of the normal tax rate – would seem adequate”.400
 
It is difficult to ascertain whether a 10% royalty withholding tax rate results on an 
overall equal sharing of revenue, but in principle, there is no apparent reason a 
similar concept should not work well in relation to electronic commerce.  Each state 
                                            
399 See e.g. discussion in Cockfield (1999); McLure (2000);  Forst (1997);  
400 Vogel (1988), p. 401.  
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would protect half of what it regards as its electronic commerce revenue.  The 
inaccurate nature of such a solution may be compensated by greater simplicity.  
Essentially, the compromised suggested is an application of the ‘division of the tax’, 
method considered by the four economists.  As noted above, the economists noted 
its attractive simplicity but rejected it for two reasons.401   The first concerned 
certain practical difficulties, but these would be rather insignificant in modern 
times: access to information, at least in a treaty context, is feasible, and taxpayers 
have in general accurate information on their foreign income and foreign taxes 
liabilities.  The second reason raised by the economists was the arbitrary nature of 
this method:  
 
“A particular country A may be much more concerned in its relations with the rest 
of the world as a country where origin predominates and residence is unimportant 
than a country B which, in its relations with the rest of the world, is predominantly 
a country of residence and only to a lesser extent a country of origin.  Thus the 
proportion presenting a true compromise for country A and the rest of the world 
may be adopted which is inappropriate for the relations of country B to the rest of 
the world”.402
 
This reason is not without merit, but then again, the alternative is to favor one state 
over the other where the respective fiscal assertions are both strong.  As argued 
above, there are compelling policy and practical reasons to adopt a compromise.  
Moreover, as most states will both win and lose as a result of electronic commerce, 
a compromise may address to some extent the concerns raised by the economists 
and also provide some ‘hedging comfort’ to many states.   
                                            
401 See text accompanying footnotes 260-261 above.   
402 League of Nations 1923 Report, p. 46. 
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 At the end of the day, since one-sided solutions will be fraught with difficulties, the 
likelihood of reaching an international norm on electronic commerce may 
significantly increase if it is agreed that an arbitrary but equal division of tax should 
apply. 
 
This solution can be incorporated into both reform options examined in this paper.  
The economic threshold method and base-erosion methods might have been 
promoted to maintain the existing revenue equilibriums, but an arrangement 
whereby the states equally share the revenue can be readily incorporated into both 
approaches.  Whatever the gross taxation or net taxation liability may be, the tax 
rates applied at source should be halved.   
 
7.8 Reform Proposals - Summary 
The above reform proposals are based upon two conclusions that emerged from 
previous discussions.  Firstly, the permanent establishment concept cannot 
satisfactory deal with electronic commerce.  Secondly, the distinction between 
business profits and royalties should be abolished.   
Treaty reform should deal with is the potential reallocation of revenue caused by 
electronic commerce.  The reform discussion indicates that such reallocation does 
not mean that the source state should be fully compensated, through treaty reform, 
for the lost revenue.  Rather, the source state and the residence state may reach a 
middle-ground compromise based upon the ‘division of tax’ method.   
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The main issue examined is how to tax electronic commerce transactions.  The 
economic threshold approach seeks to replace the physical threshold with an 
economic threshold, but its operation depends on unrealistic disclosure and 
compliance by non-residents, which require the problematic imposition of excessive 
withholding tax to induce non-residents to lodge returns.  The base-erosion 
approach, on the other hand, does away with the notion of threshold, and is based 
on the imposition of low withholding tax, thereby minimizing the negative effects 
of gross taxation.  Accordingly, the base-erosion approach presents a better and 
viable option for treaty reform.   
The main difficulty triggered by the application of withholding tax (high or low) is 
the inability to effectively induce tax withholding at source by private consumers.  
The base-erosion approach avoids this problem by targeting deductible payments.  
However, the exclusion of private consumers is likely to give rise to difficulties 
associated with neutrality, further revenue reallocation, and fairness.   Thus, reform 
must be based on a broad version of the base-erosion approach, which does not 
differentiate between business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions.   
The business-to-consumer market can be targeted through unprecedented 
international cooperation, self-assessment (and compliance), or the shifting of the 
compliance burden to a small number of entities that are involved almost all 
electronic commerce transactions, namely financial institutions.  The first two 
methods are unlikely to result in concrete collection results.  The third method will 
give rise to difficulties, but these are not fatal; they appear resolvable.  Overall, it 
seems that this method can be developed into a viable and workable collection 
mechanism, applying to non-deductible (as well as deductible) payments. 
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 8 CONCLUSION 
The interaction between electronic commerce involves new commercial mediums 
based on new technologies and intangibility creating new business models, and tax 
treaties, which are fiscal arrangements allocating taxing rights between two states 
on the basis of rules and methods forged after the First World War.  The interaction 
triggers intricate and fundamental questions.  
 
The conceptual bases of international taxation warrant source taxation of non-
residents without physical presence in the source state.  Electronic commerce 
particularly strengthens the connecting factors between the source state and the non-
residents because the source state also provides the intellectual property protection 
required to maintain the commercial value of the subject matter of electronic 
commerce transactions.  
 
Tax treaties are primarily designed to limit the state’s broad fiscal limits defined by 
the conceptual bases of international taxation.  Part of the compromise is the 
requirement that the business profits of a non-resident be untaxed by the source 
state unless the non-resident has a permanent establishment there, which requires 
physical presence or dependant agency.  Royalties, by contrast, are taxed under 
most treaties by the source state even if the non-resident has no permanent 
establishment there.  The interaction of electronic commerce with tax treaties 
provokes a range of important questions concerning the suitability of present 
arrangements and their ability to attain underlying policy objectives.   
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The OECD has reviewed existing treaty rules and examined the relationships 
between electronic commerce and the permanent establishment concept, and 
electronic commerce and income categorisation.  The OECD has confirmed the 
prevailing view that, without more, a website cannot constitute a permanent 
establishment since a permanent establishment is not a ‘fixed place of business’ nor 
is it a person.  In addition, the OECD has outlined a set of guidelines to clarify the 
increasingly vague line between business profits and royalties.  The OECD has 
indicated its intention to review the ‘broad and ultimate more important’ issues in 
relation to the permanent establishment concept, but not in relation to income 
characterisation.  It is nonetheless contended above that income characterisation 
also requires a close examination of ‘broad and ultimately more important’ policy 
issues.  This paper thus examines in detail the rationales and operation of the 
permanent establishment concept and income characterisation in the electronic 
commerce context. 
This paper concludes that the interaction between the permanent establishment 
concept and electronic commerce requires treaty reform: 
1) The fiscal assertion of the source state over remote vendors is stronger in the 
electronic commerce context as the source state supplies the 
telecommunications infrastructure, the market and the legal protections 
critical to electronic commerce.   
2) Integrity and neutrality are compromised in circumstances where a non-
resident is subject to source taxation on the basis of dependant agency 
permanent establishment but websites that perform similar functions do not 
attract source taxation. 
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3) Although there are similarities between traditional remote business mediums 
and the Internet, the differences are much greater, mainly because the 
Internet is a much more powerful commercial medium.   
4) The world has experienced other economic changes, which did not bring 
about treaty reform, but electronic commerce is different in that it does not 
represent investment in physical assets, which was central to many such 
previous changes.   
5) The compromise marked by the operation of the permanent establishment 
concept reflects the economic realties that surrounded the origin of tax 
treaties in the late 19th century and early 20th century.  At those times, the 
source state concession was not significant as the ability to generate income 
abroad without a permanent establishment or agency was limited.  Times 
have changed, and the growth of electronic commerce can render the source 
state’s concession overly generous, which generosity may not be only 
unintended, but also unacceptable.   
6) If no action is taken at the international level, action is likely to be taken at 
the state level in the form of self-help measures, which would give rise to 
double taxation, and undermine tax treaties and the relative coherence in 
international taxation.   
7) Viable reform must be supported by effective enforcement mechanisms. 
The examination of the interaction between electronic commerce and income 
characterisation also indicates that reform is warranted.  There should not be any 
distinction between business profits and royalties in the electronic commerce 
context.  A unified electronic commerce regime applying to electronic commerce 
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transactions appears more appropriate.  This conclusion is supported on a number of 
grounds. 
1) The distinction between business profits and royalties is a subset of the  
‘classification and assignment of income’ method.  This method was chosen 
for practical and political reasons, rather than for sound policy reasons.   
2) The history of the distinction between business profits and royalties turns 
upon an ongoing tension between source and residence states in relation to 
the treatment of royalties.  Developed states traditionally advocated 
exclusive residence taxation, whereas developing states traditionally 
advocated for royalty withholding tax.   
3) the reasons that have always justified source taxation of royalties now 
supports source taxation of business profits generated through electronic 
commerce.  The source state fulfills a crucial role in protecting the value of 
the underlying property and the rights granted, and thus deserves substantial 
taxing rights.  The source state does not fulfill such a crucial role in relation 
to traditional business profits arising from the remote sale of goods, but in 
the context of electronic commerce, digitization renders business profits 
subject to similar dependency on local intellectual property rights.   
4) The operation of the distinction between business profits and royalties in the 
electronic commerce context is becoming increasingly artificial.  The OECD 
Characterisation Report outlined guidelines to clarify matters, but these very 
guidelines demonstrate how problematic the distinction is.  The guidelines 
give rise to serious compliance expectations, which can be avoided if private 
consumption is excluded from the scope of the royalty provisions.  This 
 153
marks a significant departure from the language of the provisions, exceeding 
the boundaries of treaty interpretation and effectively setting new rules.  In 
addition, the approach adopted requires legal and factual analysis of 
contractual provisions and factual settings, which may be complex in 
practice.  The OECD Characterisation Report went to great length to discuss 
guidelines that may or may not accord with treaty provisions, but did not 
address or discuss underlying policy.   
5) The distinction between business profits and royalties is harmful in that it 
undermines the policy objectives that the OECD itself considered important 
to electronic commerce, namely neutrality, efficiency, certainty, simplicity 
and fairness.  These policy objectives can only be advanced by the 
elimination of the cause, i.e., the distinction itself. 
On the basis of the above, it is suggested that treaty reform should be pursued in 
accordance with the following recommendations: 
1) Reform should be confined to electronic commerce.  Broader reform nay be 
necessary, but it should not be driven by electronic commerce. 
2) The source state should not be fully compensated for the revenue loss 
caused by electronic commerce.  It must be recognized that the residence 
state maintains strong fiscal assertions in relation to the revenue concerned.  
One-sided solutions favoring the claims of only one of the two states 
concerned may not be realistically achievable.  An equal division of tax 
between the states may be more acceptable.  It is arbitrary, but overall fair.  
It will also promote simplicity and certainty. 
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3) The base-erosion approach appears more appropriate than the economic 
threshold approach as it does not require the imposition of high withholding 
tax, which would result in difficult compliance requirements and enable the 
source state to collect excessive tax revenue.   
4) Withholding tax, whether high or low, can give rise to difficulties, such as 
the potential inability to access relief from double taxation and interaction 
with trade agreements.  However, since the tax is subject to relief from 
double taxation and since the non-resident has the ability to be taxed on a 
net basis, those issues are can be effectively resolved if an international 
consensus is achieved.   
5) The most significant drawback of the base-erosion approach is that it 
excludes the business-to-consumer market.  The reason behind the exclusion 
is compelling.  The focus on deductible payments makes the tax self-
enforceable, which avoids the difficulties associates with the collection of 
the tax from private consumers.  However, this exclusion is bound to 
undermine neutrality, simplicity and fairness, and will eventually require 
adjustments to compensate for further erosion.   
 
6) Three methods to deal with the business-to-consumer market were 
examined.  The first is based on an unprecedented degree of international 
cooperation; the second on an unprecedented compliance by private 
consumers.  At present, these methods cannot be relied upon to implement 
reform.  The third method concerns collection through financial institutions.  
It poses certain difficulties, but these can be addressed.  This method may 
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thus form the basis upon which a viable and effective collection mechanism 
could operate. 
 
Seligman once noted that taxation often involves “a rather simple theoretical 
problem and many very difficult practical problems”.403  The operation of bilateral 
tax treaties in the electronic commerce context reinforces the point.  The difficulties 
discussed above can be nonetheless addressed, provided that the reform process 
follows the correct and logical sequence and starts at core principles.  Solutions to 
the practical problems could promote underlying objectives if those solutions are 
developed on the basis of a comprehensive consideration of fiscal and treaty policy 
issues.   
 
This paper applies this methodology by examining the interaction between tax 
treaties and electronic commerce at policy and practical levels, and by making 
proposals based on the results of that examination.  It is argued that the proposals 
made above would make tax treaties more responsive to technological changes, and 
thus enable tax treaties to remain effective and meaningful fiscal arrangements as 
the economic changes brought about by new technologies continue to emerge.  
                                            
403 Seligman (1921), p. 124. 
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